

# OHSU CAMPUS SAFETY REVIEW TASKFORCE



DAY AND DATE	START TIME	END TIME	LOCATION	NEXT MEETING DATE	START TIME	END TIME
Monday, January 25, 2021	11:00am	12:30pm	WebEx	Monday, February 8, 2021	11:00am	12:30pm

**Members:** Alisha Moreland-Capuia, Dana Bjarnason, Michael Alexander, Elena Andresen, Peter Barr-Gillespie, Amela Blekic, Pam Brown, Alice Cuprill-Comas, Derick Du Vivier, Dana Ghazi, Phil Gordon, Sam Habibi, Raphaela Haessler, Nancy Haigwood, Daniel Haupt, Anne Horgan, Ian Jaquiss, Megan Jones, Jonathan Jui, Adreana Kusaba, Amanda Macy, Greg Moawad, Sarah Owens, Scott Page, Lisa Reynolds, Jane Russell, Holden Sanders, Helen Schuckers, Violet Trammel, Lawrence Williams, Judi Workman, Susan Yoder

**Guest and Staff:** Ellie Boggs, Susanne Bolotow, Heath Kula, Krista Klinkhammer, Kathleen McFall, Michelle Schleich

TIME ALLOTTED	TOPIC AND PRESENTER	DESCRIPTION ACTION TO BE TAKEN/SUMMARY OF ITEM
11:00 - 11:02am	<b>Brief Mindfulness Exercise</b> <i>Alisha Moreland-Capuia</i>	
11:02 - 11:10am	<b>Summary From Last Meeting And Requests For Further Information Made, Brief Reminder Of Charter</b> - to keep us oriented to the mission <i>Alisha Moreland-Capuia</i> <i>Dana Bjarnason</i>	<p><b>Info Request</b> - Chains of escalation within the different departments or de-escalation procedures that are in place? <a href="#">Attachment 1 - OHSU Healthcare Chain of Resolution_HC-GOV-100-POL Rev. 032019</a></p> <p><b>Info Request</b> - Review statistics around code greens and other codes <a href="#">Attachment 2 - Code Green Clinical Force Stats</a></p> <p><a href="#">Attachment 3 - Culture of Safety Oversight Committee Charter</a> - Group taking the lead on OHSU's chain of resolution policy <a href="#">Attachment 4 - CBCC Roadmap</a> <a href="#">Attachment 5 - Cognitive Behavioral Care Committee Charter</a></p> <p><b>Info Request</b> - Data around interactions between public safety and individuals with ESL created Findings - No Data exist</p> <p><b>Info Request</b> - Review breakdown of demographics of OHSU members and hospital responses/breakdown <a href="#">Attachment 6 - Ethnicity Breakdown</a></p> <p>Table that shows CY19 OHSU Healthcare, OHSU Adult Inpatients, OHSU Adult Ambulatory as well as July 18 City of Portland/State of Portland. No data could be found on the breakdown of incidents have occurred (Hill vs South Waterfront vs West) as well as a record around procedural interaction between nurses, social workers, and public safety.</p>
11:10 - 11:25am	<b>Critical Incident Committee (CIC) Presentation and Discussion</b> <i>Pam Brown</i> <i>Daniel Haupt</i>	<a href="#">Attachment 7 - CIC Charter</a>
11:25 - 11:40am	<b>Treat Assessment Team (TAT) Presentation and Discussion</b> <i>Greg Moawad</i> <i>Susan Yoder</i>	<a href="#">Attachment 8 - TAT Charter</a>

11:40 - 12:00pm	<b>Cliff Note Summary Of 2018 Task Force Recommendations</b> <i>Heath Kula</i>	<a href="#">Attachment 9 - Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Recommendations</a>
12:00 - 12:25pm	<b>Standing Items - Discussion/Questions/Comments</b> <i>All</i>	What information will the Taskforce require in order to offer feedback on a way forward
12:25 - 12:30pm	<b>Standing Items - Closing Thoughts/Action Item Review</b> <i>All</i>	



OHSU HEALTHCARE

Chain of Resolution

Doc. #: HC-GOV-100-POL Rev. 032019	Category: Governing Body	
Origination Date: 11/2015	Effective Date: 03/20/2019	Next Review Date: 03/20/2022
Reviser (Title): RA Program Manager	Owner (Title): CNE/CMO	

**PURPOSE:** This policy describes processes utilized by OHSU Healthcare when seeking collaborative resolution to conflict or concerns in the clinical setting.

**OUT OF SCOPE:**

Emergent clinical situations: Response Times for Text paging for Patient Care Purposes (HC-PCM-208-PRO), the Rapid Response Team (HC-PC-159-RR), the Internal Rapid Response (in the Emergency Department), the Administrator on Duty (AOD), Public Safety (x44444), or the Emergency Medical System (call 911) should be accessed to respond to emergent clinical situations.

**PERSONS AFFECTED:**

This policy applies to all OHSU Healthcare workforce members.

**POLICY:**

OHSU commits to achieving a culture of safety by establishing communication practice expectations for all team members in order to identify and collaboratively resolve safety concerns.

**DEFINITIONS:**

- ARCC:** ARCC is a four-step process that guides direct, respectful escalation of patient safety concerns between team members. In situations of perceived hierarchal differences, fear of being seen as incompetent or anticipating resistance, it can take courage to even communicate in a “hint-n-hope” approach. Using the first three steps, ARC, is effective in facilitating a collaborative, face-to-face resolution of a concern. If collaborative resolution cannot be achieved using ARC, then the team members should activate the Chain of Resolution resources.
  - A:** Ask a Question
  - R:** Make a Request
  - C:** Express Concern
  - C:** Chain of Resolution
- Chain of Resolution:** Provides a safety net by specifying the levels of resources to provide assistance in addressing difficulties that cannot be resolved by usual actions, procedures, or collaboration. The two team members with the conflict remain engaged in the dialogue and decision-making until they jointly agree upon a resolution (Rosenstein, Dinklin, & Muro, 2014).
- Collaborative Resolution:** The criteria for achieving a collaborative resolution are;
  - a. The aims of every party are focused on a clearly identified common cause or need;
  - b. The vision of what is desired is clear with defined decision-making parameters;



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- c. Each stakeholder reports that his or her concerns have been included in the team decision-making process (Bleich, 1995).
4. **Conflict:** An individual's response to holding differing opinions about beliefs, needs, interests or values than other individuals.
5. **Culture of Safety:** A work environment that recognizes patient care safety and quality is based on teamwork, communication, and collaboration and so incentivizes escalating safety concerns, reporting of errors, identifying systems issues, and any behaviors that promote these key cultural components.
6. **Emergent Patient Problem:** The patient's condition is actively deteriorating and requires immediate additional clinical team resources.
7. **Mutual Respect:** Interpersonal behavior that supports a positive work environment in which all health care workers can provide high quality care and enjoy coming to work together (e.g. courtesy, listening, prompt & direct feedback, clear communication) (Kaplan, 2010).
8. **OHSU Healthcare Workforce Members:** Persons who perform work for or on behalf of OHSU Healthcare: all employees (faculty, represented, unclassified administrative and other categories), registered and visiting students, volunteers, board members, visiting healthcare practitioners, contracted nonpermanent individuals, vendors while doing business with OHSU Healthcare, and others who work for or on behalf of OHSU Healthcare.
9. **Patient Safety Intelligence Reports (PSI):** PSI, the OHSU event reporting system, do not take the place of using ARCC for immediate concerns. PSIs should be completed at an appropriate time following resolution to identify trends and larger systems concerns.

**KEY WORDS:** Emergent Situation, Conflict, Problem-Solving, Culture of Safety, Safety, ARCC, Resolution, PSI

#### **RESPONSIBILITIES:**

All OHSU Healthcare workforce members are responsible to assure effective communication that creates a well understood plan of care by the patient, family and team, enhances the safe practice of other team members, and reduces risk and prevents the chances of inevitable errors becoming consequential and injuring patients or staff (Leonard, Graham & Bonacu, 2004). It is the responsibility of all OHSU Healthcare workforce members to understand this policy and to utilize the process it describes.

#### **POLICY REQUIREMENTS:**

##### **Background:**

Errors arising from miscommunication among healthcare professionals have been identified as the second highest contributor to sentinel events in the United States, causing an estimated 210,000–440,000 patient deaths in 2013 (Ellison, 2015). Faulty communication occurs most often in situations of unilateral decision making, defensiveness, and disregard for another's perspective. Collaboration, mutual respect, clear communication, and teamwork are necessary to achieve a culture of safety, particularly with the complex patient population cared for at OHSU and the complex team relationships in an academic healthcare center (Quan, 2013).

1. **Resolution of conflicts about immediate safety concerns**
  - a. Communication Practice Guidelines:



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### Chain of Resolution

- i. When any patient, family member, and/or team member identifies a safety concern, nonstandard work, or ineffective communication, every team member is expected to speak up and engage in collaborative resolution:
  1. At the level closest to the concern or issue
  2. In real-time so no one will suffer, be placed at risk, receive substandard care or remain in an unsafe environment
  3. Using the first three steps of ARCC provides a guide for respectful escalation of concerns
    - A: Ask a Question
    - R: Make a Request
    - C: Express Concerns
- ii. Through an open exchange of diverse information and perspectives
- iii. With a commitment to promoting positive relationships while collaborating in decision-making.
- b. All team members are responsible to respect and consider the concerns of another team member when voiced. Hearing another team member Ask a Question, Make a Request, and Express Concerns is a signal to stop and engage in a collaborative discussion that includes:
  - i. Confirming understanding of the other team member's concerns about safety
  - ii. Sharing your rationale or clinical decision making for management of the safety risk(s)
  - iii. Verifying that each team members knows and agrees with the plan including goals and timelines for problem resolution if relevant (*"We are all in the same movie, no surprises"*- Leonard, 2004).
- c. The fourth step, the Chain of Resolution is accessed when one team member decides that a safety issue cannot be resolved directly with another team member and additional resources are needed achieve collaborative resolution. [Appendix 1].
  - i. Team members are responsible to promote safe and consistent patient care and healthy work environment 7 days a week, 24 hours a day.
  - ii. All members of the health care team have a duty and should not hesitate to advocate for resolving issues through the chain of resolution, even when they are not sure they are correct in their concerns. ***Silence is not an option.***
- d. The person who identified the issue that was not resolved with ARC, is responsible to escalate to appropriate stakeholder in the chain of resolution with a concise and comprehensive statement of the concern using Situation Background Assessment Recommendation.
- e. The first in line leader will support navigation of engagement of other stakeholders in the chain of resolution.
  - i. The Administrator on Duty (AOD) is available in real time to assist with escalation along nursing and interdisciplinary chain of resolution
  - ii. The Physician on Duty (POD) is available in real time to assist with escalation along provider chain of resolution
- f. Examples when any team member may activate the chain of resolution include the following:
  - i. Reluctance or refusal to answer questions in face-to-face discussions or by refusing to respond to phone calls or pages
  - ii. Unresolved disagreement among team members about a patient's treatment plan, staffing resources, system or process barriers impacting level of care (e.g. acute care versus critical care) or supplies/equipment.



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**Chain of Resolution**

- iii. Attending or covering physician/LIP has not responded within 30 minutes to address a significant change in the patient’s condition but the RRT is not warranted.
  - iv. Actual or escalating behaviors or practice variations that pose a threat to the safety of the patient, staff, visitor, family, etc.
  - v. A delay in treatment or care that places the patient’s recovery or safety at risk.
  - vi. Unresolved environmental, equipment or system issues that pose a risk to the patient or a team member.
  - vii. Unresolved issues despite a - stakeholder in the sequential chain of resolution declaring the issue resolved
  - viii. Impairment of a care provider including fatigue, loss of equanimity (objectivity and emotionality), loss of situational awareness, practices outside scope of practice or compliance, or escalating patient volume/needs in comparison to available resources.
  - g. If personnel in the Chain of Resolution do not respond, progress to the next level of assistance until resolution is accomplished.
  - h. Immediate risks to the safety of patients or staff must be resolved within two hours. Timeliness of response in these situations can be less, but not more, than is specified by the chain of resolution steps
  - i. Documentation of collaborative resolution involving patients; includes:
    - i. Each clinician will communicate his or her clinical judgment and/or changes in the patient’s plan of care in the EHR
    - ii. Communicate adverse events, systems issues, and /or practices inconsistent with standards/policies through the PSI system.
    - iii. If the Chain of Resolution was accessed, document team relationships, decision-making, and responsiveness in the Chain of Resolution Debrief Form.
2. Resolution of team member conflicts outside of immediate patient care concerns
- a. Communication Practice Guideline
    - i. Team members are responsible for speaking up when the actions, attitudes or behaviors of others threaten the maintenance of a culture of safety.
    - ii. Individuals involved in the conflict are expected to apply communication tactics that promote a balance of open & honest expression & listening to achieve a productive conversation about differences.
    - iii. As appropriate, resolution will be communicated via OHSU huddle structure and patient safety incident reporting

<b>Open and Honest Expression</b>	<b>Listening</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State your intention</li> <li>• Describe observable data/behavior</li> <li>• Describe the outcome or impact</li> <li>• Make a request or proposal</li> <li>• Listen to the person’s response</li> <li>• Thank the person for being open &amp; listening</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Invite/welcome the information</li> <li>• Expand understanding, ask the speaker to say more</li> <li>• Summarize</li> <li>• Reflect on new information</li> <li>• Ask what she/he needs to go forward</li> <li>• Thank the speaker for letting your know</li> </ul>



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### Chain of Resolution

- b. The Chain of Resolution is accessed when one team member decides a culture of safety issue cannot be resolved directly with another team member and additional resources are needed achieve collaborative resolution.

Administrative & Clinical Chain of Resolution:

Department Manager/Supervisor → Department or Division Director → Vice President

Provider chain of resolution:

Intern → Resident → Senior Resident → Fellow → attending → Medical Director of Service → Chief Medical Officer.A

Advanced Provider (nurse practitioner/physician assistant) → Attending

House officer (resident/fellow) → attending → program director → division/department chair → Chief Medical Officer

For non-house Officer LIPs:


APP → attending → division/department chair → Chief Medical Officer

- c. Examples when the chain of resolution may be activated by any team member include the following:
- i. Communication patterns that are a barrier to good teamwork.
  - ii. Unresolved disagreements between supervisors and direct reports about performance issues.
  - iii. Ongoing environmental, equipment or system issues.
- d. If personnel in the Chain of Resolution do not respond, progress to the next level of assistance until resolution is accomplished.
- e. Resolution of matters requiring investigation, validation and/or deliberation may take longer therefore a time frame of ten working days is expected.



- A: Ask a Question
- R: Make a Request
- C: Express Concern
- C: Chain of Resolution

### Chain of Resolution



Use judgment in determining which resources to access, in what order, etc. to support collaborative decision making

#### RELEVANT REFERENCES:

- Bleich, M. R. (1995). Institutional factors in paradigm change. *Family Systems Medicine*, 13, 319-325.
- Kaplan, K., Mestel, P., & Feldman, D.L (2010). Creating a culture of mutual respect. *AORN Journal*, 9, (4), 495-510.
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- Leonard, M., Graham, S. & Bonacu, D. (2004). The human factor: the critical importance of effective teamwork and communication in providing safe care. *Quality and Safety in Health Care*, 13(Suppl 1):i85-i90. doi: 10.1136/qshc.2004.010033
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- Rosenstein, A.H., Dinklin, S.P., & Munro, J. (2014). Conflict resolution: Unlocking the key to success. Nursing Management, 45, (10), 35-39.
- The Joint Commission. Advancing effective communication, cultural competence, and patient- and family-centered care: a roadmap for hospitals. 2010. Available at: <http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/ARoadmapforHospitalsfinalversion727.pdf>

**RELATED DOCUMENTS/EXTERNAL LINKS:**

- Code of Conduct
- Rapid Response Team Activation
- Texting Policy
- Conflict Management for Healthcare Leaders

**APPROVING COMMITTEE(S):**

- COSOC
- SOC
- Professional Board
- OHSU Healthcare Administrative Team

**REVISION HISTORY** (Revision history – brief description of change, triennial review, regulatory update, replaced policy statement, etc.)

**Revision History Table**

Document Number and Revision Level	Final Approval by	Date	Brief description of change/revision



	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020	2020
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	All
<b>Total:</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>352</b>
MNP 4N PACU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**Clinical Force** (Directed by healthcare staff for the purposes of pt's medical care such as restraints, medication, seclusion, return of hold patients, etc.)

OHS (South hospital) (except all units below)	4	3	9	1	1	3	2	3	3	0	3	4	36
5A/C	0	1	0	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	3	11
13A	2	0	0	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	8	3	24
14C	1	0	0	1	1	1	2	3	1	0	0	0	10
KPV	3	3	2	2	1	2	0	0	1	0	2	2	18
6B OBS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adult & Peds EDs & 8TH FLOOR OBS	28	18	32	29	39	29	27	30	28	28	23	21	332
PEDS- DCH (except 9N)	1	3	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	9
9N	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	7	2	0	0	2	15

**Attempted (Unsuccessful) Elopements** Public Safety call volume (pts on NMI or medical holds). Pt intent (physical or verbal) + Public Safety Intervention

OHS (South hospital) (except all units below)	1	0	3	0	4	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	16
5A/C	2	0	4	5	0	0	1	9	4	0	0	4	29
13A	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	4	10
14C	1	1	0	2	0	1	1	3	3	3	3	4	22
KPV	1	3	1	2	2	5	0	1	0	0	0	1	16
6B OBS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adult ED & 8TH FLOOR OBS	14	4	11	6	3	4	4	4	11	12	5	9	87
Peds ED	0	1	0	0	2	1	2	4	1	1	1	0	13
PEDS- DCH (except 9N)	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	6
9N	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	7

**Completed (Successful) Elopements** Public Safety call volume (pts on NMI or medical holds). Pt off OHSU property/unable to locate





## Culture of Safety Oversight Committee (COSOC) Charter

<b>Committee Name</b>	Culture of Safety Oversight Committee
<b>Review Date</b>	Created January 2015; last update December 17, 2020
<b>Purpose Statement</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Develop organizational action plans to address common themes identified in the regularly conducted safety and engagement surveys</li> <li>2) Develop strategies to address the intersection between employee health &amp; resilience, engagement &amp; and a culture of safety             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Collaborate and coordinate with Wellness Survey action plans to increase occupational health and promote a healthy work environment</li> <li>b. Adopt and apply Occupational Health and Resilience Engineering research and evidence</li> <li>c. Adopt and apply IHI Joy in Work framework and evidence</li> </ol> </li> <li>3) Develop strategies to address the intersection between dynamic work system conditions and patient safety             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Collaborate with Research and Operational informatics teams to develop capacity for early recognition of differences between work as imagined in hospital policies and work as done at the sharp end of healthcare delivery, as early signs of work system strain and elevated risk of safety events</li> </ol> </li> <li>4) Develop strategies to communicate with stakeholders regarding safety initiatives             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Patient Safety Incident reporting and trends</li> <li>b. Readiness huddles</li> <li>c. Good Catch stories</li> <li>d. Employee survey participation and results</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>Customer</b>	Patients & families, employees, OHSU Management System Governance Council (OMG), suppliers/owners
<b>Scope</b>	OHSU Clinical Healthcare
<b>Decision Making Authority</b>	<p>COSOC has the authority to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– review safety, quality and engagement reports</li> <li>– assess and evaluate conformity to standards/target</li> <li>– assess risk</li> <li>– evaluate effectiveness of actions in coordination with other stakeholders and committees whose work intersects with culture of safety development</li> <li>– approve and/or request revisions to action plans</li> </ul>

## ***Culture of Safety Oversight Committee (COSOC) Charter***

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– make recommendations to OMG</li> <li>– escalate concerns to OMG</li> <li>– request resources, not limited to environmental and infrastructure changes and additional equipment, supplies, clinical technology, information, training, staff, expertise, and/or senior leadership action, from OMG</li> </ul>
<b>Decision Making Process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approve plans and reports</li> <li>• Determine conformity to standards/target and assess risk based on an established framework</li> <li>• Request corrective action plans, approve corrective action plans, and assess adherence to corrective action plans</li> <li>• Establish regular bi-directional communication channels with others groups that are impacted by or aligned with the work of COSOC</li> <li>• Escalate concerns when there are serious safety issues or significant gaps in performance</li> </ul> <p>Decision-making by consensus can be completed during the meeting or electronically and recorded in the minutes.</p>
<b>Membership</b>	<p>Executive Sponsor: Chief Nurse Executive Dana Bjarnason</p> <p>Chair/Co-chairs: Michael Rennick and Patrick Vogelsong</p> <p>Voting Members: Representatives from medical staff, nursing, quality, safety, communications, human resources, professional/support services, patient, volunteer services</p> <p>Terms of Service: Not defined</p> <p>Administrative Resource: Executive assistant to CNE</p> <p>Refer to membership list in addendum</p>
<b>Meeting Frequency, Quorum, and Member Expectations</b>	<p>COSOC meetings have a monthly cadence which result in at least 10 meetings per year.</p> <p>A quorum is defined as 80% of voting members.</p> <p>Members are expected to attend at least 75% of the meetings and review materials before each meeting.</p>
<b>Ground Rules</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patient centered</li> <li>• Systems thinking</li> <li>• Effective teamwork and communication</li> <li>• Transformational leadership</li> </ul>

## ***Culture of Safety Oversight Committee (COSOC) Charter***

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transparency</li> <li>• Just Culture, which includes a reporting culture, learning culture, and engaged and informed culture</li> <li>• Healthy work environment</li> </ul>
<b>Reporting Hierarchy and Frequency</b>	<p>COSOC to report at a minimum of annually (Monthly Management Meeting)</p> <p>As MGT for Engagement: COSOC reports to OHSU Management System Governance Council (OMG) at least twice a year and as needed</p>
<b>Goals</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Deliver safe, high quality care by enculturating OHSU in a culture of safety</li> <li>2. Foster open, transparent discussion of errors</li> <li>3. Support and engage team members</li> <li>4. Evolve highly reliable processes to address cultural issues about safety.</li> </ol>
<b>Metrics</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Patient Safety Survey Results</li> <li>2. Staff Engagement Survey Results</li> </ol>

### **OHSU Culture of Safety model**



HC-OMS-100.05-FMT Rev. 071720

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## ***Culture of Safety Oversight Committee (COSOC) Charter***

Membership List as of 10-14-2020

<b>Name, Credentials</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Member since</b>	<b>Department</b>
Gail Armstrong, PhD, DNP, ACNS-BC, CNE	Professor, Assistant Dean of the DNP Program	2020	School of Nursing
Dana Bjarnason, PhD, RN, NE-BC	Vice President & Chief Nursing Executive	2014	Hospital Administration
Barb Bonnice, RN, DNP, NE-BC	Director, Professional Practice	2014	Nursing Administration
Pam Brown, PhD, RN	Manager, Patient Safety	2015	Quality Management
Kayla Cohn, BSN, RN	Clinical Nurse	2020	8C Trauma Surgical ICU
Desza Dominquez, MPA	Supervisor, OHSU Visitors and Volunteers	2018	Visitors and Volunteers
Mariah Dula, MA	Senior Communications Specialist	2020	Internal Communications
Heather Ebert, JD, MSN, RN	Clinical Nurse	2020	Doernbecher Neonatal Intensive Care Unit
Deb Eldredge, PhD, RN	Director of Nursing Quality, Research & Magnet Recognition	2014	Nursing Administration
Jessica Flynn, MD	Associate Professor, Family Medicine	2016	School of Medicine
Jenn Fox, MS, RN	Director of Quality	2018	DCH Administration
Rachel Gribby, PT, DPT, OCS	Physical Therapist	2020	Rehabilitation Services
Kathryn Heath, SHRM-SCP	Sr. HR Business Partner	2019	Human Resources
Clea McDow, MPA	Interim Director, Quality	2019	Quality Management
Greg Moawad, JD, MBA	Interim VP for HR	2019	Human Resources
Michael Rennick, , PT, DPT, MPH	Division Director, Rehabilitation Services	2019	Rehabilitation Services
Jane Russell, RN, MSN, BA, NE-BC	Chief Nursing Officer Doernbecher Children's Hospital	2020	DCH Administration



## ***Culture of Safety Oversight Committee (COSOC) Charter***

Kimberly Smith, BSN, RN, PCCN-K	Nurse Manager, 11K/7C Cardiovascular Intermediate Care	2020	Cardiovascular Nursing
Grace Ty, MBA	Performance Improvement Consultant	2020	Quality Management
Patrick Vogelsong, MBA, MSN, RN, CEN, TCRN	Nurse Manager, Pediatric Ambulatory Services	2020	Ambulatory Nursing
Rob Wedlake	Supervisor, Office of Visitors and Volunteers	2018	Visitors and Volunteers
Nikki Wiggins, MSN, RN, CCRN-K, NE-BC	Nurse Manager, Doernbecher Neonatal Intensive Care Unit	2020	DCH Nursing

## CBCC Road map Outline

### CBCC scope is risk for self harm/other harm response

Safe Passage:

- ❑ Self-Harm
- ❑ Harm to Others

This assessment naturally leads to more learning questions about root cause

- 1) Outcome measures decided,
- 2) Literature search of scales
- 3) Evaluation of evidence base and appropriateness/applicability/ Getting author permissions
- 4) Assigning a stability grid and interventions  
Interventions implementation varies across the environments a little
- 5) Build into EPIC
- 6) Communicate/Train/Confirm/Train
- 7) Measure outcomes

1. Identify Standard process to screen for and then assess agitation/violence risk (then create standard work)
  - a. Screening [other groups focused on these specific topics—those care plan/CPGs; and recommendations about education/resources and critical interventions related to harm risk]
    - i. Agitation scale screen & assessment: ED/acute care
    - ii. Delirium screen & Assessment: Claudette/Alaina, Dr. Drago; Neurosciences specific, short term group
    - iii. Psychosis screen & assessment
    - iv. SUD screen & assessment
  - b. Comprehensive Patient Assessment: All relevant data pulled together to Agitation/violence Risk Stability Determination
  - c. Team member self-assessment of confidence and competence
    - i. Resources available
  - d. Other- Arc of Anxiety fits in how?  
(OUTCOME: Agitation/violence risk screen standardization)

2. Identify standard process to communicate agitation/violence risk
  - a) ED handoff
  - b) Care plan
  - c) Inter-professional care safety huddle
  - d) Other (EG: dot phrases, significant events)

(OUTCOME: A/V risk communicated in standard format)

3. Identify 3 or more standard interventions based on risk level (low: moderately stable, med: moderately unstable, high: unstable)
  - a) Therapeutic alliance interventions (active listening, goal alignment, de-escalation)
  - b) Environmental:
    - I. Physical: belongings inventory, locking items, safety searches if applicable, reduction of unsafe items from room
    - II. Level of monitoring: 1:1 PSA, VMT, other camera, etc.

## CBCC Road map Outline

- III. Restraint use
- c) Pharmacological Medical plan
  - I. Capacity, hold status
  - II. Scheduled and prn use
    - i. Standard work for prn documentation (see also pain standard work)
- d) Code Green has components of all 3 above and is intervention when prior interventions have been neglected or have proven ineffective.
- e) Create or amend guides, stability grids, algorithms to assist with above.
  - a. Ensure tools are readily available on tool kit, other methods
    - i. MH tool kit migration to Safety page

(OUTCOME: 3 spheres of interventions identified and codified with guides to use: therapeutic alliance, environmental, and pharmacological.)

(OUTCOME: Code Green training (purpose, process, roles in code green, debrief, data use for improvement) developed)

### 4. Outline Curriculum for Standard Agitation screen, assessment and intervention process

- a. Identify Learning outcomes
- b. Communicate, Train, Confirm, Sustain
- c. Develop learning activities based on outcomes, resources, etc.
  - i. Assessment videos of CAM, cog pyramid etc.
  - ii. Video of standard work for code green
  - iii. SIM: code green
  - iv. SUD education alignment

(OUTCOME: Education Curriculum for Standard screen/safety interventions of agitation/violence Complete)

### 5. Facilitate monitoring process for effectiveness of standard work (system wide view)

- a. Code Green analysis (gaps in standard work?)
- b. Management of Data to assist in risk identification
  - i. High risk cognitive patients on mission control board (Outcome?)
  - ii. Leadership standard work
  - iii. Determine what should be on the CBCC radar report
  - iv. Determine who the content experts are for the MH tool kit going forward
  - v. Migrate MH tool kit to the Safety page
  - vi. Work with NI on cognitive behavioral profile report to ensure all relevant data is showing
  - vii. Bobj report development
- c. Restraint standard work/leader standard work

(Outcome: Standard Confirm/Sustain Leadership processes in place)

CBCC Road map Outline

Goal:	Who are leads?	What is step?	When is next action item due?	Or something like this.....
Data Collection & Assessment		Epic Review Literature		
Knowledge Transfer  Communication across the continuum		Epic Review		
Interventions  MUS  US		Elsevier review  Epic Review		
Harm Risk/Stability Determination				

Larger group determines the outcome we want and then mini-charter a task force of no more than 5 people to run off and create specific deliverable and bring back (so can have several task forces running at a time)

Membership on task forces swaps as the target deliverable is defined by a representative 'oversight' team

Connect Oregon: Denise Sandell

Lynette Watts ? Healthy Planet

Drew

State Health Improvement Plan:

- Community Partnerships

Do we need to have a call-out on the CBCC charter or team looking at these community partners (OHSU not solving it, but sharing the baton with others when needed)

The reason I ask is that 80% of patients likely respond and thrive with current MHToolkit resources (if we used them consistently), and the other 16% need more and the last 4% needs the whole community - so we need to keep in mind one-size- doesn't-fit -all but there are some items which are foundational for all

Continuum of Care: Healthy Handout

Repeat High Risk – Care Team

## CBCC Road map Outline

- Non-Episodic Care ; difference care delivery model
- Julia's role
- Primary Care short term
- Consistent Plan of Care – where do you keep this?
- How to find these?
- Boundaries of Acute Care

Subgroup: Denise Sandell /Troy

Pull continuum of care information to inform Harm risk on admission

Social Determinants of Health in the CBCC TIGR team

ED Acuity Scale – Troy [PEZ]

- Continuity of Care

HMC/Adventist- Community Engagement

Access to Edie – requires patient registration identification that doesn't work for patients with transient

<b>Name</b>	<b>Cognitive Behavioral Care Committee (CBCC)</b> <b>Vision: Improve safety and health outcomes of cognitive-behavioral patients throughout OHSU.</b>
<b>Effective</b>	August 2019
<b>Stakeholders</b>	<b>Inpatient/ambulatory adult and pediatric, Emergency Department, Adult/pediatric sedation services</b>
<b>Strategic Goals</b>	<p>One standard of care for patients at risk for or with delirium, changes in mental status, psychiatric or behavioral co-morbidities.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Timely, appropriate care to cognitive behavioral patients. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Proactive care: assessment, documentation, risk mitigation including management of environment, collaboration with teams, patients and families.</li> <li>ii. Education: elements of care of cognitive-behavioral patients: for all team members, best practices, guidelines for safety risks including belongings management, screening, etc.</li> <li>iii. Elements of medical holds vs NMI (notice of mental illness, hospital hold, 2 physician hold)</li> <li>iv. Behavioral restrictions on hold and committed patients, including “good cause/2<sup>nd</sup> opinion to replace missed po meds on committed patients)</li> <li>v. Reduce seclusion or restraint through: least restrictive principles, hold process, safe use of restraints, discontinuation criteria, documentation requirements</li> </ol> </li> <li>b. Quadruple aim: improve patient health, enhance patient experience, and reduce/control costs, improved clinician experience.</li> <li>c. Quality improvement to reduce: violence to healthcare workers, use of seclusion and restraint, increase knowledge &amp; of patient assessment and standardized interventions</li> <li>d. Meet all regulatory requirements related to cognitive behavioral patients</li> </ol>
<b>Purpose</b>	Achieve optimal care of cognitive behavioral patients
<b>Scope and Decision Making Authority</b>	<p><b>Scope:</b>  Patients: Cognitive Behavior changes e.g. delirium, self-harm, psychiatric conditions, traumatic brain injury, dementia  Interventions: Medical and behavioral holds (NMI, Hospital Hold, 2 physician hold), guardianship, seclusion/restraint use, clinical use of force, code green response (team and patient safety, de-escalation), environment management,  <b>Excludes:</b> Medication safety guidelines: Worker Safety reporting/response: Domestic Abuse, Active Substance Abuse</p>
<b>Practice Improvement Outcomes</b>	<p>Implementation of Standardized Care Guidelines (e.g. Suicide, Delirium)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Practice</li> <li>• Workflows</li> <li>• Interdisciplinary care planning</li> </ul> <p>Transfer of Knowledge in EHR  Assessments (identification of actual or at risk behaviors)  Interdisciplinary plan of care: patient care risks, best practices, evidence-based  Recommendations about interventions to keep doing, do differently  Communication of Committee strategies, improvement work, outcomes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Website <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Key Message Campaign</li> <li>○ Connection between learning needs assessment and key strategies</li> <li>○ Data trending</li> <li>○ Subgroup Action Plans</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Stories about best practices/strengths/wins</li> <li>○ Case debrief learning</li> <li>● Unit specific action plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Leadership Team-Committee coordination</li> <li>○ Leader Standard Work</li> <li>○ Chain of Resolution</li> <li>○ Unit communication channels (e.g. Huddles)</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>Leverage Nursing Strategic council stakeholders' input and communication channels  Coordination of learning activities with Transitions to Practice Program/Center for Professional Practice</p>		
<b>Sub Committee Work Groups</b>	<b>Suicide Care Management</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Suicide Risk Assessment, Intervention, care coordination, documentation.</li> <li>● Environmental Safety</li> </ul>	<b>Cognitive Behavior Assessment Management</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Determination of patient capacity</li> <li>● Interdisciplinary care planning when the "usual &amp; customary nursing practices" don't meet patient needs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Restraint</li> <li>○ PSA</li> <li>○ VMT</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Environmental Safety</li> </ul>	<b>Critical Incident Management</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Code Green</li> <li>● Reportable Force</li> <li>● Elopements</li> <li>● Clinical Violence: patient, employee, visitor/family</li> <li>● Environmental Safety</li> <li>● "De-escalating" communication while applying restraint and administration of medications when patient escalated</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation Steps</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1- Systematic implementation of standardized care for cognitive-behavioral patients.</li> <li>2- Global education on Cognitive Behavioral Care</li> <li>3- General policy review/update of appropriate policies*</li> <li>4- Facilitate self-development of nurses using the professional practice standards and standardized care guidelines <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Self-identified barriers to provision of care to cognitive behavioral patients</li> <li>b. Build skills and confidence to identify risks and develop effective plans of care</li> <li>c. Progressive competency evaluation and growth</li> </ol> </li> <li>5- Promote standardization and use of interprofessional care conferences.</li> <li>6- Mitigate stigma related to mental health and substance use disorder diagnosis</li> <li>7- Review behavioral PSIs and debriefs of cognitive-behavioral events that require a quality or performance improvement approach</li> <li>8- Reviews data on quality measures; determine organizational and nursing-wide goals for priority improvement; and supports divisions/units in performance improvement relevant to specific to barriers and opportunities</li> </ol>		
<b>Members</b>	<p><b>Co-Chairs:</b> Director of Professional Practice &amp; PPL: Cog/Behavioral</p> <p><b>Committee Representation</b></p> <p>Direct Care Nurses: (shift representation, Adult Acute Care &amp; Critical Care, Pediatrics, Emergency, Ambulatory)</p> <p>Management Representation: Adult Acute Care &amp; Critical Care, Pediatrics, Emergency Department, Ambulatory</p> <p>Patient Advocate's office/AOD</p> <p>Patient Safety Office</p> <p>Pharmacy</p> <p>Physician/NP/PA: Internal Medicine, Gerontology, Psych (ad hoc)</p> <p>Professional Practice Leaders: PMHNP &amp; Cognitive Behavioral Nursing</p>		

	<p>Public Safety /Use of Force Committee Liaison Social Work: Psych Social Work</p> <p>Stakeholder/Committee Liaison Roles to assure alignment/communication Pediatric Best Practice Committee Liaison (Bobbie, Paula, Sam, Andrea, Melinda) Substance Use Disorder Committee Liaison (Dorreen, Susannah, Deanna, Dianne, Drew) Delirium Neuro Sciences Work Group (Claudette) Nurse Practice Council (Gayle, Melinda)</p> <p><u>Ad hoc Members:</u> Rehab Therapies Performance Improvement Consultant Quality Specialist Nurse Informaticist</p>
<b>Reporting</b>	<p>Sponsor: Dana Bjarnason Reporting Structure: Safety Oversight Committee</p>
<b>Meetings</b>	<p><b>Frequency:</b> Monthly <b>Duration of Meeting:</b> 1.5 hours <b>Administrative Contact:</b> Amy Do</p>

<b>Standardization: Critical Incident</b>	<b>Standardization: Cog-Beh</b>	<b>Standardization: Suicide</b>
<b>Process Owner: Barb Bonnice</b>	<b>Process Owner: Kristen Richards</b>	<b>Process Owner: Dianne Wheeling</b>
<b>Team Captain: Liz Fero</b>	<b>Team Captain: Jaqueline Abbe</b>	<b>Team Captain: Pam Brown</b>
Cassandra Barton, RN, CVICU	Ashley Arehart, SPL, Peds	Whitney Black, MD, Psych
Doreen Blanchard, Manager, Acute	Christine Bartlett, Director, Critical Care	Melinda Hartenstein, ANM, Peds Ed
Paula Bennett, Manager, Peds	Yvonne Barsalon, RN, ED	Mariah Hayes, Director, Acute
Heath Kula, Public Safety	Julia Dearmond, PMHNP, Psych consult & restraint content expert	Bobbie Hildreth, RN, Peds
Desi McCue, Director, ED	Katie Drago, MD, Geriatrics	Suzannah Lujan-Bear ANM, Acute
Sarah Milligan, RN, ED	Sherri Grimstead-Arnold, SPL, Trauma ICU	Rachel Rose, ANM, MICU
Andrea Monto, SW	Katherine Hammond, ANM, ED	Kai Roller, Manager, SW
Robert Osten, Pharmacy	Daniel Mala, RN, ED	
Raquel Reyes, Safety Office	Gayle Murphy, PPL	Ambulatory Clinical Nurse
Deanna Eichler, consultant		
Patient Advocate/AOD		

\*Policy List Addendum:

Clinical Violence Alerts	Hospital holds for Treatment of Mental Illness
Violence Alert Flag Requests	Medical Hold for non-mental health patients
Safety Searches	Pediatric Behavioral Health Safety Protocol
Missing Persons	Patient Safety Attendant, Policy and Procedure for Use of



Patient Personal Property	Administrative Discharge of an Adult Inpatient\
Suicide Risk assessment in Non-Psychiatric Settings	Determination, Notification and Consent for Video and Audio Monitoring
Restraint and Seclusion, Use of	Law Enforcement Relations
Capacity assessment	Patient Visitation
Patient Rights	Delirium Order set

Ethnicity table to include nurse leaders (ANMs, NMs, Directors/ACNOs, PPLs)

	CY 2019	CY2019	CY 2019	CY 2019	CY 2019	Jul-18	Jul-18
	OHSU Nurses	OHSU Nurse Leaders	OHSU Health-care	OHSU Patients (Inpatient Adult)	OHSU Patients (Ambulatory Adult)	City of Portland	State of Oregon
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	0.40%	1.46%	0.60%	0.90%	0.70%	0.70%	1.80%
<b>Asian</b>	6.90%	2.19%	8.40%	3.00%	4.90%	8.10%	4.80%
<b>Black or African American</b>	1.20%	3.65%	4.30%	2.70%	3.00%	5.80%	2.20%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	4.30%	2.92%	6.90%	7.30%	5.90%	9.70%	13.30%
<b>Native Hawaiian /Other Pacific Islander</b>	0.80%	0.73%	1.00%	0.60%	0.40%	0.70%	0.50%
<b>Other race or multiracial</b>	0.40%	0.73%	0.40%	1.30%	1.50%	5.50%	3.90%
<b>White</b>	79.90%	83.94%	63.60%	81.40%	80.70%	70.50%	75.30%
<b>Unknown or declined</b>	6.20%	4.38%	14.80%	2.70%	3.00%	0.00%	0.00%

**Department of Public Safety  
Critical Incident Committee  
Effective September 1, 2015**

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<p><b>Strategic Element</b></p>	<p>This committee will serve as an OHSU-community guidance and review panel to analyze instances in which Department of Public Safety (DPS), Healthcare and other OHSU community members are at a higher risk to be involved in, or have already been involved in, a critical incident.<sup>1</sup> This committee will also meet regularly to make recommendations for changes in policy, practice and/or training to impacted Departments in order to eliminate repetition of avoidable instances in a more favorable outcome could potentially be achieved.</p>
<p><b>Purpose / Problem Statement</b></p>	<p>The purpose of the Committee is:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Monitor situations identified by members as involving a higher risk of a critical incident occurring and communicate, plan and intervene early as appropriate to ensure best practices;</li> <li>2. Review critical incidents that occur to identify areas for improvement;</li> <li>3. Debrief involved members to ensure improvement in identified areas;</li> <li>4. Identify common themes in critical incidents to reveal trends or patterns to provide guidance for policy revisions, or practice or training modifications in OHSU Departments; and,</li> <li>5. Make recommendations to OHSU Departments for changes in policy, practice or training that will minimize similar future instances.</li> </ol>

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<sup>1</sup> A “critical incident” is defined as any event, circumstance or situation in which the physical or emotional health of any person is placed at substantial risk. Examples include but are not limited to calls in which self-harm or harm to others is threatened or occurs, as well as instances in which staff or members use reportable force on any person. It also includes incidents where, in the best judgment of the involved DPS staff, the incident is likely to have significant impact on the confidence of the non-DPS involved party, their family and/or the community.

<p><b>Expected Outcomes</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Improvement of OHSU policy, practice and training as those areas may impact critical incidents;</li> <li>2. Reduction of injuries to patients, staff, officers and those they interact with as a result of the adoption of changes as identified above;</li> <li>3. Ensuring that, where possible, similar future critical incident are avoided by changes in policy, practice and training;</li> <li>4. Confirming that all actions by OHSU staff up to and during a critical incident are reasonable under law and policy and consistent with best practices, and if not, to note conflicts that develop and to suggest changes, and;</li> <li>5. Advocate for adoption of any suggested changes to policy, practice or training as deemed worthy by the committee, wherever practicable.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Committee Goals</b></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Early intervention in situations identified by members as involving a higher risk of a critical incident occurring;</li> <li>2. Review critical incidents that occur on a monthly basis;</li> <li>3. Make recommendations for changes to policy, practice or training to any OHSU Department in order to meet the Purpose and Expected Outcomes sections above; and,</li> <li>4. To provide uniform, system-wide perspective on critical incidents.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Members, or their Designees</b></p>	<p>Chair: Director, Public Safety  Representatives/Members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vice President, Campus Safety</li> <li>• Lieutenant, Public Safety</li> <li>• Director, Patient Relations</li> <li>• Nurse Manager, Psychiatry Inpatient</li> <li>• Nursing PPL, Emergency Department</li> <li>• Nursing PPL, Medical/Psychiatric nursing</li> <li>• Director, Women and Children</li> <li>• Director, Emergency Services</li> <li>• Manager, Social Work</li> <li>• Manager, Patient Safety</li> <li>• Manager, Regulatory Program</li> <li>• Physician, Emergency Medicine</li> <li>• Physician, Psychiatry</li> <li>• Vice President, Research and Student Affairs</li> <li>• Legal Counsel</li> <li>• Vice President, Risk Management</li> <li>• Any other Ad Hoc members, when their expertise is deemed necessary by consensus of the members</li> </ul>

<b>Reporting</b>	This committee will prepare recommendations for any requested changes to policy, practice or training to the party responsible for implementing any requested changes. The Director of Public Safety will be responsible for communicating those requests to the potentially impacted Departments, but may request assistance, where appropriate, from other members or committees.
<b>Boundaries</b>	<p>Boundaries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) On a monthly basis, or as completed, the committee shall review qualifying critical incidents;</li> <li>b) If, at any time after an incident has been referred to the committee, the committee becomes aware of a potential civil cause of action associated with the incident, it shall cease a review of the incident until advised by Legal and/or Risk that the matter may be reviewed; and</li> <li>c) This committee will not decide issues related to employment, discipline or remediation as they relate to individual employees;</li> </ul>
<b>Decision-Making Authority and Recommendations</b>	<p>Authority</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Approves: This committee will approve any findings upon reaching a consensus. The Director of Public Safety will be responsible for communicating those findings to any potentially impacted Departments.</li> <li>b) Recommends: Those findings will contain recommendations only – and no Department is required to implement any suggested changes. Where appropriate, the committee will continue to seek support for the implementation of any suggested changes.</li> </ul>
<b>Meetings</b>	Monthly and as necessary.



Department of Public Safety

# OHSU THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PROCESSES

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**OHSU Department of Public Safety**

3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Rd. Portland Oregon, 97239-3098. Mailcode: PP22C

Tel: 503.494-7744 Fax: 503.494-4839

Page 1 of 9

Revised July 2015

## 1. Purpose Statement:

As provided in the OHSU Workplace Violence Policy, violence and threats of violence at OHSU will not be tolerated. OHSU seeks a safe environment for its community, including employees, patients, visitors, students, affiliates and guests, and is committed to maintaining an environment free from workplace violence and threats of workplace violence.

Threats or intimidation are unacceptable regardless of whether the person communicating the threat has the ability to carry them out, whether the threat is made on a present, conditional, or future basis, or whether the threat is made in person, through another person, in writing, verbally, or electronically including via social media.

OHSU members found to have engaged in behavior that constitutes workplace violence or otherwise risks harm to OHSU or the OHSU community may be subject to criminal prosecution if applicable, and disciplinary action (via employment or academic processes) up to and including termination/dismissal.

## 2. Function of the Threat Assessment Team

The Threat Assessment Team will serve as the primary group responsible for evaluating threats of violence and/or potential threats of violence made or posed by individuals against the University and members of the University Community. Threat Assessment Team goals are to:

- Promote a safe and secure environment.
- Provide clear and direct communication pathways for individuals to express concern.
- Establish and maintain early intervention strategies which include support, legal intervention and advocacy.
- Provide education with regards to safety, the reporting of threats, support resources inside and outside the University, and statistical information.
- Develop education material as to what threat assessment is, what should be considered a threat, what resources are available, personal security considerations, how best to report a threat, and the position of the University on violence prevention.
- Constantly evaluate lines of communication to ensure that they remain open and easily accessible to members of the University.
- Ensure evidence-based assessment of behavior that may point to a risk of violence.
- Ensure a measured response, including the development of strategies that are scalable, flexible, adaptive, and able to incorporate a variety of relevant resources.
- Build partnerships with internal and external departments, offices, organizations and agencies to address potential threats on campus.

- Monitor national, state, and local events for the latest trends in workplace violence risk assessment and mitigation strategies, especially as they reflect challenges in the higher education and health care setting.
- Serve as a communication link between various members of the University administration, faculty, staff and health-care providers to attempt to best utilize information to avoid harm and respond to threats as appropriate.
- The core mission of the Threat Assessment Team is to identify who, where, when of violence and to determine what actions may escalate and what actions may mitigate the risk of violence.

### **3. Scope of Responsibilities and Authorities of the Threat Assessment Team**

The Threat Assessment Team is established through OHSU policy 07-30-020 (regarding workplace violence). The Threat Assessment Team is charged with assessing threats and making recommendations to protect members of the OHSU Community. The Threat Assessment Team's determinations will supplement, but not take the place of mandatory reporting requirements placed on any member of the University community by law. Threat Assessment Team recommendations will in no way restrain the actions of members of the University acting in their official capacities.

### **4. Definitions**

*Workplace Violence:* (1) Any violence; or (2) any behavior, communications, or conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear violence. Such behavior, communications, or conduct may include, but are not limited to the following:

- Assault (as defined in ORS 163 and ORS 654.412);
- Threats;
- Bullying;
- Stalking (as defined in ORS 163.732);
- Domestic violence and/or dating violence;
- Damaging property;
- Targeting by activists/extremists or others at non-OHSU facilities (i.e., home harassment);



- Publication of the personal information of OHSU Members and/or their immediate families;
- Communications regarding instances of Workplace Violence, with seeming approval from or endorsement by the speaker;
- Communications regarding firearms or weapons containing allusions to violence;
- Other behavior that would cause fear in a reasonable person;
- Any other form of threatened violence. Such behavior may be written, verbal, electronic, or physical.

## 5. Membership

Only OHSU staff may serve as full members of the Threat Assessment Team unless an exception is allowed by the Director of Public Safety. Non-OHSU members may be included on a more limited, ad-hoc basis or

The Threat Assessment Team will consist of members from the following areas:

- Public Safety: Director or designate
- Vice President of Campus Safety
- Public Safety Representatives
- Human Resources
- Risk Management
- Integrity
- Legal
- Academic Affairs
- Research
- Hospital Administration
- Psychiatry
- Other members at the discretion of the TAT Chair.

Each Department will designate a primary and backup member to achieve 24-7-365 availability. Both the primary and backup members are full participatory members and have equal responsibility on the team. Members leaving the team will collaborate with the Chair to identify an appropriate and seamless replacement. Membership changes for each department must be immediately communicated to the Chair to ensure that accurate and up-to-date lists are maintained at all times.

The Director of Public Safety will serve as the Chair and will have oversight for maintaining a

record of all information about the threat and all decisions and actions made by the team. In the absence of the Director of Public Safety, his/her designate will serve as Chair. Public Safety will also provide administrative support to the team.

The Chair will provide applicable training to member of the team. Members of the team are required to attend at least four hours of applicable training either as arranged by the team or by external organizations such as the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals. All members will endeavor to review cases in a timely manner, contribute regularly, and attend meetings on a consistent basis.

## **6. Responsibilities of Reporting Threats and Violence by the OHSU Community:**

Any OHSU member who is aware of any act of workplace violence must report the incident to the OHSU Department of Public Safety at 503-494-4444. Faculty and staff working in off-campus locations (i.e. off-campus clinics, off-campus work sites, or satellite campuses) should report emergencies to local law enforcement but are not relieved of their responsibility to report to Public Safety in a timely manner.

In non-emergent situations, faculty, staff, and students working in off-campus locations, but owned and/or operated by OHSU, are encouraged to call OHSU Department of Public Safety at 503-494-7744, for assistance with safety plans and other resources.

OHSU members are encouraged to be alert to the possibility of workplace violence. Any report of violence or threats of violence will be handled in a confidential manner to the extent possible, with information released only on a need-to-know basis.

OHSU members who act in good faith by reporting real or implied violent behavior or violations of this policy will not be retaliated against or subjected to harassment. Deliberately false or misleading reports of violence will be handled as incidents of unacceptable personal conduct, and individuals making such false or misleading reports will be subject to disciplinary action under the University's disciplinary policy.

## **7. Referral Process and T3 Procedure**

### ***Initial Referral – Threat Triage Team (T3)***

Any potential workplace violence should be referred to the OHSU Department of Public Safety. This information may initially come directly to Public Safety from an involved individual, through a witness or by-stander, though Student or Employee Health Services, through Human Resources or via another internal or external source. Public Safety staff will have the resources and training

to screen threat information and take immediate actions as necessary.

Once dispatch or a member of Public Safety receives the reporting party's information, Public Safety will dispatch a responding officer who will gather information and determine if a crime has been committed or if there is an immediate threat to the OHSU community. If a crime has been committed or there is an imminent threat, the responding officer will take appropriate action in cooperation with Public Safety command staff to safeguard OHSU and the OHSU community, and will follow internal processes to ensure a threat assessment triage documentation form is completed as soon as possible.

Once the threat assessment triage document form has been completed, the responding officer or CSL will refer the case to the Threat Triage Team (T3). This group will consist of three people from these categories (with no more than two individuals from the same department):

- The initial responding officer or Community Safety Liaison
- DPS ranking member (DPS Sergeant/OIC on shift or above)
- Non-DPS TAT member or AOD

Each decision of the T3 will be documented by the use of the threat assessment triage document form. The T3 will review all reports of threats and/or potential threats within 4 hours of the initial report and determine whether the subject of the report is a credible threat of workplace violence. If any member votes believes that standard is met, assessment is required by the full Threat Assessment Team. The responding officer, CSL or other Public Safety member must notify the highest ranking DPS command staff available through chain of command to evaluate how and when to activate the full Threat Assessment Team. The TAT Chair or his/her designee may refer any case to the TAT at his/her discretion. The circumstances of any report where the T3 unanimously vote against assessment by the full Threat Assessment Team will be made available for their review in a prompt manner.

## **8. Threat Assessment Process/Management**

If it has been decided that a full Threat Assessment Team evaluation is necessary, the Chair/or designate will ensure that the Threat Assessment Team is notified and a file is started or additional information is added to an existing file if the individual involved has been assessed in the past by the TAT.

The Chair or designate will ensure all necessary information is loaded into the Threat Assessment file as appropriate and activate the full team within a reasonable time frame based on the facts of the case. This should usually occur within 36 hours of receiving the referral.

## **Activating the Threat Assessment Team:**

E-mail, text message or the OHSU paging system are examples of some of the appropriate communication methods to activate the team.

All communication of activation should include the following:

- Tagline: “TAT Activation”
- Significance or time sensitive nature of the case,
- Immediate Response Needed, No rush, etc
- New Case or Update
- Status of the subject, (i.e., employee, student, patient, family of patient, etc.)
- Link to the case file in Box.com
- All pertinent information about conference call or meeting time and location.

## **Managing Files:**

Threat Assessment files are stored and managed through Box.com. Access is granted to members of the TAT only.

**Case Status** - Each case will be assigned a status of open, inactive, or closed.

- a) Open – subject poses a threat to the OHSU community.
- b) In-active – immediate threat may be mitigated but case is not closed, IE the subject still has a relationship with OHSU or an OHSU community member in same manner.
- c) Closed – subject no longer poses a threat to the OHSU community. Justification is needed as to why the subject is unlikely to pose a future threat to the OHSU community.

Open and in-active cases should be managed, monitored, and updated monthly at a minimum by the Community Safety Liaison and each status should be updated as appropriate. The Community Safety Liaison is also responsible for reaching out monthly to the complainant/victim of the alleged threat to check on status and update or recommend closing cases as needed. All updates must be documented in the case file and it is the responsibility of the TAT member who makes an entry, to communicate to the TAT that a new comment or entry exists. This notification will happen the same day as the update. All documents gathered in regards to the case should be scanned and saved into the appropriate folder.

The summary of the subject of concern’s criminal history as well as other relevant facts should be entered on a case document into the file that will be named after the person of concern. The TAT team can use the “Notes and Comments” folder to communicate with one another in regards to the case, ask relevant case questions, as well as store other case related information and documentation.

### **Threat Assessment Team Meeting:**

The Threat Assessment Team will utilize its membership and resources to gather all available and prudent information not already gathered and analyze it by any means it deems appropriate. This analysis or assessment can occur in person, via conference call or via the use of the Notes and Comments file in the appropriate case file in Box.com.

A quorum will consist of the Chair and five additional team members.

The team will provide an update or recommendations to relevant OHSU community members no later than 72 hours after its initial assessment and will provide supplemental updates and recommendations as necessary as each case progresses.

## **9. Clery Act Requirements**

Per Clery Act Timely Notification requirements, OHSU needs to ensure compliance with federal law regarding the Clery Act on Timely Warnings.

Timely Warnings need to be issued for the identified Clery crimes reported to the Department of Public Safety when those crimes have occurred on OHSU defined geography, i.e. any building or property owned or controlled by OHSU or reasonably contiguous to OHSU property. Those crimes must represent a serious or continuing threat to the OHSU community and the posting of the warning will not hinder the investigation.

See OHSU DPS Timely Warning Policy 357 for guidance.

## **10. Confidentiality/Information Security**

The Threat Assessment Team will adhere rigorously to the information security and confidentiality requirements of FIRPA, HIPAA, LEDS and any other applicable regulations. Prudent steps to ensure this will occur include:

- Threat Assessment information, except for meeting coordination, will not be routinely transmitted electronically outside of the OHSU network system (Box.com is used to store TAT files)
- If the team determines that assessment information should be shared with non-OHSU individuals or groups (e.g., external law enforcement, mental health providers, potential victims, etc.), the attached “Rules for Information Sharing” will be followed and all practical confidentiality safeguards will be used.
- All information gathered about any individual or individuals by the team (medical information, criminal history, etc) will be treated as confidential unless otherwise

- designated as such by the Chair in conjunction with the University Integrity Office.
- Inclusion of individuals on an ad-hoc basis (OHSU and non-OHSU) is at the discretion of the Chair with consent of a majority of the TAT members.

Team members should utilize the document “Rules for Information Sharing & Access to OHSU Controlled Information” for further reference on information privacy and access. LEDS/NCIC information and other law enforcement database information cannot be put into the folder but can be summarized in a document for review by the team members. All team members will appropriately balance the need to convey information relevant to threat assessment to the full team with the desire to protect confidential information whenever possible, including being constantly mindful of the restrictions of HIPAA, FERPA, and other restrictions on private information.

## **11. Team Review**

Team performance will be monitored by the Chair. The team will meet monthly in the absence of assessments, to review composition, training, issues, and developments related to threatening behavior and workplace violence. The Threat Assessment Team will review all T3’s, whether they resulted in an activation or not. The Threat Assessment Team will also compile an annual report for OHSU leadership.

**GINNY BURDICK**  
**State Senator**  
DISTRICT 18  
MULTNOMAH COUNTY  
WASHINGTON COUNTY



Office: Oregon State Senate  
Salem, OR 97301  
(503) 986-1718  
E-mail: [sen.ginnyburdick@state.or.us](mailto:sen.ginnyburdick@state.or.us)  
District: 6227 SW 18th Dr.  
Portland, OR 97239  
(503) 244-1444

## OREGON STATE SENATE

December 3, 2008

Dr. Robertson,

I am pleased to share with you the final report and recommendations of the Critical Incident Readiness Task Force. You charged the members of the task force to answer a pair of challenging questions: Is the existing police response to an active shooting incident at an OHSU facility adequate? If not, what changes should be made to improve that response? After three months of work and four productive meetings of the task force, we feel we have answers to your questions.

This report gives you a full explanation of the process we went through to reach these recommendations, the feedback we received and the reasoning behind our decisions. It also includes several attachments providing more in-depth information about certain topics of interest, including information about the involvement of the mental health community.

I respect your dedication to continuing to provide a safe environment for your employees, students, patients and visitors. The task force members and I realize this is a difficult issue for any organization to consider and that these recommendations do not represent a final decision for OHSU's future. Regardless of the decision you make, strong leadership and communication skills will be required to make the OHSU campus as safe as possible.

I speak on behalf of all the task force members when I say thank you for asking us to be a part of this process. We appreciate your acknowledgement that this is a sensitive issue affecting many individuals and groups beyond the confines of OHSU. Your decision to convene a public task force shows your commitment to making OHSU a transparent institution and a good community partner. We wish you the best of luck as you move forward with this process.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ginny Burdick".

Senator Ginny Burdick

Chair, Critical Incident Readiness Task Force

# Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Recommendations

## Executive Summary

### **Situation**

Like most universities across the country, Oregon Health & Science University began reviewing its critical incident readiness following the campus shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University. After a thorough internal analysis of OHSU public safety officers' authorities, training and equipment, OHSU president Joe Robertson, M.D., M.B.A., decided to form a public task force to consider whether additional steps were necessary to ensure the continued safety of the OHSU community. The Critical Incident Readiness Task Force was specifically asked to review the readiness to respond to a critical incident, including an active shooter, at OHSU facilities on Marquam Hill, South Waterfront and West Campus in Hillsboro.

### **Task Force Organization**

The task force includes local law enforcement and government representatives, Portland-area residents, OHSU employees and other stakeholders. The task force met four times during fall 2008. These meetings included:

- August 26: organizational meeting.
- September 26: meeting to receive testimony from technical experts.
- October 23: meeting to receive testimony from the public.
- November 6: work session.

### **Recommendations**

It is the majority opinion of the task force that the following recommendations be implemented by OHSU to improve the safety of patients, visitors, faculty, staff and students.

#### ***Recommendation 1***

*OHSU should seek a change to the state statute governing OHSU Public Safety Officers to clarify their roles and authorities regardless of whether it moves forward with the recommendation to establish an armed presence. (20 voted for; 1 against).*

#### ***Recommendation 2***

*A full-time armed law enforcement presence should be established at OHSU in order to provide a faster response to an active shooter incident, provided that all the conditions listed below are met. (17 voted for; 1 against; 3 abstained)*

- All armed officers have completed the 16-week DPSST academy.
- All armed officers complete supplemental OHSU campus public safety training.
- All armed officers complete 40-hour Critical Incident Training developed and conducted by the Portland Police Bureau.
- All armed officers complete Cultural Awareness Training.
- An official OHSU review process is established to review any use of a firearm by an OHSU officer.
- A commitment to on-going training in firearms proficiency, proper use of force, and joint critical incident training with Portland Police Bureau and other law enforcement agencies.



## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Recommendations Executive Summary

The majority of task force members recommended OHSU seek a change in state statute that would allow it to employ its own armed law enforcement officers. The task force would also support OHSU contracting with a local police department to establish an armed presence.

The task force considered and rejected several options for responding to active shooter incidents. These rejected options include maintaining the status quo; encouraging the Portland Police Bureau to modify its existing tactical doctrine to speed up response; and hiring armed security guards who are not sworn law enforcement officers. These options were either unworkable, did not guarantee sufficient training, would be unacceptable to a majority of stakeholders at OHSU, or would not provide an adequate decrease in the response time to an active shooter incident.

### **Conclusion**

The task force feels the current response to an active shooter on an OHSU campus is unacceptably slow. The group believes the safety of the OHSU campus could be enhanced by establishing a permanent presence of certified and armed law enforcement officers with additional specialized training to deal with vulnerable populations, including the mentally ill.

The Task Force also encourages OHSU to enhance communication with the residential neighborhoods that surround Marquam Hill. In particular, systems should be explored with Portland Police Bureau that could facilitate timely communication with the neighborhoods during a critical incident.

Critical Incident Readiness Task Force  
Report and Recommendations

**Introduction**

Like many universities across the country, Oregon Health & Science University conducted an extensive review of its public safety capabilities, training and equipment following the tragic campus shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University.

Following this review OHSU President Joe Robertson, M.D., M.B.A., decided it was in the best interest of the university to establish a public task force to consider OHSU's readiness to respond to a similar critical incident. The task force was specifically asked to consider whether additional steps were necessary to ensure the continued safety of the OHSU community, including whether OHSU should have armed police officers on campus.

Dr. Robertson sought to establish a diverse task force representative of the wide audiences OHSU serves. The task force members include:

<b>Name</b>	<b>Representative Group</b>
• Sen. Ginny Burdick	State Legislator
• Sen. Bruce Starr	State Legislator
• Margie Lowe	Governor's Office
• Tim Moore	Multnomah County Sheriff's Department
• Jane Ames	Portland Mayor's Office
• Carmen Merlo	Portland Office of Emergency Management
• Olga Acuña	City of Hillsboro
• Susan Egnor	Homestead Neighborhood Association
• Ken Love	South Portland Neighborhood Association
• Mike Reese	Portland Police Bureau
• Allen Zaugg	Hillsboro Police Department
• Barbara Glidewell	Patient Relations Representative
• Marcus Mundy	Urban League
• Sandra McDonough	Portland Business Alliance
• Susan Cox	Veterans Administration
• Carol Howe	OHSU Faculty
• Nina Katovic	OHSU Student Council
• Mike Bandy	AFSCME
• Harold Fleshman	ONA
• Steven Scott	OHSU Health System
• Nancy Haigwood	OHSU West Campus
• Román Hernández	OHSU Board of Directors
• Martha McMurry	Community Advocate

Note: The Executive Director of National Alliance on Mental Illness Multnomah was offered a seat on the task force but did not participate. Additional information about the involvement from the mental health community is included as attachment 10.

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

### **Communications and Outreach**

OHSU developed a communications plan to support the work of the task force. The plan called for engaging the Portland community, the OHSU community, and specific groups within OHSU through a variety of communication methods.

Internally, OHSU communicated with its employees and students through several emails, postings on the Intranet, a town hall hosted by Dr. Robertson that was later available online, and presentations at regular meetings for clinical, research, student and administrative leaders.

A news release was sent to Portland-area media in August announcing the creation of the task force. The first three task force meetings were publicized through public meeting notices, and the public input meeting was also publicized through an ad in *The Oregonian*.

A second news release issued the week before the public input meeting drew a great amount of media interest from print, TV, radio and Internet media outlets.

A survey and Q&A were also posted to the OHSU Web site and highlighted in internal and external messages. Dr. Robertson received more than 20 emails about the task force from internal audiences and more than 200 responses to the survey were collected and analyzed. These results are included as Attachments 6 and 7. A list of all the primary communications activities is included as Attachment 4.

### **Background**

OHSU reviewed the four official reports on the shootings at Virginia Tech: “Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007”; “Virginia Tech Overview of the findings and recommendations of the April 16 Tragedy internal review committees”; Report To The President On Issues Raised By The Virginia Tech Tragedy”; “National Association of Attorneys General Task Force On School And Campus Safety”. From these reports OHSU identified four key findings relevant to OHSU:

- There was widespread confusion at Virginia Tech about what information could be shared across departments and with outside agencies.
- The lack of a formal system for assessing troubling student behavior meant that several warning signs that could have prompted action on the part of the university went unnoticed by agencies and departments that could have taken action.
- Once the shooting started, campus police could not immediately communicate emergency messages without prior approval, which slowed the sharing of information with the campus community.
- Joint training that had taken place before the incident between campus officers and local city police meant that the tactical response to the incident was well-coordinated and saved lives.

These four findings led the OHSU Department of Public Safety to make four recommendations to the OHSU Executive Leadership Team:

- OHSU must have clear, documented information sharing guidelines.
- OHSU must have an interdisciplinary threat assessment team.

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

- OHSU must upgrade its critical incident communications capability.
- OHSU Public Safety Officers must be professionalized and be able to train with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to respond to active shooters.

OHSU understands the best way to ensure an active shooter incident does not happen at OHSU is to do everything possible to identify problem situations before they evolve into a crisis. Over the past 18 months, much work has been done on the first three recommendations. The ability of OHSU departments to share information with each other has been clarified. A threat assessment team has been formed and is completing its policy development and training. Upgrades have been made to the communication system and additions to that system are under review.

The efforts made by OHSU to address these preventive measures will make a real difference in the way potentially violent incidents are detected and addressed before they cause any harm. However, even the best preventive measures can fall short.

### **Current Response to an Active Shooter at OHSU**

Studies have shown that an active shooter injures or kills four people per minute. These incidents continue until the shooter is engaged by an armed law enforcement officer. As soon as the active shooter is engaged by armed law enforcement officers the shooting of innocent bystanders stops for one of three reasons: the shooter begins to target the law enforcement officers instead of innocent bystanders; the shooter is injured or killed by the law enforcement officers; or the shooter commits suicide.

The Portland Police Bureau (PPB) serves as the current armed response to an active shooter on the Marquam Hill Campus or South Waterfront. The Portland Police Bureau utilizes a tactical doctrine for engaging an active shooter that calls for a five-officer contact team. Because all PPB officers are trained to a certain minimum standard, any five officers can form this contact team.

Discussions with PPB command and analysis of response times to actual emergency calls for service have produced a timeline that show it would take at least 15 minutes to assemble a five-person contact team and engage an active shooter on the Marquam Hill Campus. While the first arriving unit from PPB could be on-scene in less than seven minutes, an additional eight minutes would elapse before the entire team of five officers could be assembled.

The Hillsboro Police Department serves as the current armed response to an active shooter on the OHSU West Campus. The Hillsboro Police Department employs a tactical doctrine that utilizes a five-officer contact team. This doctrine has been adopted by all Washington County law enforcement agencies, and all of these agencies train together for critical incident response. As a result, any five officers from any Washington County agency can form the five-person contact team. In most cases, a five-person contact team can be assembled in about 5 minutes and engage an active shooter shortly thereafter.

The OHSU Department of Public Safety would participate in this response by meeting the police officers at a designated location on campus, guiding the contact team to the location of the active shooter, and providing any additional support from outside the line of fire. Only armed officers

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

that have received training in the tactical doctrine of the responding police agency may participate as members of the contact team. Because they are prohibited by state statute from attending the full police academy training program offered by the State of Oregon and because they are prohibited by state statute from carrying firearms, the OHSU Public Safety Officers may not participate as members of the five-person team.

Although they would not engage the active shooter directly, OHSU officers have a variety of other critical incident tasks that they have planned and trained for during this type of critical incident, including notification to the campus about the critical incident, crowd and traffic control, establishment of a perimeter, and liaison with emergency medical services and other first responders. These tasks are also vital to the successful management of a critical incident, and would be outside the scope of the other responding police agency.

Attachment 1 shows an active shooter timeline analysis. This timeline includes the projected response times for the Portland Police Bureau, the OHSU Department of Public Safety, compared against the timeline of events from the Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University shootings.

### **Likelihood of an Incident**

OHSU is a large and complex institution with multiple missions. Because it is not possible to know in advance when or where a critical incident or active shooter event may take place, an analysis of “attractors” helped OHSU assess its exposure to potential threats. The OHSU Department of Public Safety reviewed types of activities and locations that have the potential to increase the risk of a critical incident. They then compared OHSU against other universities and hospitals. The analysis shows OHSU has more attractors than any organization against which it was compared. The analysis also shows OHSU is unique in Oregon, combining many of the attractors associated with large universities with those of community hospitals, and adding a few of its own. This chart is included as Attachment 2.

### **Task Force Process**

The task force met four times during fall 2008. These meetings included an organizational meeting on August 26, a meeting to receive testimony from technical experts on September 26, a meeting to receive testimony from the public on October 23 and a work session on November 6. Below is a summary of those meetings. A complete set of minutes and attendance sheets from those meetings is included in this report as Attachment 3.

#### *Organizational Meeting, 8/26/2008*

At the organizational meeting, Dr. Robertson welcomed the task force and explained that it had been formed to help him evaluate the complex issue of responding to an active shooter incident at an OHSU facility. Gary Granger, the OHSU Director of Public Safety, provided a background briefing for the task force, including information about the capability of the OHSU Department of Public Safety and the anticipated response time of the Portland Police Bureau.

Director Granger presented information about the work that OHSU has done to address non-response activities that make a critical incident less likely, including improved information sharing and communication, elimination of radio communication ‘dead zones’, and the creation

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

of a threat assessment team. Granger also discussed two remaining gaps in critical incident preparedness: armed response to an active shooter and the inability of OHSU Public Safety Officers to attend the full 16-week police officer training program at the Department of Public Safety Standards and Training (state police academy).

The task force members asked a variety of questions about the existing response plan and procedures. These questions included inquiring about the existence and role of the Portland Police Bureau Special Emergency Reaction Team (SERT) in a critical incident response; the use of text messages to communicate with the OHSU community; identifying which agency is responsible for communicating with the neighborhood around OHSU during a critical incident; the current response plan for OHSU West Campus; statistics on the use of tasers by OHSU Public Safety Officers; and how often and by what means the Portland Police Bureau is contacted today by OHSU Public Safety.

The task force selected dates and topics for the remainder of the meetings, and the due date of the final report was set.

### Technical Experts Meeting 9/26/08

The task force met to hear testimony from emergency communications experts and law enforcement professionals, from both Portland and outside Oregon.

Captain Paul Berlin from the University of California San Francisco spoke about the 'hybrid' nature of the UCSF Police Department - that it employs both armed police officers and unarmed security officers. He discussed the training that officers receive, the different roles and responsibilities of the two types of officers, relationships with the San Francisco Police Department, the challenges of dispatching SFPD officers to a complex location like the UCSF campus, the challenges of recruiting police officers in the San Francisco area, and the use of memoranda of understanding to clarify roles and responsibilities between the UCSF and SFPD officers when responding to various types of calls for service.

Public Safety Director Charles Green of the University of Iowa spoke about his organization's transition from unarmed security officers to a hybrid department with both armed police officers and unarmed public safety officers in October of 2007. The department had been authorized under state law to carry firearms since 2004, but had not done so as a matter of university policy. Director Green explained that the armed police officers carry both firearms and tasers, but the security officers carry neither. The University of Iowa has a memorandum of understanding with the local police department that outlines how the two departments work together. Director Green said the relationship has been a positive and productive one.

During the question and answer session, Director Green described how activities of the campus police are coordinated with the city police department. He also discussed the extensive training that campus police receive in using various techniques to defuse situations without the use of force. Director Green discussed the period of 'provisional arming' that his department experienced. Under this system, the officers were trained in the use of firearms, but were not permitted to carry them. Instead, the firearms were kept in a secure location on campus and would be issued to the officers only when necessary. It quickly became clear that this was not a

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

good option, and it was discontinued. Instead, trained officers are now permitted to carry firearms at all times while on duty.

In response to a question about whether there was a specific incident that caused the University of Iowa to consider arming its police officers, Director Green responded that there had been an on-going discussion about arming officers for years. He stated that in his opinion, if an institution asks employees to perform law enforcement functions then those employees need to be trained and equipped to perform those functions, including the use of firearms.

Patrick Jones from the Portland Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) discussed the role that his agency plays in dispatching and coordinating first responders across the region. This includes not just Portland Police Bureau, but Portland Fire, EMS and other emergency responders. Jones spoke at length about the complexities of 911 dispatch, the role of global positioning systems (GPS), and the challenges of dispatching to a complex location like OHSU.

In response to questions from the task force, Jones stated that there was no technical reason that BOEC could not coordinate dispatch of resources to OHSU. He also stated that the use of two different radio systems by OHSU and Portland Police Bureau should not create an impediment to joint operations and training.

Chief Rosie Sizer from the Portland Police Bureau stated her support for OHSU having armed officers, but stated PPB is currently understaffed and would not be able to contract with OHSU to provide police officers on campus. She spoke highly of the work Gary Granger and OHSU Public Safety Officers have done building a positive relationship with the Portland Police Bureau.

Chief Sizer explained that if OHSU were to employ its own armed police officers, they would be eligible and required to attend the full 16-week DPSST academy. She also talked about the 40-hour crisis intervention training recently implemented by PPB and required of all officers. Chief Sizer also spoke about staffing levels for the Central Precinct, which is the precinct in which OHSU Marquam Hill campus is located, saying it is the largest precinct geographically, but has the lowest level of staffing because of the relatively low number of calls.

Chief Sizer said most PPB officers have a limited knowledge of the OHSU Marquam Hill campus. She noted the challenging topography, the frequent new construction, and the relatively low volume of calls for service as contributing to this situation. She stated that even with GPS her officers would require the assistance of an OHSU Public Safety Officer to get to most locations on campus quickly. Chief Sizer recognized that her officers can get to most locations in the city in about 5 minutes, but the deployment patterns of her officers and the challenging nature of the geography at OHSU mean the response times to that location are greater than she would desire.

Chief Sizer ended by saying she believes this conversation is overdue, and that she agrees with the comments of Director Green with respect to giving the proper training and equipment, including firearms, to employees that are expected to perform law enforcement functions. She

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

also noted the need for clear policies relating to the use of force and accountability measures to ensure that the policies are followed.

In response to questions from the task force about the possibility of a Portland Police Bureau substation located on Marquam Hill, Chief Sizer noted that the Portland Police Bureau does not use substations to house officers. They do have several contact offices, but officers are not stationed there. They are used to complete and file reports.

### Public Input Meeting 10/23/08

The public input meeting opened with a presentation of background information for members of the public in attendance and a discussion of the task force's charge. Director Granger shared information about the analysis undertaken by OHSU following the Virginia Tech incident, the number of potential 'attractors' at OHSU, and supplied current statistics about armed officers at universities nationwide.

Approximately 20 people were in attendance, including several OHSU employees. Three members of the public provided testimony. All three were opposed to OHSU having armed officers on campus. One person providing testimony was from the neighborhood surrounding OHSU and expressed specific concerns about how the many individuals suffering from a mental illness would react to armed officers, and how our officers would be trained to intervene in these situations. The other two individuals who provided testimony had both had encounters with OHSU Public Safety Officers they felt were handled inappropriately and expressed concerns things could have been worse had the officers been armed.

### Work Session Meeting, 11/6/2008

The task force established that the current armed response time was too slow. They then considered and rejected a number of options for reducing the response time.

### **Recommendations**

After much careful consideration, the task force crafted two recommendations. It is the opinion of the task force that these two options represent the best avenues to move toward a safer campus for patients, visitors, faculty, students and staff by providing better, more complete training for existing OHSU Public Safety Officers and by allowing faster engagement of an active shooter by armed law enforcement officers.

The task force understands that these are only recommendations. Dr. Robertson will discuss these recommendations with the OHSU Board of Directors and executive leadership team before a final decision is made. The task force members recognize that they have limited knowledge of the financial and other resources of OHSU and leave the specific means of implementing these recommendations to the discretion of Dr. Robertson. The task force is relying on Dr. Robertson to balance the decision to implement these recommendations in full or in part within the broader goals and objectives of the university.



## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

The votes for and against these recommendations are included as Attachment 8.

### ***Recommendation 1***

*OHSU should seek a change to the state statute governing OHSU Public Safety Officers to clarify their roles and authorities regardless of whether it moves forward with the recommendation to establish an armed presence.*

### ***Recommendation 2***

*A full-time armed law enforcement presence should be established at OHSU in order to provide a faster response to an active shooter incident, provided that all the conditions listed below are met:*

- All armed officers have completed the 16-week DPSST academy.
- All armed officers complete supplemental OHSU campus public safety training.
- All armed officers complete 40-hour Critical Incident Training developed and conducted by the Portland Police Bureau.
- All armed officers complete Cultural Awareness Training.
- An official OHSU review process is established to review any use of a firearm by an OHSU officer.
- A commitment to on-going training in firearms proficiency, proper use of force, and joint critical incident training with Portland Police Bureau and other law enforcement agencies.

### **Options for Implementing Recommendation 2**

The task force considered two options for providing armed law enforcement officers at OHSU facilities. The first option would be for OHSU to seek a change in state statute that would allow it to employ armed law enforcement officers. The second option would be to enter into a contractual arrangement with an existing law enforcement agency to provide armed law enforcement officers at OHSU facilities. While the task force would support either option, the majority of members present at the work session expressed a preference for Option 1.

#### ***Option 1: OHSU seeks the authority to employ armed law enforcement officers***

The task force identified several advantages to a legislative change that would allow OHSU to employ armed law enforcement officers.

#### ***Advantages***

- Because any armed law enforcement officers must interact with the unarmed public safety officers currently employed by OHSU, it is important that clear lines of authority be established and maintained between these two groups. Having both types of officers within one department would provide these clear lines of authority. Armed law enforcement officers from another agency could introduce unnecessary complexities into training and response operations.

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

- OHSU is a complex community both socially and geographically and it takes time for an officer to develop a thorough understanding of the environment. Officers employed by OHSU would have the time to develop this understanding over a period of years. An officer provided to OHSU under contract may only be stationed at OHSU for a short period of time and would find it difficult to develop the same level of knowledge about the community.
- The task force heard that the type of individual who is interested in campus law enforcement is different from an individual who might be interested in a municipal law enforcement career. The ability to employ fully-trained and certified armed law enforcement officers would allow OHSU to be more effective in targeting those individuals who have the special skills necessary to succeed in a complex community like OHSU.

### *Disadvantages*

- This option would require a change in state statute. The task force understands many individuals and groups are not comfortable with armed law enforcement officers at OHSU. Firearms are controversial, and any discussion about creating the authority for OHSU to employ armed law enforcement officers may generate passionate debate in the state legislature.
- Significant administrative and policy changes would be required within the OHSU Department of Public Safety, including an enhanced plan for recruiting, hiring, training, and retaining individuals with the right skills and disposition to be effective armed law enforcement officers at an academic medical center. The administrative challenges of this task far exceed those that would be required to manage even a complex contract for providing armed law enforcement officers from another agency.

### ***Option 2: OHSU contracts with an existing law enforcement agency to provide armed law enforcement officers***

#### *Advantages*

- This is a tested method for stationing armed law enforcement officers at institutions of higher education in Oregon. At least two Oregon University System institutions use this method to provide an armed law enforcement presence on campus. This provides a base of experience that OHSU could draw upon as it created a contract with an existing police agency.
- This option would not require a change in state statute and so would take less time and energy to accomplish.

#### *Disadvantages*

The task force identified several disadvantages associated with contracting for armed law enforcement services from an existing agency. While many of the disadvantages are the reverse of the advantages listed for Option 1 (difficulty in maintaining clear lines of authority; campus

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Report and Recommendations

law enforcement requires a different outlook and skill set than municipal law enforcement; officers require long periods of time to thoroughly understand the OHSU environment), the task force identified several additional disadvantages to this option.

- The cost of contracting for armed law enforcement officers is significantly greater than the cost to employ them within OHSU. The OHSU Department of Public Safety estimates that the incremental cost of employing armed law enforcement officers without adding additional staff to the department would be about \$350,000 dollars annually for twelve armed officers. The existing contract between Oregon State University and the Oregon State Police to provide law enforcement services is about \$1 Million annually for ten officers.
- It would take longer to implement a contract providing for armed law enforcement officers than it would for OHSU to hire and deploy those officers internally. The agencies most likely to be approached to provide armed law enforcement officers to OHSU under contract would have to make new hires to meet the terms of the contract. Those officers would be required to complete the full pipeline of training required by that agency before they would be available to OHSU. Those officers would then need to complete additional training that is specific to their role under the contract with OHSU, adding additional months to the training process. A timeline that illustrates the training for both options is included as Attachment 9.

### **Conclusion**

The task force recommends that the state statute controlling the authorities of Special Campus Safety Officers be clarified. Specifically, some OHSU Department of Public Safety officers should be permitted to attend the full 16-week DPSST academy and be commissioned as peace officers. The task force recommends that this change be pursued regardless of a decision to allow these officers to carry firearms.

A majority of the members of the task force support having fully trained and certified law enforcement officers armed with firearms present at OHSU at all times to ensure a prompt response to an active shooter incident, provided certain specific training standards are met. Some of the task force members support contracting with an existing law enforcement agency to provide this service, although the majority of the task force members support the OHSU Department of Public Safety being able to employ its own armed officers.

The task force encourages OHSU to enhance communication with the residential neighborhood that surrounds Marquam Hill. In particular, it is recommended the university work with the Portland Police Bureau to explore systems that would facilitate communication with the neighborhood during a critical incident. OHSU should also assess whether there are additional measures that could be taken by OHSU to ensure that information about a critical incident is communicated to the neighborhood in a timely manner.

Critical Incident Readiness Task Force  
Report and Recommendations

**Attachments**

Attachment 1: Active Shooter Timeline Analysis

Attachment 2: “Attractors” Document

Attachment 3: Task Force Meeting Minutes and Sign-In Sheets

Attachment 4: Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Communications

Attachment 5: Task Force Background Packet

Attachment 6: Survey Responses


Attachment 7: Internal Feedback Summary

Attachment 8: Votes on Recommendations

Attachment 9: Training Timeline

Attachment 10: Mental Health Community Involvement

# ACTIVE SHOOTER TIMELINE ANALYSIS



	<i>OHSU (Public Safety)</i>	<i>Medical Universities</i>	<i>UCSF (Police)</i>	<i>UW (Police)</i>	<i>Oregon University System</i>	<i>Oregon State University (Public Safety + OSP)</i>	<i>University of Oregon (Public Safety + Eugene PD)</i>	<i>Portland State University (Public Safety)</i>	<i>Portland Medical Centers</i>	<i>Legacy Emanuel (In-House Unarmed Security)</i>
Total Attractors	15		12	14		7	7	4		8

**Medical Attractors**

Emergency Room	Y		Y	Y		N	N	N		Y
Level 1 (or Eq) Trauma Center	Y		N	Y		N	N	N		Y
Residential Psychiatric Facility	Y		Y	Y		N	N	N		Y
Veterans Services or Proximity To	Y		N	N		N	N	N		N
Women's Services Provider	Y		Y	Y		N	N	N		Y
Regional Medical Provider	Y		Y	Y		N	N	N		Y
Children's Hospital	Y		Y	N		N	N	N		Y
Mother/Baby Unit	Y		Y	Y		N	N	N		Y

**Academic Attractors**

Undergraduate Residential Population	N		N	Y		Y	Y	Y		N
Activist-Targetted Research	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		N
Animal Research Populations	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		N
Radiation Sources	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	Y		N
Major Sports Events	N		N	Y		Y	Y	Y		N
Bio-hazard containment labs	Y		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		N
Federally regulated Select Agent Labs	Y		Y	Y		Y	N	N		N

**Location Attractors**

Urban Center	Y		Y	Y		N	Y	Y		Y
Tourist Attraction (Misc)	Y		N	N		N	N	N		N

**Response Resources**

Campus/Hospital Staff with Police Powers	N		Y	Y		N	N	N		N
Police on site	N		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		N
Armed Response on-site	N		Y	Y		Y	Y	N		N

# SIGN IN SHEET

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Organizational Meeting

SoN 358/364, 1:30-3:30 p.m.

Name	Representative Group	Sign In
Margie Lowe.....	Governor's Office	
TBA.....	Governor's TF Crossover Rep.	
Senator Ginny Burdick.....	Legislature	Present
Senator Bruce Starr.....	Legislature	Bruce W. Starr
TBA.....	Multnomah County	
Jane Ames.....	City of Portland	
Carmen Merlo.....	Portland Office, Emerg. Management	Carmen Merlo
Olga Acuna.....	City of Hillsboro	
Susan Egnor.....	Homestead Neighborhood	Susan Egnor
Ken Love.....	South Portland Neighborhood	
Mike Reese.....	Portland Police Bureau	Present
Allen Zaugg.....	Hillsboro Police Bureau	Allen Zaugg
Barbara Glidewell.....	OHSU Patient Representative	
Marcus Mundy.....	Community/Urban League	Marcus Mundy
TBA.....	Community/Mental Health (NAMI)	
Sandra McDonough.....	Business Representative	
TBA.....	Veteran's Representative	
Carol Howe.....	OHSU Faculty	Carol Howe
Nina Katovic.....	OHSU Student Council	Nina Katovic
Mike Bandy.....	AFSCME Representative	Mike Bandy
Harold Fleshman.....	Oregon Nurses Association	Harold Fleshman
Steven Scott.....	OHSU Health System Representative	Steven Scott
Nancy Haigwood.....	West Campus Representative	Nancy Haigwood
Roman Hernandez.....	OHSU Board of Directors	Roman Hernandez
Martha McMurry.....	Community Advocate	

# ***Critical Incident Readiness Task Force***

## ***Organizational Meeting Minutes***

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

### **CIRTF Members**

See attached list.

### **Welcome**

Dr. Joe Robertson, President of Oregon Health & Science University (“OHSU”) welcomed all in attendance and expressed special appreciation to the CIRTF Members for dedicating their time and energy to this important project. Dr. Robertson stated of all the issues he has faced as President of OHSU, this is the most complex and perplexing one. He has no preconceived notion of how to take action on this issue and no foregone conclusions on how best to address the university’s needs on this front.

As background for the reason this task force was created, Dr. Robertson mentioned how the events that have taken place at Northern Illinois and Virginia Tech have created a reality in which we cannot deny our need for action in this area. Dr. Robertson questioned if we are in a position where appropriate steps have been taken by the university to deal with a similar tragic event in the most efficient manner possible. Dr. Robertson expressed his desire for this to be an open and transparent process, making the university open to CIRTF Members to assist them in making a sound, thoughtful recommendation. The CIRTF recommendation would be taken to OHSU’s Board of Directors for final adoption before OHSU would begin the process of implementation.

Dr. Robertson then turned the meeting over to Senator Ginny Burdick, Chair of the CIRTF.

### **Introductions**

Sen. Burdick began by emphasizing that early identification of exposures and development of a plan is a very important exercise, even if the plan is never put into action. Sen. Burdick spoke to how revealing the “Attractors” chart (Section 3, Page 1 of meeting notebook distributed to members prior to meeting) is in identifying the types of risk attractors and response resources OHSU has in comparison to other universities and health system. Sen. Burdick expressed a desire to have the work product of the CIRTF be a heavily prevention oriented strategy so we never have to see a Virginia Tech-type headline about OHSU.



Sen. Burdick turned the meeting over for introductions of the CIRTF Members and their representative groups:

**CIRTF Members Present:**

Sen. Ginny Burdick – D-Portland, OHSU  
Sen. Bruce Starr - R-Hillsboro, W Campus  
Carol Howe - OHSU Faculty  
Steven Scott – OHSU Health System  
Nancy Haigwood – OHSU West Campus  
Carmen Merlo – Director, Portland Office of Emergency Management  
Mike Bandy – OHSU AFSCME President  
Susan Egnor – Chair of the Homestead Neighborhood Association  
Barbara Glidewell – Patient Representative  
Nina Katovic – OHSU Student Council  
Román Hernández – OHSU Board of Directors  
Allen Zaugg - Commander, Hillsboro Police Bureau  
Harold Fleshman, ONA President

**Invitees Present:**

Dr. Joe Robertson, President of OHSU  
Joe Partridge – CIRTF Staff to assist with organization and information gathering  
Gary Granger – Director, OHSU Public Safety

Sen. Burdick requested those in attendance not on the task force introduce themselves. She then commented about how much progress the Portland Police Department has made in this area and the hope their representative will be in attendance at the next CIRTF meeting.

**Charter, Objectives and Work Plan**

Sen. Burdick invited Gary Granger, Director of OHSU Public Safety to come to the front table and address the group concerning some of the risks OHSU must overcome if faced with a critical incident event.

Mr. Granger spoke to the importance of prevention, preparedness and communication between OHSU and the community as being key factors taken away from the lessons learned upon examination of the Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois events. OHSU Public Safety current has concerns surrounding equipment currently available to OHSU Officers, inability to receive full training, staffing issues, authority for Public Safety to take necessary action to control critical incident and ability to recover from event.

Sen. Burdick made reference to the potential for legislative action to be a necessary step in implementing this task force's recommendation. Statutory change is part of the group's tool chest.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger what would happen today if a critical incident occurred and made reference to the copy of the presentation made to OHSU's Board of Directors (Section 4 of meeting notebook) not long after the Virginia Tech incident. Sen. Burdick also made reference to the Active Shooter Timeline Analysis presented to the Board of Directors (Section 7, Page 7 of meeting notebook).

Mr. Granger provided the following timeline information:

- Within 60 seconds of notification to Public Safety of a critical event in progress the following would take place:
  - Lock down of all areas of campus with this remote capability.
  - Call made to local police for assistance.
  - Appointment of OHSU Officer in charge.
  - OHSU Public Safety Officers (PS Officers) dispatched to scene. Approximate arrival time of two PS Officers would be 3 minutes from dispatch. If the critical event involved an armed individual, PS Officers would be unable to get too close because they do not carry firearms.
  - Broadcast messages would be sent out to include utilization of OHSU's text paging system.
- During the next 5 minutes:
  - Additional PS Officers would arrive.
  - PS Officers would assist with keeping people from coming in and out of critical event area.
  - OHSU Officer in charge would continue to dispatch new information to the OHSU community.
- During the next 6-10 minutes:
  - Portland Police Department Officers (PPD Officers) begin to arrive.
  - Portland Police Department doctrine requires 5 PPD Officers be present before they can engage the shooter.

Mr. Granger emphasized that it would take 15-25 minutes from the time the call for police assistance was made by OHSU to have PPD Officers in a position to begin to control a shooting event. In an active shooter scenario, statistics indicate one life is lost every 4 minutes. One barrier mentioned by Mr. Granger in getting PPD Officers close to the shooter is PS Officers would be unable to escort PPD Officers to the exact location to engage target because they are not armed. The only assistance PS Officers could provide would be to continue to hold the perimeter.

Sen. Burdick asked if a SWAT Team would be the first on the scene from the Portland Police Department. Mr. Granger stated the SWAT Team would not be called in unless the event turned into a hostage situation. At that time the SWAT Team would be dispatched along with hostage negotiators.

Carmen Merlo asked Mr. Granger about the content of the text message that would be sent to the OHSU community. Mr. Granger stated specific information concerning a shooter on campus would be shared along with the exact location of the shooter and instruction concerning evacuation or staying put. Ms. Merlo asked about the characters of text allowed by OHSU text paging system and if the message would be sent to everyone with a text pager or not. Mr. Granger said there are limitations to the amount of information that can be included in a text message. It could be that several messages would need to be sent to distribute all necessary information. Mr. Granger went on to say the message would probably only initially be sent to management pagers – not all OHSU pagers.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger how much has changed at OHSU since the Virginia Tech incident. Mr. Granger stated that analysis has been done concerning OHSU's readiness to handle a similar situation. The analysis has been shared with OHSU Executive Leadership and OHSU's Board of Directors. Some action has been taken.

Mike Bandy asked Mr. Granger about the status of the VA Hospital Officers – are they armed? Mr. Granger explained the VA Officers are armed as they are governed by Federal Law and protect federal property. A handshake agreement is in place with the VA Officers to assist in patient unit areas currently leased by OHSU. This assistance is intended to fill the security gap until PS Officers can arrive on the scene.

Susan Egnor asked Mr. Granger what can be communicated to the neighborhood surrounding OHSU if a shooter has moved from OHSU property. Mr. Granger stated OHSU would need to rely on community law enforcement capabilities to deliver this message.

The focus of discussion changed to tactical doctrine and standardized training associated with same. Any officer from any agency in the county would have the ability to respond and be part of a 5 contact tactical cell to engage target. The first team would go directly to the threat and the arrival of subsequent teams would focus on containment of the event. This tactical team could comprise of armed PS Officers side-by-side with community officers. Sen. Burdick commented that “armed” means trained.

Sen. Bruce Starr commented the focus of the decision had been primarily surrounding and event at OHSU's Main Campus. He asked Mr. Granger about the readiness of OHSU West Campus. Mr. Granger expressed concern in this area as there is currently not enough funding for 24/7 coverage at the West Campus. There is currently adequate staffing for a PS Officer presence 20/7. OHSU relies on Hillsboro Police Department Officer (HP Officer) to assist with security of the West Campus. All HP Officers have access to all areas of the West Campus.

Sen. Starr asked about the level of HP Officers familiarity with the West Campus. Mr. Granger responded by stating it is as good as it can be. It takes approximately 3 months to train PS Officers to become fully familiar with the campus. He went on to explain that a PS Officer is assigned to wait at a campus entry point for emergency personnel and escort them to the exact location of the event.

Nancy Haigwood commented on the increasingly brazen tactics of animal rights activists and the increasing development of land adjacent to the Primate Center as an immediate concern. Some animal rights activist groups have begun harassing employees at their personal residence.

Sen. Burdick made reference to a request recently made to exempt Primate Center employee's names from the public record law. She said her first reaction was not to grant the exemption until she began to learn more about some of the intrusive tactics being used nationally by activist groups. The exemption was ultimately granted.

Mr. Bandy suggested a Portland Police Department substation at OHSU due to the high density of the area. Mr. Granger agreed that this route is an option. Sen. Burdick posed the questions if it would be more cost effective to have OHSU's own armed, trained presence on campus or to contract those services out.

In support of an armed presence on campus, Barbara Glidewell presented a historical prospective of a bank robbery event that occurred years ago in which the perpetrators cut down trees to block most of the roads leading up to campus. They left one route available for their own escape. The robbery was successful.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger about the security tactics in place surrounding the Tram. Mr. Granger spoke to the unique nature of the Tram. A threats and risks assessment was performed with assistance from local police and the Federal Government. As a result of this assessment, some of the physical attributes were changed from the original design to enhance protection of the Tram from a critical incident. Mr. Granger explained that PS Officers are posted at the top and bottom of the tram, but do not ride the tram. The Tram operator always has direct radio access to PS Officers while operating the Tram.

Sen. Burdick asked about the use of tasers by PS Officers. Mr. Granger responded by stating PS Officers have been carrying tasers for about 5 years. Statistics show PS Officers have pulled the taser for use approximately 50 times per year. Of the times the taser is pulled for use, the trigger is actually pulled approximately 25% of the time. The taser is an effective deterrent in 75% of the cases in which it is pulled.

Román Hernández asked Mr. Granger for an example of the kind of scenario that would result in OHSU contacting the local police department for assistance. Mr. Granger told of a case when a gentleman worried about his suicidal brother

contacted OHSU to let us know his brother was in route to OHSU and there was a gun missing from the house. OHSU Dispatch contacted the Portland Police Department for assistance. When PS Officers arrived at the Emergency Department, they learned the suspect was standing at the triage desk. The decision was then made to put hands on the suspect at that time. The suspect was not armed.

Allen Zaugg spoke of a relatively inexpensive software system purchased by the Hillsboro public schools, which provides a mobile map of all buildings, exits/entrances, shut off valves for hazmat staff as well as a 360 degree photo of all rooms and buildings. This system has the potential to overcome the hurdle of getting emergency personnel exactly where they are needed independently rather than relying on an escort. Joe Partridge commented on the potential usefulness of this type of a system, however the CIRTF has been charged with submitting a recommendation to the Dr. Robertson by November. This would be something to take a look as part of a second phase to this project. Sen. Burdick spoke in support of the suggestion, but commented that this solution was on the borderline of being outside the purview of the task force.

### **Review of Background Materials**

Sen. Burdick turned the time over to Mr. Partridge for a review of the background materials notebook distributed to the CIRTF Members prior to the meeting.

Tab 1 – Collection of analysis dealing with the Virginia Tech incident.

Tab 2 – Information outlining the gaps in OHSU's current abilities.

Tab 3 – Attractors chart. Mr. Granger went into some detail about the high number of risk factors OHSU has in relation to other academic and health centers. Sen. Burdick asked for additional information concerning the green highlighted boxes. Mr. Granger said the green color was used to highlight the institutions currently resourced with on site armed officers who hold police powers.

Tab 4 – Slides from the Campus Security presentation to OHSU's Board of Directors.

Tab 5 – US Department of Justice special report on campus law enforcement (2004-05). The comment was made concerning a growing trend nationally in the arming of police forces for large institutions. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger to speak to any safety experience data available that compares unarmed forces with armed forces. Mr. Granger stated he is not aware of any specific data to this topic, but provided education concerning the recently enacted Cleary Act reporting requirements concerning workplace violence events. A suggestion by Sen. Burdick was made to contact the Portland State Criminal Justice Department to see if statistics of this type would be available for the task force to review. Mr. Partridge will check into this in addition to contacting institutions that have made this change in their safety protocol. Mr. Granger offered to contact the University of Iowa in this regard as

well. Ms. Merlo cautioned the group concerning making a direct correlation between arming officers and a decrease in crime as the decrease in crime could be a result from a change in another area. For example, increased light in high crime areas can result in a decrease in occurrences. Mr. Bandy highlighted that we may not be able to fully rely on information from University of Iowa because OHSU does not have student housing as an attractor. Ms. Glidewell expressed working with PS Officers approximately 3 times per week due to a violent, out of control patient, family member or visitor. She used the term “drama follows trauma” as a suitable attractor even though OHSU does not sponsor student housing. Sen. Burdick stated the OHSU attractors need to remain the focus of the task force.

Tab 6 – White paper prepared by Mr. Granger, thoroughly outlining OHSU’s existing authorities and touching on the potential change in landscape if new authorities were put in place.

Tab 7 – Presentation to OHSU Executive Leadership Team focusing on legislative changes needed for change in OHSU’s existing authorities.

Tab 8 – Collection of new releases and FAQ’s both internal and external.

Mr. Partridge let the Members know that if any additional materials are requested, he will gather and distribute to the entire CIRTF for review.

Carol Howe asked Mr. Granger for examples of the types and frequency of calls the Public Safety Department routinely handles. Mr. Granger stated the majority of calls responded to by PS Officers deal with community policing activities (i.e. unlocking doors, finding cars, approximately 25 calls per day concerning a potentially violent individual.

Ms. Merlo urged the CIRTF to not just look at the active shooting scenario and overlook the fact that OHSU has radioactive material onsite and a women’s facility. She encouraged the group to identify the more day-to-day safety reasons to arm the officers, not just the low occurrence/high profile and mortality rate scenario.

Mr. Bandy asked about the comments that came in to Dr. Robertson from the OHSU community after the Towne Hall conducted on this subject. Mr. Partridge volunteered to look into gathering and distributing this information to the group.

### **Gap Identification**

Sen. Burdick asked the group to identify current gaps in OHSU’s current safety position to provide focus for the group’s effort.

1. Information Sharing/Communication. Mr. Granger highlighted the importance of solidifying communication protocols for a critical event. This is one of the lessons learned when examining the Virginia Tech incident.

OHSU is close to increasing our communication technology – contract terms of this arrangement are under negotiation.

2. Communication Dead Zones on Campus. Marcus Mundy asked about OHSU's participation in TOPOFF and was wondering about the radio frequency used by OHSU is the same as the police. OHSU uses the same frequency as the police per Mr. Granger. He spoke to difficulties with "dead zones" around campus and an effort a year ago internally upgrade some OHSU systems to assist with this problem. Mr. Partridge indicated that 800 MHZ is a challenge and OHSU would assist Portland Police with communication while on campus. This may take the form of giving PPD Officers our communication equipment because PS Officers would be unable to accompany PPD Officers in an armed scenario.
3. Threat Assessment Team. OHSU is in the process of forming and training an onsite Threat Assessment Team. This task should be accomplished by the end of the year. Mr. Granger stated it is clear from the Virginia Tech event that OHSU needs the path and authority clearly outlined to "push the big red button immediately and directly" at the onset of a critical incident.
4. OHSU's Response Capability. The materials from the Executive Leadership Team presentation graphically illustrate this issue.
5. Inability for PS Officers to Receive Full Training at Police Academy. Mr. Granger stated that due to current language of the law, PS Officers are not able to receive adequate training – armed or not – to handle all of the issues that come up in a given day at OHSU. Mr. Granger explained PS Officers are only allowed to attend 6 weeks of the 16 week academy training. After this abbreviated training, PS Officers have the title of "Special Campus Security Officers". Mr. Granger spoke briefly on the history of arming PS Officers at OHSU. PS Officers were disarmed through legislative action in the '70's.

Sen. Starr asked if a cost analysis had been done surrounding an increase in training for PS Officers. Mr. Granger explained that the academy training itself is offered at no cost to those authorized to take it. OHSU would look to expand the training of existing PS Officer rather than hire additional staff. To arm OHSU's PS Officers would cost approximately \$250,000 per year to maintain two armed officers on campus 24/7. Sen. Starr spoke to contemplation of a contract with the Portland Police Department to provide these services. Mr. Granger spoke of a contract currently in place between the Portland Police Department and Portland State at the cost of approximately \$1 million per year. Ms. Howe asked how much of the \$250,000 estimation would be salary increases. Mr. Granger responded that some of the monies spend would be for salary increases to those armed PS Officers and an increase in training costs. Sen. Burdick asked if Mr. Granger envisions some armed and some unarmed PS Officers. Mr. Granger outlined a multi-layered staffing format with certain PS Officers possessing certain training and authority. Ms. Glidewell asked about increase in insurance costs to the university if PS Officers become armed. Mr. Partridge stated it is difficult at this time to outline specific dollar outcomes. Harold Fleshman commented on

newly trained officers with guns – who will investigate the use of armed force? Commander Zaugg stated there are certain protocols in place at community police departments pertaining to how to conduct a shoot review. Those could be used as a model. Mr. Granger informed the group that armed PS Officers would have a different position description and job requirements in order to be hired. Public Safety currently employs retired police and only those who are qualified would be viable candidates for these armed PS Officer positions.

6. Primate Center's Specific Needs. Mr. Hernández emphasized that the Primate Center need to be a specific point of discussion. He recommends looking into external perimeter security. When he visited the Primate Center, he was surprised to find there was no locked gate and there was one unarmed officer at the entrance. He believes further assessment needs to be done at the West Campus. Mr. Granger spoke to OHSU actively working on this issue; however, funding has proved to be a barrier in making security improvements at this time. Ms. Haigwood thanked Mr. Hernández for bringing this issue to the forefront of the discussion. Sen. Starr made a recommendation that the CIRTF have one recommendation for OHSU's Main Campus and a separate recommendation for OHSU's West Campus.

Mr. Fleshman asked about security at other School of Nursing campus in Oregon. Sen. Burdick spoke to reliance on local law enforcement for these areas. She also commented on the lack of attractors and the desire to not have the group stray too far from the original charge of the CIRTF.

Sen. Burdick stated the gaps identified will be the basis for the next meeting and turned the time over to Mr. Partridge to formalize the groups schedule going forward. After group discussion, the following schedule was decided upon:

**September 26, 2008 at 10:00 am** – Expert testimony will be heard from local law enforcement, campus safety and communications experts.

**October 23, 2008 at 6:00 pm** – Public testimony will be heard by CIRTF invitees and by members of the general public.

**November 6, 2008 at 9:00 am** – Work Session where the bulk of the work will be done to move a draft document to a smaller group to finish and present to Dr. Robertson to take to the OHSU Board of Directors.

Sen. Burdick commented that she hoped Chief Sizer would be able to participate in the discussion due to the special training for the mentally ill that has been conducted locally.

Mr. Partridge committed to distributing “gaps” information, information on officer training and a contact list for all CIRTF Members by week's end.



Ms. Haigwood made an open invitation offer to individual group members to tour the Primate Center facility if interested.

Mr. Granger proposed setting up 4 or 5 times to personally conduct a campus security tour. The tour would take approximately 1 hour with good walking shoes.

The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 by Sen. Burdick.

Minutes submitted by: Joe Partridge \_\_\_\_\_

Minutes approved by: Senator Ginny Burdick \_\_\_\_\_

# SIGN IN SHEET

Friday, 9-26-08

## Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Organizational Meeting

SoN 358/364, 10:00-12:00 p.m.

Name	Representative Group	Sign In
Margie Lowe.....	Governor's Office	
TBA.....	Governor's TF Crossover Rep.	
Senator Ginny Burdick.....	Legislature	
Senator Bruce Starr.....	Legislature	
Timothy Moore.....	Multnomah County	<i>Timothy Moore</i>
Jane Ames.....	City of Portland	
Carmen Merlo.....	Portland Office, Emerg. Management	<i>Carmen Merlo</i>
Olga Acuna.....	City of Hillsboro	<i>Olga Acuna</i>
Susan Egnor.....	Homestead Neighborhood	
Ken Love.....	South Portland Neighborhood	
Mike Reese.....	Portland Police Bureau	<i>Mike Reese</i>
Allen Zaugg.....	Hillsboro Police Bureau	<i>Allen Zaugg</i>
Barbara Glidewell.....	OHSU Patient Representative	<i>Barbara Glidewell</i>
Marcus Mundy.....	Community/Urban League	<i>Marcus Mundy</i>
TBA .....	Community/Mental Health (NAMI)	
Sandra McDonough.....	Business Representative	<i>Sandra McDonough</i>
Susan Cox.....	Veteran's Representative	
Carol Howe.....	OHSU Faculty	<i>Carol Howe</i>
Nina Katovic.....	OHSU Student Council	
Mike Bandy.....	AFSCME Representative	<i>Mike Bandy</i>
Harold Fleshman.....	Oregon Nurses Association	<i>Harold Fleshman RN</i>
Steven Scott.....	OHSU Health System Representative	<i>Steven Scott</i>
Nancy Haigwood.....	West Campus Representative	<i>Nancy Haigwood</i>
Roman Hernandez.....	OHSU Board of Directors	
Martha McMurry.....	Community Advocate	

# ***Critical Incident Readiness Task Force***

## ***Expert Testimony Meeting Minutes***

Friday, September 26, 2008

### **CIRTF Members**

See attached list.

#### CIRTF Members Present:

Sen. Ginny Burdick – D-Portland, OHSU

Timothy Moore, Multnomah County

Carmen Merlo – Director, Portland Office of Emergency Management

Olga Acuña – City of Hillsboro

Susan Egnor representative James Hearn - Homestead Neighborhood Association

Mike Reese – Portland Police Bureau

Allen Zaugg - Hillsboro Police Bureau

Barbara Glidewell – Patient Representative

Marcus Mundy – Community/Urban League

Sandra McDonough – Business Representative

Carol Howe - OHSU Faculty

Mike Bandy – AFSCME President

Harold Fleshman, Oregon Nurses Association President

Steven Scott – OHSU Health System

Nancy Haigwood – OHSU West Campus

#### Invitees Present:

Chief Rosie Sizer, Portland Police Bureau

Patrick Jones, Portland Bureau of Emergency Communications

Director Charles Green, University of Iowa Public Safety (Teleconference)

Captain Paul Berlin, University of California San Francisco

Public Safety (Teleconference)

Joe Partridge – CIRTF Staff to assist with organization and information gathering

Gary Granger – Director, OHSU Department of Public Safety

### **Welcome**

Sen. Burdick welcomed all committee members and guests participating in this Expert Testimony Meeting of the CIRTF then turned the time over to Joe Partridge to introduce Captain Paul Berlin, University of California San Francisco Public Safety.

### **Captain Paul Berlin Testimony**

Joe Partridge provided information concerning Captain Paul Berlin's background to the CIRTF.

Captain Berlin began by thanking the task force for asking him to participate in this discussion. He spoke to his full support in the arming officers in environments similar to UCSF considering the violence that is encountered by officers daily. Captain Berlin commented on the perception of safety by the community and the crime deterrent value when a gun is seen. Their department fully supports the concept of arming officers.

Sen. Burdick introduced herself as the chair of the CIRTF and asked Captain Berlin if he was finished with his prepared remarks. Captain Berlin indicated that he was. Sen. Burdick turned the time over for questions from the task force members.

Sen. Burdick asked Captain Berlin how many armed officers UCSF has at present. UCSF currently has 43 armed officers and a staff of 60 unarmed civilian security officers that are unarmed. Captain Berlin commented that the officers are currently undergoing active shooter training utilizing an AK47. Sen. Burdick asked if all 43 sworn officers are participating in this training, followed by an affirmative response.

Sen. Burdick asked if there are any other specialized training programs in place to reflect the uniqueness of UCSF. Captain Berlin stated there is semiannual firearm qualification testing in a timed environment. Twice yearly officers participate in eight hours of firearms testing. Monthly training is conducting in a briefing style format associated with use of force and lethal force; laws of arrest, search and seizure; review of current events around the country and analysis of what could be done differently. UCSF feels it is important to have this information fresh in their minds when they go out into the community. Sen. Burdick asked if there is any training focused on encounters with the mentally ill. UCSF does have a medical science building that is manned with security officers who are trained in dealing with the mentally ill. The security officers notify the local police and a UCSF officer will be immediately dispatched to the scene. The officers are trained on ways to handle some of the unique issues that come with interacting with someone who is mentally ill until local law enforcement arrives. UCSF does house mentally ill patients, so this is an ongoing issue. Sen. Burdick asked if the armed officers also participate in this training. Captain Berlin spoke to training received by armed officers in the academy and during incident briefings.

Sen. Burdick opened the floor to CIRTF members' questions. Barbara Glidewell mentioned her frequent interactions with OHSU's Department of Public Safety and their training concerning "talk downs" of a hostile, explosive individual. She spoke to her experience with role playing various scenarios, expressed the importance of practicing this technique and asked if role play training conducted at UCSF. Captain Berlin stated that critical incident training is conducted

quarterly to include active shooter incident; violent individuals making statements and the use of negotiation and communication techniques. Some of these trainings are based on real examples, which are then debriefed to identify areas for improvement. Additional training points are developed based on the debriefing discussion.

Steve Scott asked how long have the 43 officers been armed and how much of the decision to arm was based on the physical urban location of UCSF. Captain Berlin spoke to his experience at UCSF since arriving in February of 2007 and the UCSF Police Department has been armed for more than 25 years. He spoke to the diverse community with areas high in narcotics activity surrounding UCSF, which brings other criminal activity to the area. It is critical for their officers to be able to respond when needed and, at times, become the right arm for the San Francisco Police Department due to the low number of police officers in the East Bay area. Their officers are not only needed for the protection of those on campus, but also act to assist the SFPD in the surrounding community.

Carol Howe asked if their officers participate in joint training exercises with the SFPD. Captain Berlin explained UCSF's communication system can readily switch over to the SFPD's communication system and work hand in hand with them. Just recent UCSF participated in The Urban Shield, which is a collaboration of local swat teams and some from other areas of the US – one from Boston -- that take part in scenario training, which include hospital scenarios involving hostage and barricade situations and mentally ill scenarios. Their participation with this group is a significant advantage, teaching different styles of entry and dealing with and defusing the primary catalyst individual(s). Captain Berlin emphasized their collaborative involvement with local law enforcement has increased during the last five years. He has been in law enforcement for over 30 years and has never seen as much collaboration and teamwork with local law enforcement. It is imperative that this trend continue due to the low numbers of local officers in the East Bay.

Mr. Scott inquired as to the different duties between the sworn and unsworn officers. Captain Berlin stated that UCSF currently has a mix of sworn officers and unsworn security personnel, which has been a good balance, but they are looking at adding about 20 more sworn officers to their team due to the growth of the Mission Bay area.

Mr. Scott requested clarification of the differences between the sworn and unsworn officer duties. Captain Berlin detailed some of the security officer duties that differ from the sworn officer duties: Ensure folks coming in buildings display the appropriate identification at security desks; ensure the individual is an employee and it is appropriate for that individual to have access to the particular area; they are trained and briefed concerning the different current issues around campus to enable them to act as the eyes and ears for the sworn officers; to escort

students, faculty and staff as needed. The unsworn are an important part of the department and outnumber the sworn.

Nancy Haigwood made note of the geographic challenges facing a complicated three dimensional campus and asked what UCSF has done to enhance campus familiarity given the number of officers working various shifts and different types of officers. Captain Berlin explained their officers' participation in line ups and staying current on details of occurrences on campus and the community of San Francisco. This group works with the investigation divisions of the SFPD. It is imperative for them to be aware of what is happening in the area. Another issue faced by UCSF is crimes perpetrated by animal rights activists. They would immediately communicate threats and/or violent activities perpetrated by animal rights activists to the SFPD. Captain Berlin emphasized the need for teamwork to keep everyone on the same page.

Ms. Haigwood asked for additional information on how they assure that the UCSF officers and security officers can find a specific location when needed. Captain Berlin stated that UCSF has 222 sites of owned and leased property, which poses a challenge. UCSF has a special phone number to be used by the university community to report a crime or ask for immediate assistance. When the UCSF emergency number receives a call, they would notify the appropriate local community resource (fire, police, medical) and dispatch UCSF officers to the area. The UCSF community must call this specific number to report an emergency rather than calling 911. Calling 911 would dispatch the California Highway Patrol to deal with the emergency rather than tap into the UCSF emergency system. They conduct crime prevention meetings and safety fairs to provide information to the UCSF community members on the special number to call to report an emergency. UCSF officers participate in field training which entails the review of a written list of sites and a drive through to the various locations. Ms. Haigwood thanked Captain Berlin for his remarks.

Sen. Burdick asked for Captain Berlin to speak to having stand-alone armed and trained presence versus contracting this service out to the local police department. He stated their department has been armed for 25 years. Sen. Burdick requested information relating to his observations, pros and cons, between these two options. Captain Berlin began by speaking to the effect the understaffed police departments would have on the successfulness of contracting these services out. For example, the Oakland Police Department currently has 700 officers and a study done indicates approximately 1,400 officers would be needed to police a community the size of Oakland. The City of San Francisco currently has 1,500 officers and they should have about 2,000. The officers would literally be working overtime to assist UCSF. The staffing numbers are also low for the sheriff department. It comes down to a numbers issue to perform the adequate number of patrols and provide the service of a contract arrangement with the SFPD was entered into. If someone from the UCSF community were to contact the local police department to report a robbery, they would be lucky to get a call

back in a month if ever due to the shortage of officers that deal with thousands of robbery reports and ongoing homicide investigations. A call to UCSF Public Safety would be acted upon and contact would be made and an investigation would begin within 24 hours.

Carmen Merlo asked when the last officer involved shooting occurred. Captain Berlin stated the last shooting was approximately 10 years ago.

Sandra McDonough inquired as to the background of the private security officers they employ and how many of the UCSF officers are ex-police officers. Captain Berlin stated that they do not currently have any ex-police officers in the department, but do have some that have experience as a security guard. Most of the officers have various differing types of work experience other than working for community local law enforcement.

Sen. Burdick asked if the security officers carry tazers, to which Captain Berlin replied in the negative and further commented that tazers are not used by their armed officers either.

Ms. Howe asked for information pertaining to jurisdictional and command issues that may arise between their armed officers and the local police and how those issues are handled. Captain Berlin reference a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) that is in place with the San Francisco Police Department. SFPD would handle all homicides, officer involved shootings and would be involved in any other crimes in which forensic evidence would be collected and analyzed. UCSF does not have the type of expertise or equipment needed to collect and analyze evidence. UCSF officers would investigate burglaries, robberies, petty theft, misdemeanor crimes, incidents involving the mentally ill and traffic accidents if not fatal. Usually when the SFPD officer arrives they want to take the report and leave because of the level of confidence they have in our officers, but the relationship is clearly spelled out in the MOU. Sen. Burdick asked if the task force could obtain a copy of the MOU.

Mr. Scott asked if the role of both parties is spelled out clearly in the MOU between the two agencies to which Captain Berlin responded affirmatively. Sen. Berdick asked if he would be willing to send the task force a copy of the MOU. Captain Berlin said certainly and asked for information on how best to transmit the MOU. Mr. Partridge volunteered to contact Captain Berlin after the meeting with those details.

Sen. Burdick expressed her thanks to Captain Berlin in taking the time to speak with the task force. Captain Berlin stated it was a pleasure to take part in the discussion and wish the task force good luck.

### **Director Charles Green Testimony**

Mr. Partridge introduced and welcomed Director Charles Green from the University of Iowa Public Safety. Mr. Green began with some background information. He is an Associate Vice President and Director of Public Safety. He was a State Trooper 24 years ago and has been with the University of Iowa for 14 years. The university was unarmed at that time, but is now armed since November 2007. They sought and received approval from their Board of Regents at the end of October 2007. They had already been training for the use of arms on a provision basis three years prior just for certain events, but are now fully armed 24/7.

Sen. Burdick asked how many armed officers does the university have at this time. Mr. Green stated there are currently 35 sworn officers and 15 security guards. The security guards do not carry a firearm, tazer, cuffs or weapons of any type. The security guards' primary duties include patrolling the residence halls and staffing the night van program specifically in place to transport women from campus to their residence safely. Sen. Burdick inquired if tazers are carried by the sworn officers in addition to hand gun to which Mr. Green responded affirmatively.

Sen. Burdick requested a description of the landscape of the campus. Mr. Green explained that the main campus is fairly centralized with an Oakdale Campus about 5-6 miles away from the main campus area. They also occupy some city-shared buildings in the downtown area.

Sen. Burdick then asked about the university's coordination activities with local community law enforcement agencies. Mr. Green explained the close arrangement the university has with local law enforcement agencies, which is governed by a mutual aid agreement. The agreement provides for joint response and investigation under certain circumstances. The university officers receive annual firearms training along with others in the county. Mr. Green then spoke to his support of the initiative to review this issue, but also is in support of arming university public safety departments. He explained that his support of arming the officers is not so much tied to how much crime exists in a particular area, but due to the nature of the work these officers are called upon to engage in. It is unpredictable and should not be undertaken by those that are unarmed.

Sen. Burdick inquired as to the training provided to their officers to talk people down including those with mental illness. Mr. Green regarded this type of activity as "verbal judo". Their officers receive training on verbal techniques to deescalate a situation which involves any type of individual...mentally ill or not. They receive annual training at the academy concerning the use of firearms, legal issues and mental health. Their group has gone through the same state wide academy as other officers do even prior to arming.

Sen. Burdick asked if there was a particular incident that started the internal discussion to arm the university's officers. Mr. Green stated that the Virginia



Tech incident caused every campus to look at what they are doing in terms of firearms and emergency communications. The University of Iowa, in collaboration with the two other universities in there system, had already presented a proposal on this issue prior to the Virginia Tech event. The Virginia Tech incident just propelled the work that was already done. The Iowa Governor and Legislators were concerned that the University of Iowa was the only Big 10 University not armed at the time, so it was really a combination of previous internal discussions and Virginia Tech.

Sen. Burdick turned the time over to the CIRTF members' questions for Mr. Green.

Commander Allen Zaugg asked Mr. Green to speak to the challenges that have faced their community policing program. The University of Iowa approved a half time position to focus on community policing and crime prevention. This type of interaction has been so successful that a full time crime prevention officer is now in place and is fully trained on crime prevention and certification. This individual works at a grass roots level with faculty, staff, students and the community in the prevention of crime. This officer also speaks at student orientation in dealing with the parents as well. This is a very important component of the university's safety program as the patrol officers usually do not have the time for these types of activities.

Ms. Haigwood inquired about animal activist threats or incidents at the University of Iowa. Mr. Green detailed an incident which happened about five or six years ago where the university was infiltrated by animal rights activists, computers were damaged and animals were set free. This type of activity remains a constant concern at the university.

Mike Bandy asked for information about the frequency of tazer and firearm use at the university. Mr. Green stated that tazers came into use in 2002 – before their officers were armed. Since 2002 tazers have been used less than 20 times and firearms have not been pulled except to alleviate the suffering of a hurt animal.

Sen. Burdick ask for Mr. Green's opinion as to the benefits of going same route as the University of Iowa in beginning with a provisional arming program first. Mr. Green suggested bypassing the provisional arming period they went through. The university's Vice President, General Counsel and he could see early on it was a struggle to make the decision of when to arm or not. The need to receive permission from executive leadership to arm on a case-by-case basis created a delay in response time and made the Public Safety team less effective. Although Mr. Green does not support the idea of provisional arming he believes it was an avenue that helped his superiors to see that the university needed to take that next step. Sen. Burdick made the comment that it seem strange to have an active shooter on campus and then have to go through channels to gain approval to arm.

Ms. Glidewell inquired as to the number of patient beds at the University of Iowa due to her surprise at low number of times he reported tazers being used. Mr. Green admitted he was not absolutely sure, but believed the number to be over 500 – maybe even closer to 800 [**Note: – The number of beds is 680 for the comprehensive academic medical center and regional referral center**]. He explained that they try to avoid the use of force in the hospital setting if at all possible. Since tazer have become more widely used in a hospital setting, there have been some lawsuits and other things because that really is not the appropriate way to respond to a patient. There is a specific hospital team that addresses these types of issues with patients and Public Safety is in standby mode to assist with force if the patient is hurting themselves, others or in danger of escaping. Ms. Glidewell commented that an armed presence can be a deterrent in this type of situation to which Mr. Green agreed.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Green if he was able to listen to the information provided by Captain Berlin concerning not utilizing tazers and their officers currently undergoing training with AK47's. Mr. Green said he was able to listen to the comments made by Captain Berlin. Sen. Burdick asked for comments from Mr. Green about his philosophy on the use of this type of weapon. Mr. Green stated that 15 of their sworn officers are trained in the use of rifles, but they prefer to use a more civilian rifle such as an M4 or M16. These officers had to go through rigorous training and not all officers could fulfill that rifleman or riflewoman role. He went on to express his surprise at UCSF's intent to use such a high powered rifle due to its strength and velocity. Sen. Burdick inquired as to the type of situation at the University of Iowa that would initiate the use of a rifle versus the more commonly used hand gun. Mr. Green explained that rifles would be used in the event of a visiting VIP, like the President of the United States, Heads of State or Presidential Candidates. They would work in a back up capacity to the Secret Service.

Mike Reese asked about other less lethal options their officers have other than the tazer. Mr. Green spoke about options available including an expandable baton, pepper spray and hand cuffs, in addition to the tazer and firearms. The officers have pepper foggers at their disposal, but they are not routinely carried by the officers.

Sen. Burdick thanked Mr. Green for his helpful insight and asked for his parting thoughts. Mr. Green gave his support to the CIRTF in their review of this issue. He went on to reiterate that due to the unpredictable nature of the incidents responded to by public safety officers in a campus environment, he feels they must be armed. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Green if he felt an AK47 rifle would be necessary to which Mr. Green stated this decision should be based on analysis for the force necessary in our area.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Partridge who was the next individual to present expert testimony to the CIRTF. Mr. Partridge stated we could proceed with the two

individuals in attendance or could take a short break. Sen. Burdick suggested a short break and asked the CIRTF members to reconvene at 11:15.

### **Patrick Jones Testimony**

The CIRTF members returned from break and Sen. Burdick turned the time over to Patrick Jones. Mr. Jones began by providing some background concerning the scope of the Portland Bureau of Emergency Communications (“PBEC”). The PBEC is the 911 bureau for Multnomah County and all of the municipalities within Multnomah County. The PBEC has a two-fold mission -- they take calls and dispatch the appropriate services needed based on the type of emergency. Police, fire and emergency medical services are all dispatched from the same facility. The PBEC is the largest 911 facility in the State of Oregon. The traditional partner agencies of the PBEC include the PPB and other agencies such as Gresham police and fire and AMR, which is a private company providing EMS services. Our non-traditional partners include the Coast Guard, Port of Portland and several others that interact with PBEC either for some sort of dispatch services or coordination of dispatch services.

The PBEC has 36 dispatch positions on the operations floor. Most 911 bureaus are much smaller than this, with a handful of positions. The PBEC has an on-site backup with 10 dispatch call-taking positions and an emergency evacuation trailer with another 13 dispatch and call taking positions to continue the 911 operations if they were unable to use the main facility.

Mr. Jones went on to explain some of the technology used by the PBEC. In addition to the telephone and radio capabilities, they utilize a computer aided dispatch system (“CAD”) which allows for call documentation and the use of computer logic to allocate the best resources. The PBEC CAD footprint is unusual as it extends from the traditional partners to the PBEC’s non-traditional partners, such as the Port of Portland’s Airport Police and Fire Dispatch Center and the Coast Guard dispatch center on Swan Island and PCC Public Safety. These are unusual situations which allow the non-traditional partners to receive information concerning emergency activity in their areas. These non-traditional partners may also provide assistance or additional information concerning a particular event.

When 911 call comes in, a package of information is already available in the CAD system like the physical location and name of the caller. This same package of information is not available when a call comes in from a cell phone or a trunk line from a large entity. There is the ability to get a very general location by identifying the cell tower transmitting the call. Some cell phones now provide for transmission of a GPS signal which triangulates the caller’s position sometimes to within about 100 feet of the caller. More than half of the calls coming in to the PBEC do not provide an exact location for the caller. This is also a problem with larger entities like OHSU. An outgoing call from OHSU would produce a pilot number and general address of the caller that has no direct relation to the exact

building and room the caller is in. Situations arise daily where the caller cannot convey where they are calling from or they are not willing to provide an exact location.

The PBEC operator taking a call defines the problem and enters information into the CAD system using the known location. CAD interprets the location and makes the necessary dispatch notifications. CAD is a sophisticated system that will convert entered land marks to street address to dispatch the call to the appropriate precinct.

The general policy for dispatching rules for a particular police bureau is established and made part of the CAD logic, which dictates how many officers to send for a particular level of emergency. These rules are close to uniform across the board. Life threatening emergencies get the highest priority along with a call in which the nature of the emergency cannot be established by the PBEC operator.

Mr. Green then moved on to providing information about how the PBEC communicates with OHSU today. This is currently done primarily by telephone. The PBEC will receive a call from OHSU requiring dispatch of services for a fire emergency. All of the OHSU buildings have fire monitors that relay exact location information to dispatch and services are sent based on this.

The PBEC does not manage the radio devices that are used by emergency services. This is managed by a separate bureau. The Bureau of Technology Services runs the radio shop that is located in the same building as the PBEC but is a separate bureau. Concerning communicating via radio services with OHSU's new 450MHZ system, the 450MHZ system does not communicate with the 800MHZ system used by local emergency services. OHSU made the decision to move away from the 800MHZ radios and install their own 450MHZ system, but still has a small cash of 800MHZ radios for the primary purpose of communicating with off campus emergency resources. Mr. Green expressed his hope that he had not gone too far off the path with his comments. The issue here is with the inability of PBEC and emergency services to communicate with OHSU using the standard 800MHZ radio system.

Mr. Green turned his comments to speaking about the active shooter protocols in place by the individual police agencies. To the 911 Center this means if a call is received reporting an active shooter or similar scenario it is important for the 911 operator to pass on all information available about the situation to those responding. The PBEC operator can open a TAC channel to a non-primary talk group that is focused entirely on these difficult, complex, time sensitive issues allowing just the responders to have all of the airtime to stay informed on the current status if these dynamic types of scenarios. This approach allows the rest of the communications system to operate as usual by providing separate radio time for responders to a highly urgent incident.

Mr. Green turned the time to the CIRTF member questions.

Sen. Burdick requested information concerning any barriers that may prevent the PBEC from extending their CAD system to take calls from OHSU. Mr. Green commented on a cultural barrier, for lack of a better term. Currently the PPB is the responsible party for every bit of law enforcement in the City and the PBEC is very comfortable passing through a call for service to the PPB. It is rare, and should be, when they ever cede authority away from themselves and this decision should be made with much forethought. The CAD system is designed to be an interactive tool, with information coming in and then resources or communications going out based on the new information. From a technical standpoint, the CAD system is not designed to have multiple dispatchers controlling a single call and allocating resources. They do have a unique arrangement with their non-traditional partners who are able to not only able to see information about a particular call, but can assume the primary responsibility position for a call. This type of call transition would be documented in the CAD system.

Sen. Burdick asked if OHSU would need to convert back to the 800MHZ radio communication if they became an armed police force. Mr. Green stated he didn't feel this type of conversion would be required given the depth of the CAD system. Sen. Burdick then asked if he would recommend OHSU's conversion back to the 800MHZ system. He stated he would recommend that 800MHZ be explored again as an option for the primary way OHSU would communicate with emergency services. OHSU should be able to talk over via radio with emergency services.

Gary Granger made the request to Sen. Burdick to provide some further comment on this issue. Sen. Burdick welcomed Mr. Granger's comments and invited him up to the table. Mr. Granger started by explaining the need behind OHSU's conversion to the 450MHZ system. Due to OHSU's dense vertical environment, 40-50% of campus space was a radio dead zone when the 800MHZ system was in place versus the current 95% coverage rate with the 450MHZ system. OHSU purchased a system that can link 800MHZ radios directly to OHSU 450MHZ radios by patching through a console in the DPS dispatch area. This technology has not been tried in a crisis situation yet, so it is understandable why there may be some concern on Mr. Green's part. Mr. Green expressed his appreciation of Mr. Granger's comments and stated he has no doubt OHSU's decision to switch was well thought out based on valid reasons. Mr. Green went on to say current communication is effective between DPS, PPB through PBEC. His concerns are more related to the vendor that currently manages the 800MHZ system and OHSU's ability to make the handshake agreement that would need to be in place to make dependable communication happen between the two different frequencies.

Sen. Burdick turned the floor to other members for questions or comments. Chief Sizer spoke to the effort currently underway to replace the 800MHZ system and hopes that some of these problems could be solved with the next generation. Sen. Burdick commented on the legislative work being done to get cell phones easier to locate. Sen. Burdick asked for additional questions of Mr. Green to be postponed until the end of the meeting.

### **Chief Rosie Sizer Testimony**

Sen. Burdick introduced Chief Sizer as a good friend, Chief of the Portland Police Bureau for two years whose success is measured by things that do not happen. Chief Sizer came on board just after the James Chasse incident that got a lot of publicity due to the tragic nature of the event. She quickly instituted a very aggressive training program for officers who are called to deal with agitated, mentally ill members of the community. Sen. Burdick went on to commend Chief Sizer and the PPB in how they managed several high tension demonstrations rather smoothly relating to President Bush visiting Portland. Sen. Burdick spoke to the tremendous amount of planning and work that goes into managing that type of community event. Sen. Burdick stated she is thrilled, as a citizen of Portland, to have Chief Sizer as her Chief and expressed appreciation for Chief Sizer taking the time to participate in this discussion with the CIRTF.

Chief Sizer began her remarks by inviting task force member Commander Mike Reese to agree or disagree with her comments as he sees fit as she believes that a variety of good minds, not a single opinion, creates the best outcomes. Chief Sizer conveyed her support for the DPS to become a police department. She stated there is no interest in engaging in a contractual relationship with OHSU for policing services.

Chief Sizer spoke to the effectiveness of equipping PPB officers with tazers. Statistics show that 65% of the time suspect compliance was achieved simply by pointing the tazer and activating the red indicator light on the subject. The PPB no longer classifies the pulling and pointing of a tazer as a use of force.

Chief Sizer turned her comments to police training in Oregon. She is a member of the DPSST Board which provides training for communications staff, some training for fire fighters, some security officers and police officers. About one year ago DPSST implemented a 16 week curriculum which represented a significant expansion to the training previously offered in the State of Oregon. The training converted to a more scenario based training. In the past there was one day of scenarios focused on firearms and the most extreme situations. The training is moving towards an adult learning model which provides the opportunity for the police officer to practice the work rather than sitting in class listening to theory. As part of this curriculum, the officers have three days (24 hours) of crisis intervention training rather than the 8 hours provided previously. If OHSU forms its own police department, this 16 week training course would be available as soon as an officer was hired and enrolled in academy training. Chief

Sizer detailed additional training provided to Portland Police Officers including 40 hours of in-service focusing on a variety of topics and most recently ready to complete a 40 week curricula on crisis intervention training. Chief Sizer stated that she cannot say there would not be an incident like Chasse last week or last year, but feedback received from advocates of the mentally ill indicates a positive trend in level of satisfaction and fewer complaints.

Chief Sizer provided some statistical information relating to the size and structure of the PPB. The PPB currently has just under 1,000 sworn officers and three branches. The services branch which takes care of the administrative function of hiring, training and pay; an investigative branch which focuses on the investigation of drug and major crimes; and the patrol branch. PPB is divided into five precincts. The entire west side of Portland is Central Precinct and under the command of Mike Reese. They are organized into districts with staffing levels that are minimally set for each shift per day. Chief Sizer commented that the citizens of Portland would likely be shocked by the low staffing number. The night shift is the most lightly staffed at eight officers in the Central Precinct for the whole west side of Portland. The afternoon shift is staffed at 14 and the day shift is 12. Most of the PPB services are clustered in the high service areas, downtown and Northwest Portland.

Chief Sizer stated that there are very few calls for service from OHSU. The OHSU security department is very well regarded by the PPB officers as a group that takes care of business. At times with PPB encouragement, OHSU officers exceed their authority. There is a gray area between what DPS officers are empowered to do versus what PPB needs them to do in certain circumstances. As Central Precinct Commander, Chief Sizer had conversations with Gary Granger about services time for the worst case scenarios and he gladly took up the mantle to become more self sufficient on the Hill.

Chief Sizer commented on the lack of knowledge of most PPB officers on the geography of the Marquam Hill campus other than the location of the Emergency Department. OHSU's topography and construction proves very challenging for PPB officers, which is compounded by the infrequent calls for service. The PPB would almost always depend upon a member of the DPS to act as a pathfinder for the PPB officers even with the implementation of GPS systems. The response time for PPB officers to reach OHSU during an emergency is less than desirable given OHSU's location and limited resources of the PPB. The response time goal as an agency for the highest priority calls is to reach the location within five minutes. This goal is roughly achieved, but there are pockets around Portland where the response time is longer. The challenge with OHSU is getting the appropriate resources to the campus in a timely manner given where they are primarily located in Portland and the topography of the campus.

Chief Sizer indicated this discussion is long overdue given the treats we find in our society. It is easy for good people to assume nothing bad will ever happen,

but we keep facing situations where the worst is happening with enough frequency that we need to be better prepared in America. It is better to have an armed trained officer rather than have a community who feels they must arm themselves for protection.

Chief Sizer spoke again concerning the inability of the PPB to entertain a contract arrangement for services in any reasonable timeframe due to the lack of staff, resources and willingness to provide those services to OHSU. The PPB has a 20 year old contract, along with some other agencies, to provide security and other services to Tri-Met transit system. Most of those dollars are coming out of the PPB's budget, even though Tri-Met is paying a substantial fee, because replacement positions were not given the PPB to handle the additional staffing load. The PPB has been running at 40 to 50 vacancies for years and they are trying to staff up. If OHSU wanted to contract for patrol services for 50 officers, the PPB would be down 100 officers rather than 50.

Chief Sizer encouraged the CIRTF to look at the model currently used by the Port of Portland's own Police Department. There is an agreement in place between the Port and PPB concerning mutual aide and the services that would be provided by the PPB concerning investigative follow up of the homicides or officer involved shootings.

Sen. Burdick asked Chief Sizer if the Port officers have been recently armed to which Chief Sizer responded in the negative. Sen. Burdick raised an issue that would face OHSU and possibly Portland State as they are having similar discussions, of the cultural or turf issues that may come up relating to those who are accustomed to services from the PPB now looking to a different resource. Chief Sizer stated that the specifics of the relationship would need to be worked out and is probably more of a discussion than the confines CIRTF's charge. She went on to say that she does not support the philosophy that PPB's responsibility should include the Port of Portland property. She believes that most PPB officers would be very happy to have Gary Grangers group handle most of the work that occurs at OHSU, with the commanding officers of both groups working closely together to continually improve the relationship. Any logistic issues that could arise are all resolvable.

Sen. Burdick made reference to the testimony from the experts at University of Iowa and UCSF and their different philosophies relating to the provision of lethal and non-lethal equipment to their sworn and unsworn officers. Sen. Burdick asked Chief Sizer to provide her opinions and observations as to what level of force would be appropriate at OHSU. Chief Sizer began by stating she feels more of a connection with the program in place at the University of Iowa. She also feels the same philosophically in that if you are going to have security personnel intervening in these types of police-like calls, they should be provided with the tools they need to perform the job. In her professional experience, less-lethal options are helpful as long as there are accountability measures to look at how



they are being used, develop clear policy relating to their use and provide the necessary training. Chief Sizer commented that 20 years ago Tri-Met realized they ran a very good transit department, but were unable to operate an adequate security department. The decision was made by Tri-Met to take steps to outsource this service. In her opinion, what the CIRTF is really taking on is can OHSU trust the caliber of officers that are being hired and is OHSU capable of the oversight and administration necessary to administer this type of security force. The university landscape has changed dramatically as the task force members are all aware.

Sen. Burdick turned the time over to Mr. Granger to ask Chief Sizer questions for the benefit of the group. Mr. Granger began by describing his collaborative relationship with Chief Sizer since 2001, working together regarding the use of tazers and other issues. He believes the interactions DPS currently has with the PPB are complimentary in many cases. If a car goes off the side of the road close to campus, DPS would receive a call from PPB for assistance on evaluating the severity of the situation due to the close proximity of the DPS officers to the scene. Mr. Granger spoke to the law enforcement activities the DPS officers are called upon to perform on a daily basis. He has been pleased with the highly collaborative relationship that has existed between his and Chief Sizer's teams over the last 7 years and is appreciative of the positive comments Chief Sizer has relayed to the task force today.

Sen. Burdick turned the time over to the panel for questions. Mike Bandy made mention of a comment he made at the last CIRTF meeting concerning the small city-like nature of OHSU's main campus and the option of having a small PPB substation on the hill. This option would negate the accessibility issue PPB currently has when responding to calls at OHSU. Mr. Bandy asked Chief Sizer to comment on this along with inquiring as to how the PPB handles the provision of five officers in responds to an active shooter call from a logistic standpoint. Chief Sizer explained that officers will routinely cross precinct boundaries as the call load demands. This is accomplished with the assistance of the CAD system utilized by the PBEC, which is designed to allocate resources from around the city. During an active incident that requires heavy staffing, the non-emergent calls may not be dispatched and are held for action when the resources become available to do so. Chief Sizer went on to address Mr. Bandy's question concerning the feasibility of a substation on campus. The PPB currently has several contact offices scattered around Portland, but does not utilize substations. These contact offices may have a computer that is linked to the PPB systems, a phone and space to write reports. These contact offices are not staffed and their use can be sporadic based on the specific location of the office. Chief Sizer went on to detail which contact offices are most widely used. The use of the contact offices is on the decline as technology is being put in place for the officers to perform these types of administrative activities in their patrol car. Concerning the ability for the PPB to man a substation on campus, Chief Sizer restated her earlier comment of the PPB not having the adequate staffing to handle the current work

load let alone providing policing services for OHSU. She went on to state her understanding that privatization of labor is a very contentious issue, but law enforcement has seen more privatization than in other areas of the general workforce in her opinion. She relates this to the municipal monies being stretched and the citizens' desire for a higher level of service in the area of security and law enforcement. She views forming a private police force at OHSU as an investment that will be more costly than the current DPS model, but will be more able to handle the very real threat that exists in today's society.

Sen. Burdick asked the members if there were any additional questions at this time. Ms. Glidewell commented relating to the need for training of OHSU staff in working with armed officers if this becomes a reality at OHSU. She went on to say she feels some of the staff members are a bit naïve, thinking a situation will be immediately resolved once DPS officers are on the scene. The staff would need to be trained on how to cooperate with officers, particularly those carrying a weapon. She finished by stating there is a lot of work to do, but it is important to do it. Chief Sizer commented that she would not expect staff to respond any differently than they would instinctively in a critical incident involving armed officers. She believes the most important training for everyone in this modern age surrounding personal security and safety awareness training so as not to misinterpret what they are seeing. Some individuals act against their own instincts in a crisis situation. Their mind is telling them to be scared, but they operate in a position of denial that they are actually seeing a critical event unfold. This can delay their call for the appropriate resources to handle the situation.

Chief Sizer asked to be excused from the meeting and thanked the CIRTF for the opportunity to participate in the discussion. Sen. Burdick thanked Chief Sizer for her participation and turned the time over to Commander Reese to make any additional comments he felt were necessary to which he declined.

Sen. Burdick expressed she felt some good work was done during the meeting, apologized to the group for the meeting going 15 minutes over and turned the time over to Mr. Partridge to address next steps. Mr. Partridge mentioned the next meeting will be held in the evening on October 23<sup>rd</sup>. The location is yet to be determined. Details will be sent to task force members as they become available. It is anticipated there will be a couple other periods of expert testimony as there was not sufficient time in today's meeting to fit everyone in. Mr. Partridge encouraged the task force members to contact him with any questions as we move forward.

Sen. Burdick thanked everyone for coming and stated it was a very interesting meeting.

The meeting was adjourned at 3:45 by Sen. Burdick.

Minutes submitted by: Joe Partridge

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Minutes approved by: Senator Ginny Burdick

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# SIGN IN SHEET

Critical Incident Readiness Task Force, Organizational Meeting

Thursday, October 23, 2008

University Place, 310 SW Lincoln St.  
Portland, 6:00 to 8:00 p.m.

Name	Representative Group	Sign In
Margie Lowe.....	Governor's Office	
TBA.....	Governor's TF Crossover Rep.	
Senator Ginny Burdick.....	Legislature	<i>Ginny Burdick</i>
Senator Bruce Starr.....	Legislature	
Timothy Moore.....	Multnomah County	<i>Tommy Moore</i>
Jane Ames.....	City of Portland	
Carmen Merlo.....	Portland Office, Emerg. Management	<i>Carmen Merlo</i>
Olga Acuna.....	City of Hillsboro	<i>Olga Acuna</i>
Susan Egnor.....	Homestead Neighborhood	<i>Susan Egnor</i>
Ken Love.....	South Portland Neighborhood	
Mike Reese.....	Portland Police Bureau	<i>Mike Reese</i>
Allen Zaugg.....	Hillsboro Police Bureau	
Barbara Glidewell.....	OHSU Patient Representative	<i>Barbara Glidewell</i>
Marcus Mundy.....	Community/Urban League	<i>Marcus Mundy</i>
TBA .....	Community/Mental Health (NAMI)	
Sandra McDonough.....	Business Representative	
Susan Cox.....	Veteran's Representative	
Carol Howe.....	OHSU Faculty	<i>Carol Howe</i>
Nina Katovic.....	OHSU Student Council	<i>Nina Katovic</i>
Mike Bandy.....	AFSCME Representative	<i>Mike Bandy</i>
Harold Fleshman.....	Oregon Nurses Association	<i>Harold Fleshman</i>
Steven Scott.....	OHSU Health System Representative	<i>Steven Scott</i>
Nancy Haigwood.....	West Campus Representative	<i>Nancy Haigwood</i>
Roman Hernandez.....	OHSU Board of Directors	<i>Roman Hernandez</i>
Martha McMurry.....	Community Advocate	

# ***Critical Incident Readiness Task Force***

## ***Public Input Meeting Minutes***

Thursday, October 23, 2008

### **CIRTF Members**

See attached list.

### **Welcome**

Sen. Ginny Burdick called the meeting to order at 6:15 PM. Sen. Burdick welcomed all those in attendance and turned the time over to Joe Partridge and Garry Granger to provide some background information to the community members in attendance.

### **Background – Formation of CIRTF**

Mr. Partridge began by providing information about the CIRTF's formation. Dr. Joe Robertson, OHSU President, formed the task force in the Summer of 2008. The narrow charge assigned to the CIRTF is to assess the readiness and ability for OHSU to adequately respond in an active shooter situation. At present, the Portland Police Bureau would be called to OHSU to respond to such an event. In connection with the PPB, response time frames were put together, indicating that it would take the PPB approximately 20 minutes to be positioned to engage an active shooter. The CIRTF has been charged with determining if this is adequate. If not found adequate, the task force has been asked to identify recommendations for changes to the current structure. There are a variety of possible recommendations that could be made by the CIRTF, one of which is to explore the possibility of changing the current structure of OHSU's Department of Public Safety to include armed, sworn officers. Due to the sensitive nature of this option, the CIRTF has convened this public meeting to hear testimony from community members on the subject. In Dr. Robertson's comments to the task force at the organizational meeting and in comments to those in attendance at an information Town Hall held last summer, he stressed that he has no preconceived notions concerning this subject and would like to hear a wide range of views.

Mr. Partridge then turned the time over to Gary Granger, Director of the Department of Public Safety, for background information gathered during OHSU's initial analysis of this issue, which prompted the formation of this task force. Sen. Burdick interjected a reminder to folks that under the sworn officer scenario, those officers would be fully trained as police officers.

### **Background - Critical Incident Readiness Analysis**

Gary Granger began by commenting that the Virginia Tech event pushed everyone across the country back to the drawing board concerning response to an active shooter scenario. There have been four official reports written as a result.

The reports identify several areas in which steps can be taken to improve an institutions ability to adequately anticipate and react during an active shooter event.

The first finding is the apparent confusion regarding the sharing of information with other areas of the institution. The reports recommend clear documentation and distribution of protocols for the sharing of information to avoid confusion when a critical event arises. OHSU has taken steps in this regard and is currently working on the final draft of this document.

The second finding spoke to the institutions ability to assess threats before they become critical events. OHSU is in the process of forming a Threat Assessment Team, which will be fully functional by 2009.

The third point that came out of OHSU's investigation into this matter is OHSU's Department of Public Safety has unclear authority under current law and is unable to participate in the full police officer training offered by the State, which includes active shooter training.

Mr. Granger mentioned that no one knows what the chances are for a critical incident. However, we do know that OHSU has many attractors which put the university in a high risk category when compared to other like institutions. The tram is a special attractor that brings a large number of tourists to OHSU who would not be on campus but for that reason. 86% of all other universities employ armed officers. Oregon and two others are the only states that prohibit the arming of university security personnel.

Mr. Granger went on to explain the active shooter timeline, emphasizing that statistics show an active shooter will continue until there are no more victims or armed officers arrive and engage the individual. The timeline points covered were as follows:

- PPB needs five officers before engaging active shooter.
- Approximate time for five officers to arrive is 15 minutes.
- PPB officers would then need to take additional time to move to the location of the active shooter before engaging.
- Studies show that four people die per minute during an active shooter event.
- OHSU could have two officers to the area in 3 minutes, but would be unable to respond at all for this type of critical event.

Mr. Granger stated that most calls for armed officers do not begin that way. The majority of the calls to DPS are not typical "police work" calls, but there are times when a DPS officer is faced with a situation that requires that level of engagement. DPS officers need the ability to participate in all training available to community police officers and a clear set of authorities to work by.

Sen. Burdick asked for any questions from the task force for Mr. Granger, to which there were none.

### **Public Input**

Sen. Burdick turned the time over to those in attendance who desired to give testimony to the CIRTF. Each individual who requested time to address the CIRTF would be called up and given 3-5 minutes to speak.

Sen. Burdick called Jess Bueler to provide testimony. Mr. Bueler stated he regularly sees DPS vehicles turn around on the street he lives on and doesn't want the officers in those vehicles to be armed. He stated an understanding of the concerns due to the event at Virginia Tech, however, feels more of the focus needs to be on prevention and development of early warning protocols. Mr. Bueler commented that a health university should be able to identify these signs in a particular individual. He went on to say the VA Hospital security staff does not carry guns and they get along fine. He is concerned about what could happen if an unstable patient were to get possession of a gun. Mr. Bueler also expressed concern regarding the ability for a DSP officer to differentiate between a truly threatening individual and a person who is developmentally disabled, neurologically impaired or mentally ill. He mentioned an individual in his neighborhood that has a seizure disorder; he does not want to see that person get shot because the DPS officer thinks they are a threat due to lack of training. Mr. Bueler said he would not longer consider OHSU an option for his healthcare if the DPS officers begin to carry guns. He also mentioned the "do it before the guards shoot you" approach that some may take if DPS becomes armed.

Sen. Burdick commented on the excellent point made by Mr. Bueler concerning challenges posed by the mentally ill population. She referred to PPB's struggles with this issue as well and has implemented a new training program that has had a very positive effect. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Bueler if this information provides some reassurance for him.

Mr. Bueler indicated this would address only one of his concerns, but not all. He fears that if a DPS officer gets spooked, someone will get shot.

Sen. Burdick asked the task force members if there were any questions for Mr. Bueler, to which there were none. Sen. Burdick called Mars Greenwood to provide her comments.

Ms. Greenwood expressed her agreement with Mr. Bueler's comments. Ms. Greenwood stated she is not involved with any animal rights groups. In August 2005, a hanging doorknob flyer was left on her front door containing information about research at OHSU. This flyer had the phone number of the OHSU President's Office. Ms. Greenwood called the number wanting to know OHSU's side of the research issue. Ms. Greenwood was invited to come to the office to get public information on the subject. Upon her arrival, DPS officers were called and responded to the office. Ms. Greenwood went on to describe one of the

officers stepping in close to her and yelling at her. She was asked to leave. She left the building and was followed by a male DPS officer while walking down the public sidewalk. Ms. Greenwood stated she was pushed, handcuffed and arrested for trespass and criminal mischief. Ms. Greenwood expressed the history of violence at OHSU toward animals and people like her. Later, she was approached by a “filmer” to prove OHSU lied about arresting her on private property rather than public. She stated she is very against arming DPS officers because they acted “over the top,” which could happen to anyone. She went on to say that DPS officers were violent, rude, hostile and aggressive. She fears that she would have been mortally wounded if the DPS officers had guns when this interaction occurred. Ms. Greenwood then turned her comments to the tram, stating OHSU wanted the tram – the taxpayers should not have to pay for security when money is needed for parents and schools. Ms. Greenwood finished her comments by stating no one needs to be carrying a weapon.

Sen. Burdick asked Ms. Greenwood if she lives in the neighborhood surrounding OHSU, to which Ms. Greenwood replied that she lives in Multnomah County.

Sen. Burdick asked the task force members if there were any questions for Ms. Greenwood, to which there were none. Sen. Burdick called Spencer Moore to provide his testimony.

Mr. Moore said he saw the notice in the paper about this public meeting and it brought back a bad memory which occurred at OHSU. Mr. Moore used the fitness center at OHSU as he is a veteran and was be treated at the VA. Mr. Moore stated that the last time he was at OHSU was on November 1, 2002. As a result of asking some questions, he was surrounded by men in black. He can no longer come to OHSU, even for medical treatment, without permission. Mr. Moore explained that earlier that day, he was on a bus being blocked by a Max train, which had struck a girl. One witness told him the girl had been speaking and they were taking her to OHSU. When Mr. Moore arrived at OHSU, he went to the Emergency Department to ask how the girl was doing. A DPS officer asked him if he was a family member, to which he said that he was not. He just was concerned about the girl. The DPS officer called for two more officers. He stated he could not move and was “truly under arrest”. The DPS officers asked for his identification. Mr. Moore said he felt the three officers wanted to punch him. He is glad the DPS officers had no lethal force weapons at their disposal at the time. He said he shook one of the DPS officer’s hands in a very firm “squeezing” fashion and they were so hurt by this action that he cannot come back to campus. He feels this is a petty vendetta giving grown boys “godlike power.” Mr. Moore went on to say he pays no attention to the order prohibiting him from being on campus. He violates the order by using the tram.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Moore if he would feel better knowing that scenario training would be offered teaching de-escalation techniques rather than using force. Mr. Moore stated there needs to be more training and screening of personnel. He went on to say the DPS officers are “Blackwater want-a-be’s” that



have not had enough of war. He does not think that making lethal force available to the DPS officers is the solution. He would only want an extensively qualified “Zen Master” to carry a weapon at OHSU and that type of person does not exist.

Sen. Burdick asked if there were any others in attendance who would like to provide testimony, to which there was no response. Sen. Burdick turned the meeting over to Mr. Partridge to outline next steps.

### Next Steps

Mr. Partridge said the work session for the CIRTF is scheduled for November 6<sup>th</sup> at OHSU. The exact location is yet to be determined. This meeting will be open to the public, but no additional testimony will be heard. Mr. Partridge told the task force members that minutes from today’s meeting would be circulated. He asked for task force members to feel free to contact him if any items, tools or resources will be needed. Mr. Partridge reminded the group that the report is due to Dr. Robertson on November 14<sup>th</sup>. He also mentioned that staff would be available to assist with the preparation of the report if needed.

Susan Egnor mentioned it was noted in the minutes of the last meeting that additional experts were expected to provide information. She asked when these additional experts would be heard by the CIRTF. Mr. Partridge said that the NAMI representative that was to be heard declined to give testimony at the last minute. He stated that he put out some feelers for a member of the psychology staff to address the CIRTF, but received no affirmative response. Mr. Partridge let the task force members to provide him with the names of any additional experts they would like to hear from and he will arrange for the securing of information in the format agreeable to the task force (written, telephone conference, in person).

Sen. Burdick mentioned that others who were unable to attend today’s meeting that will be at the work meeting. Mr. Partridge stated that written testimony from today’s meeting will be made available to all task force members not in attendance today and for anyone who comes to the work meeting.

Sen. Burdick requested that Mr. Partridge send the link via email to enable task force members view the video from the last meeting if they would like, to which Mr. Partridge replied in the affirmative.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:50PM by Sen. Burdick.

Minutes submitted by: Joe Partridge \_\_\_\_\_

Minutes approved by: Senator Ginny Burdick \_\_\_\_\_

# SIGN IN SHEET

Critical Incident Readiness Task Force, Work Session

Thursday, November 6, 2008

Room 217, Old Library, 9 a.m.-11 a.m.

Name	Representative Group	Sign In
Margie Lowe.....	Governor's Office	
TBA.....	Governor's TF Crossover Rep.	
Senator Ginny Burdick.....	Legislature	present.
Senator Bruce Starr.....	Legislature	
Timothy Moore.....	Multnomah County	present.
Jane Ames.....	City of Portland	
Carmen Merlo.....	Portland Office, Emerg. Management	
Olga Acuna.....	City of Hillsboro	
Susan Egnor.....	Homestead Neighborhood	Susan Egnor
Ken Love.....	South Portland Neighborhood	
Mike Reese.....	Portland Police Bureau	
Allen Zaugg.....	Hillsboro Police Bureau	
Barbara Glidewell.....	OHSU Patient Representative	Barbara Glidewell present.
Marcus Mundy.....	Community/Urban League	
TBA .....	Community/Mental Health (NAMI)	
Sandra McDonough.....	Business Representative	Sandra McDonough
Susan Cox.....	Veteran's Representative	
Carol Howe.....	OHSU Faculty	Carol Howe
Nina Katovic.....	OHSU Student Council	Nina Katovic
Mike Bandy.....	AFSCME Representative	
Harold Fleshman.....	Oregon Nurses Association	Harold Fleshman
Steven Scott.....	OHSU Health System Representative	Steven Scott
Nancy Haigwood.....	West Campus Representative	Nancy Haigwood
Roman Hernandez.....	OHSU Board of Directors	
Martha McMurry.....	Community Advocate	Martha McMurry

# **Critical Incident Readiness Task Force**

## **Work Session Minutes**

Thursday, November 6, 2008

### **CIRTF Members in Attendance**

See attached list.

Sen. Ginny Burdick called the meeting to order at 9:30 AM and welcomed all those in attendance. She turned the group's attention to the draft document, detailing various recommendation options, prepared as a starting point for discussion purposes.

Concerning the arming issue, Sen. Burdick mentioned the general nervousness from the mental health community as a con and the quicker response time during an active shooter event as a pro.

Susan Egnor asked why there have been no additional experts to speak to this issue. Joe Partridge explained that the NAMI representative scheduled to testify at the public testimony meeting declined to do so on short notice. The acting director of NAMI was unclear about her ability to provide representative testimony for NAMI. She asked the NAMI Board for direction on this issue. The Board determined NAMI is not the proper organization to speak on behalf of the mental health community on this issue. The withdrawal of NAMI's participation was communicated the afternoon of the date of the public testimony meeting. Other suggestions were made on who would be the appropriate group to testify, but it was too late in the day to make other arrangements. Mr. Partridge stated there were other organizations that offered written testimony. Ms. Egnor asked about the general opinion communicated in the written comments. Mr. Partridge indicated the general theme is no guns in a clinical environment.

Sen. Burdick reminded the group that a recommendation from the task force for anything other than "no action necessary" marks the beginning of much more discussion on this point. The State System of Higher Education is also actively reviewing this issue. Portland State University made the decision recently to not pursue arming their security personnel at this time. She went on to state that this issue will spill out in the legislative arena where the view of some is to let staff carry concealed weapons – "more guns – less crime." She expressed her desire to not throw guns in the hands of untrained people when even with extensive training, police officers have been shot with their own gun. She spoke to her clear understanding of the political terrain on this issue.

Sen. Burdick suggested the group take a few minutes to review the draft response document and the article from the *Portland Tribune* speaking to concerns from the mental health community relating to this issue.

Sen. Burdick called the meeting to order after a short break. She told the group she would like to go over the draft recommendations and identify options the group would like to discard, reach consensus on the option to recommend or narrow options down if clear consensus cannot be reached. She explained that some of the options drafted would require statutory change. Sen. Burdick reminded the group there are no options on the table that would arm officers without providing extensive training, to include specialized training on techniques to utilize when responding to an event involving a mentally ill community member. She also mentioned that the costs and liability issues should be taken into account by the task force as well.

Harold Fleshman spoke to his desire to have the same psychological work ups used by the Portland Police Bureau mentioned in the group's recommendation to Dr. Robertson.

Sen. Burdick asked the group for observations and comments on the draft document or the article reviewed by the task force. Barbara Glidewell mentioned her intimate involvement with the Department of Public Safety Officers talking down an agitated patient or visitor. She stated they are very well equipped to effectively engage verbally as a first resource. She went on to say that, mentally ill or not, if someone is brandishing a weapon, they are out of control and a potential harm to themselves and those around them. An armed officer would be a bonus in this situation, but not something she sees as being the first line of response. The additional training sworn officers would go through would only enhance the current skills DPS Officers successfully use.

Sen. Burdick stated it is misleading to think that just because the Department of Public Safety is not armed there is no potential for the use of firearms by others on campus. The patient with a gun in the psych ward has a low rate of occurrence, but a very high impact.

Mike Bandy asked why OHSU is positioning to be in the forefront on this issue rather than waiting for the higher education system to set the standard. Sen. Burdick spoke to the higher number of attractors OHSU has when compared to other universities. Gary Granger expressed the feeling that if you need to be in front to make something happen, then be in front. When OHSU was looking at the taser issue, Dr. Bill Wilson expressed the desire to never be violent with a mentally ill patient, but sometimes the use of a taser is the most humane way to handle the danger to self and others. Mr. Granger went on to say he feels OHSU is different enough to make an independent decision on this issue.

Ms. Egnor asked if contracting with the state police for services would be a viable option since the PPB indicated no interest in entertaining discussion with OHSU about providing contract law enforcement services. Mr. Granger stated this option has not been explored. Sen. Burdick added that this would not be a viable solution due to the difficult budget issues currently faced by the state police.

Sandra McDonough mention the comment made in a prior meeting concerning PPB officers not being familiar enough with the OHSU campus to get to an active shooter quickly. She went on to say the risk of an active shooter is low but it could happen. Contracting with a private armed security company would only work if PPB can get an adequate number of officers on the hill quickly. It has already been established that the

response time for PPB arrival in an active shooter scenario is not adequate. The only other option would be to arm DPS Officers.

Martha McMurry shared her personal story concerning her 12 year old son being taken hostage. The hostage taker was shot by PPB along with her son. Training of PPB officers was not adequate at the time, but changes have been made due to post incident analysis conducted after the use of deadly force. The mentally ill community is not the only group that could be hurt. She expressed a desire to continue discussion with the PPB concerning contracting of police services. An alliance with the PPB must be established. Mr. Granger spoke to the collaborative relationship that currently exists between DPS and PPB.

Mr. Granger spoke about the models in place where the county sheriff department deputizes an officer, which provides “police authority” for that individual, including the ability to carry a firearm and participate in training.

Nancy Haigwood clarified that arming DPS does not prohibit OHSU from calling the local police. Mr. Granger stated the PPB would still be contacted, but the end goal is to reduce response time in a critical event and expose DPS officers to all aspects of training provided to PPB officers.

Timothy Moore suggested a change in the language used to describe the issue (arming security guards vs. forming a fully trained and certified police force). He feels the consistency of language used to describe the issue could assist with minimizing some of the emotional impact. He went on to comment on the need for distinct lines between how policing activities are conducted in psych areas versus other areas of the university. Mr. Moore expressed interest on behalf of the County in entering into a partnership with OHSU to address security concerns.

Mr. Granger stated that no statutory change would be needed if DPS Officers, employed by OHSU, were commissioned by the Sheriff’s Department. A memorandum of understanding would need to be entered in to, outlining the rules, hiring criteria and training for those to be commissioned. Ms. McDonough asked about coordination with PPB under this plan. Mr. Partridge responded that Chief Sizer has stated the PPB is not opposed to other agencies practicing law enforcement, although it may be administratively complicated to make the relationships clear. Mr. Moore added that once set up, it would not continue to be administratively burdensome to manage. Mr. Bandy requested this option be included in the draft document presented as a discussion tool today. Sen. Burdick expressed concern that implementing this option could be viewed as a work-around to the legislative process. Ms. Haigwood spoke to the complications that may arise due to OHSU campus in two counties, to which Mr. Moore responded this could be worked through. Ms. Egnor commented the issues and political battles would still be the same if DPS officers were deputized, it would just be less cumbersome to effectuate the change. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Moore if the authority of a County Sheriff extends beyond “jailer”, to which he responded yes. He added that they have a jail division, but also join East County for swat team and crime scene investigation activities.

Ms. McDonough suggested that if contracting for services is the route taken, she would like some push back on the PPB for provision of this service. Her group has contracted for three officers to police 213 identified city blocks. The arrangement provides for the PPB to call upon those officers for assistance in the event of a major event.

Ms. Haigwood shared she was not in favor of arming anyone when she was asked to service on the CIRTF, but now sees the reasoning behind it. We should be able to protect our assets.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Partridge to go over the options outlined in the draft document. Mr. Partridge explained the “first Option 2” does not address armed response capabilities, but does provide for legislative change to clarify the role and authorities of the DPS Officer. Mr. Granger stated the initial white paper was written because the role is not statutorily clear as written. The CIRTF reached a consensus that, regardless of the issue of arming the officers, legislative action should be undertaken to provide clarification of roles and authorities.

Sen. Burdick stated the contracting arrangements may be problematic for the sheriff’s office, to which Mr. Moore disagreed. He assured the group that the deputized officers would be assigned fully to OHSU and could not be pulled for other events that may arise around town. He added they are not currently having any difficulty finding qualified applicants for sheriff positions.

Sen. Burdick asked if the sheriff group participates in training concerning the specialized nature of interacting with the mentally ill. Mr. Moore confirmed they do.

Ms. McMurry suggested continuing communication with PPB on the issue of contracting with them for police services even if deputizing DPS Officers is included in the final recommendations.

Mr. Granger stated his support of the have DPS deputy sheriff officers, if they cannot be called away from OHSU for other law enforcement needs and they must report to him rather than someone in the county sheriff department. Mr. Moore spoke to his personal support of this type of structure, although this may not be supported equally by all law enforcement management personnel. Sen. Burdick raised the issue of possible change in methodology with the changes in management personnel that could have an adverse affect on this type of structure.

Carol Howe went over some of the pros and cons of “own vs. deputize” officers (nicer not to do ourselves, but may be administratively burdensome to manage), but the end result is still an armed force on campus and the political issues surrounding that fact. Ms. McDonough mentioned there are legal liability issues regardless of whether or not OHSU arms its existing DPS officers or deputize officers. Mr. Partridge believes those issues would be handled through the contracting process. Sen. Burdick stated the opinion that deputizing is taking a different route to the same outcome. She went on to say there would need to be clear standards for the hiring and training of those to be deputized. Mr. Moore stated a complete training program in place, which presents theory and then

provides real world training opportunities. Mr. Granger stated a concern of possible friction concerning day-to-day management issues between county management and OHSU management. Mr. Partridge asked Mr. Granger if he has any examples of documents outlining the specific structure this type of arrangement, to which Mr. Granger replied in the negative.

Mr. Partridge stated he shares the concern expressed earlier regarding the deputy route appearing to be a legislative end run around. Ms. Katovic commented that change to OHSU's governing statute has not been successful in the past. Why would this time be successful? Mr. Granger spoke to the other items contained in those house bills that were contributing factors in the bill not passing.

Marcus Mundy focused the group back on the fundamental issue of whether or not to recommend an armed presence at OHSU. The group could then go on to the specifics of the recommendation. He stated he does not like the end around feel of the deputizing option.

Ms. McDonough suggested the group take the armed, private security guard option of the table (Option 4 of the draft document). There was group agreement on this point.

Sen. Burdick went over the pros and cons outlined for Option 5, adding that in the worst case scenario this may be the only way to effectively respond. Ms. Egnor asked if every DPS Officer would be trained and armed, to which the response was only a portion of the officers would be armed.

Sen. Burdick asked the task force if there was support for the recommendation of Option 1 of the draft document (continue current protocols), to which the answer was no.

Sen. Burdick asked the task force if there was support for Option 2 (first), to which the answer was yes.

Sen. Burdick stated that Option 2 (second), has already been ruled out.

Sen. Burdick spoke to taking Option 3 off the table as it would be difficult, if even possible, to get the PPB to lower the number required in their contact team doctrine.

Sen. Burdick mentioned Option 4 does not address the need for the armed presence at OHSU to have access to the same training as local law enforcement, therefore, would not be a favorable recommendation.

Sen. Burdick asked for those opposed to recommending Option 5, to which there was one objection and two task force members who were unsure at this time. Mr. Granger stated he is a realist and understands the complexity of this issue. He would rather see a legislative change that allows for full training and provides clarity of roles and authorities of DPS Officers even if they cannot carry guns at this point. This change is better than no change. Mr. Moore said clarity and additional training would be a positive step. Ms. Howe the 20 minute timeline for assistance from PPB puts her in favor of a trained and



armed presence on the hill. She went on to say there are armed officers on the hill on a regular basis, while performing transportation and guard duties for inmates that require medical attention. She is in support of a fully trained, psychologically tested, armed presence, with clear lines of authority and review processes in place even if a gun is pulled from holster. Mr. Partridge stated the need for the task force to include all required elements and conditions in their recommendation to Dr. Robertson.

Mr. Mundy suggested including the additional costs and cost savings in their proposal. Although it may be difficult to get, data on cost savings associated with risk mitigation related to armed officers would be good to include in the recommendation. He would also like to see cultural training as part of the recommendation training package.

Mr. Granger said a rough budget was developed when he began looking at this issue over a year ago. It would cost approximately \$250K-\$300K per year to employ our own police force and two to three times that amount to contract out for those services. Sen. Burdick asked for basic numbers to be produced for the contracting scenario. Mr. Moore added he would expect those numbers to be triple or quadruple the cost of OHSU employing sworn officers. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger what was included in his \$250K-\$300K estimate. Mr. Granger responded that salary increases are a large part of the cost, but there is also hardware and additional training time. He said they may want to add approximately 20% to account for specialized mental health training. Sen. Burdick stated she would like to have cultural training, joint training with other law enforcement agencies and training on techniques to utilize when encountering an individual with a mental illness or disability.

Ms. Egnor asked Mr. Granger if the same people currently employed as DPS Officers would be hired for the sworn officer positions. Mr. Granger stated there would be one standard in place to determine if a candidate is qualified. Internal candidates would be given the opportunity to apply for the sworn positions and the remaining open positions would be filled with applicants from outside OHSU. Sen. Burdick enforced the issue that not all currently employed DPS officers would make the grade to be hired as a sworn officer.

Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Bundy to work with Mr. Partridge to quantify costs and benefits.

Sen. Burdick asked the task force to set aside the particular issues of how to implement the group's recommendation and vote on the armed vs. unarmed issue before the group. There was one objection, three task force members abstained and the majority voted in favor of recommending a fully trained, armed presence at OHSU.

Sen. Burdick turned the discussion to issue of contracting out for these services versus OHSU having its own police force. The group discussed not having enough information about cost to factor that into the decision. Mr. Bandy spoke in support of a two tiered system with interactions between our own sworn officers and local law enforcement agencies. Mr. Fleshman spoke in support of deputizing OHSU officers. Ms. Howe mentioned the group has decided that legislative change is absolutely necessary to clarify roles and responsibilities. Why deputize our officers if we will be recommending



legislative change? Ms. Haigwood believes we should outline all acceptable options the task force's recommendation to Dr. Robertson. The final decision can be made from there. Sen. Burdick mentioned it is possible that none of the recommendations of the task force be implemented. Ms. McMurry stated that training is an important part of the cost estimate and recommendation. Sen. Burdick said training is her highest priority in this process.

Ms. Egnor noted she would like a provision for notification to the neighborhood during an active shooter or dangerous individual on the loose scenario. Sen. Burdick asked Mr. Granger if DPS currently takes steps to notify the neighborhood about dangerous events, to which the response was no. It is currently the PPB's responsibility to make notifications to the neighborhood. Ms. Egnor said notification is not received from PPB. Mr. Granger stated his support concerning this issue and believes formalizing this process can be a separate part of the overall effort. Sen. Burdick requested this be referenced in the final report.

Ms. Glidwell expressed concern surrounding tension between sheriffs and others in the DPS. Mr. Granger spoke concerning his end goal of a safe campus. He would like this to take place in the most efficient way possible. It is understood there may be stratification; however, universities across the country have overcome obstacles to make this work.

Sen. Burdick stated Mr. Granger had made some good concluding remarks and asked the task force to vote on the issue of contract versus stand alone sworn officers, to which the majority voted for the stand alone officers.

Mr. Partridge said he would put together recommendations based on the discussion. Sen. Burdick requested the attractor chart be referenced in the document. Ms. Egnor also would like the response time used as an important aspect of the recommendation.

Sen. Burdick thanked everyone on the task force for the thoughtful discussion on such a difficult issue. No more meetings are scheduled for the CIRTF.

The meeting was adjourned at 11:50AM by Sen. Burdick.

Minutes submitted by: Joe Partridge \_\_\_\_\_

Minutes approved by: Senator Ginny Burdick \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment 4: Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Communications

Date	Audience(s)	Communication
7/10/2008	OHSU employees and students	Broadcast message about task force creation
7/10/2008	OHSU board	Email about task force creation
8/6/2008	OHSU managers	5-Minute Manager Newsletter
8/8/2008	ELT	Email regarding town hall
8/12/2008	OHSU employees and students	Broadcast email reminder regarding town hall
8/13/2008	OHSU employees	Town hall
Week of 8/13	OHSU employees	Ozone tile with link to town hall video
8/14/2008	Portland Media	News release
8/14/2008	Internal and external	Q&A posted to Web site
8/14/2008	Internal and external	Survey posted to Web site
8/26/2008	General public	Public meeting notice #1
9/23/2008	General public	Public meeting notice #2
10/9/2008	Faculty	Presentation to Basic Science Chairs
10/9/2008	Nurses	Presentation to Patient Care Operations (PCO)
10/9/2008	Faculty	Presentation to Faculty Senate
10/10/2008	Students	Presentation to Student Council
10/15/2008	General public	Public meeting notice #3
10/16/2008	Portland Media	News release
10/16/2008	Faculty	Presentation to Clinical Chairs
10/16/2008	General public	KEX-Radio story with interview
10/16/2008	General public	KXL-Radio story with interview
10/16/2008	General public	KATU.com article
10/17/2008	General public	OPB-Radio story with interview
10/17/2008	General public	KOIN-TV story with interview
10/20/2008	OHSU employees and students	Broadcast email
Week of 10/20/2008	OHSU employees	Ozone tile
10/22/2008	General public	Live interview on KPAM's The Bob Miller Show
10/22/2008	General public	KGW-TV story with interview
10/22/2008	General public	Article in <i>The Oregonian</i> with interview
10/22/2008	General public	Ad regarding public input meeting in <i>The Oregonian</i>
10/22/2008	OHSU managers	Presentation to Monthly Managers meeting
10/23/2008	General public	KOIN-TV story with interview
10/23/2008	General public	KGW-TV story with interview
11/6/2008	Faculty	Presentation to Professional Board
11/6/2008	General public	Article in the <i>Portland Tribune</i> with interview



# Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report

February 2008, NCJ 219374

## Campus Law Enforcement, 2004-05

By Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.  
*BJS Statistician*

During the 2004-05 school year, 74% of the 750 law enforcement agencies serving 4-year universities and colleges with 2,500 or more students employed sworn law enforcement officers. These officers had full arrest powers granted by a state or local government. The remainder employed nonsworn security officers only. Nearly all public campuses (93%) used sworn officers compared to less than half of private campuses (42%).

Two-thirds (67%) of campus law enforcement agencies surveyed used armed patrol officers during the 2004-05 school year. Armed patrol officers were used at nearly 9 in 10 agencies that employed sworn officers and at nearly 1 in 10 agencies that relied on nonsworn officers only.

These findings come from the first survey of campus law enforcement agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics since the 1994-95 school year. Among agencies included in both the 1994-95 and 2004-05 surveys, the percentage using sworn officers increased from 78% to 79% and the percentage using armed patrol officers increased from 66% to 72%.

On campuses with 5,000 or more students, private campuses had a higher ratio of law enforcement employees to students than public campuses. Between the 1994-95 and 2004-05 surveys, comparable agencies increased their collective staffing levels from 2.8 full-time employees per 1,000 students to 3 per 1,000.

Almost all campus agencies using sworn officers conducted criminal record checks, reference checks, background investigations, and driving record checks of applicants for sworn positions. About 80% of agencies used these preemployment screening methods when hiring nonsworn officers. Most agencies also used additional screening methods—such as psychological evaluations, written aptitude tests, physical agility tests, and medical exams—when hiring sworn officers.

More than 9 in 10 agencies had a written emergency preparedness plan. During the 2004-05 school year, 58% of agencies participated in emergency preparedness exer-

**About three-quarters (74%) of 4-year colleges and universities with 2,500 or more students were served by a campus law enforcement agency with sworn personnel**




Figure 1

cises. Most agencies also used designated personnel to address a variety of crime and safety-related issues through prevention and education programs.

During the 2004 calendar year, campus law enforcement agencies received on average 62 reports of serious violent crime per 100,000 students and 1,625 reports of serious property crime. Violent crime rates for private campuses were about twice that of public campuses; property crime rates were 48% higher. Between 1994 and 2004, campus crime rates decreased by 9% for violent crime and by 30% for property crime.

Data by campus type and size and other detailed information are available in the Appendix tables on the BJS Website at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cle0405.pdf>.

### Three-quarters of campus law enforcement agencies used sworn officers with full arrest powers

During the 2004-05 school year, 74% of campus law enforcement agencies serving 4-year campuses with 2,500 or more students employed sworn personnel with full arrest powers (table 1). Nearly 9 in 10 agencies that employed sworn personnel used armed patrol officers, accounting for 65% of all agencies. Less than 1 in 10 agencies that relied only on nonsworn officers used armed patrol officers, accounting for 2% of all agencies.

Among agencies included in both the 1994-95 and 2004-05 surveys, the percentage of agencies that used armed patrol officers increased from 66% to 72%. The use of sworn personnel by campuses included in both surveys increased slightly, from 78% to 79% (figure 2).

### Ten campus law enforcement agencies had at least 155 full-time employees

New York University had the largest agency with 345 full-time employees, followed by the University of Texas Health Science Center (Houston), Temple University (Philadelphia), and Howard University (Washington, D.C.).

Campus served	Full-time employees
New York University	345
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston	235
Temple University	202
Howard University	200
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey	194
University of Southern California	190
Michigan State University	180
University of Alabama - Birmingham	170
George Washington University	156
University of Florida	155

### Largest sworn campus agency had 166 full-time officers

The largest sworn campus law enforcement agency served Howard University, with 166 full-time officers, followed by Temple University (Philadelphia), University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (Newark), and George Washington University (GWU) (Washington, D.C.). Of the ten largest sworn campus agencies, GWU was the only agency that used unarmed patrol officers.

Campus served	Full-time sworn officers
Howard University	166
Temple University	119
University of Pennsylvania	100
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey	97
George Washington University	95
University of Florida	86
Georgia State University	79
Yale University	78
University of Maryland - College Park	76
Vanderbilt University	76

**Table 1. Sworn, nonsworn, and armed campus law enforcement by type and size of 4-year campus, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Number of agencies	Percent of agencies using —			
		Sworn police		Nonsworn security only	
		Total	Armed	Total	Armed
<b>All campuses</b>	750	74%	65%	26%	2%
<b>Public</b>	465	93%	86%	7%	0%
15,000 or more	152	98	91	2	0
10,000-14,999	82	93	87	7	0
5,000-9,999	144	93	82	7	0
2,500-4,999	87	86	82	14	0
<b>Private</b>	285	42%	30%	58%	6%
15,000 or more	20	65	55	35	5
10,000-14,999	29	66	59	34	10
5,000-9,999	74	42	27	58	8
2,500-4,999	162	35	24	65	5

**Between 1994-95 and 2004-05, the percentage of agencies using armed patrol officers increased**




Figure 2

Other large campuses patrolled by unarmed sworn officers included the University of Iowa (Iowa City), Iowa State University (Ames), Portland State University (Portland, OR), University of Oregon (Eugene), and Oregon State University (Corvallis) (not shown in table).

New York University was the largest campus—with more than 39,000 students—to use nonsworn officers only. Other large 4-year campuses that used nonsworn officers only included the University of Southern California (Los Angeles), DePaul University (Chicago), and Columbia University (New York) (appendix table 2).

Typically campus law enforcement agencies have working relationships with local law enforcement and draw on their resources when needed. Depending on the type of campus agency, examples of local support may include arresting suspects, investigating crimes, providing armed support in dangerous situations, or operating a police sub-station on campus.

**Among schools with 5,000 or more students, private campuses had more law enforcement employees per capita than public campuses**

During the 2004-05 school year, the 750 agencies surveyed had more than 25,000 full-time employees, including about 13,000 sworn personnel. These agencies served more than 8 million students. The average number of full-time employees was 34, with a range of 96 on the largest private campuses to fewer than 20 on the smallest campuses (table 2).

Campuses had on average 3.8 full-time campus law enforcement employees per 1,000 students. Private campuses averaged 4.7 officers per 1,000 students compared to 3.3 per 1,000 on public campuses. Among schools with 5,000 or more students, private campuses had more law enforcement employees per capita than public campuses.

Campuses using sworn officers employed on average 2.3 full-time officers per 1,000 students. Private campuses averaged 3 sworn officers per 1,000 students compared to 2.1 sworn officers per 1,000 students on public campuses. On campuses of 5,000 or more students, private campuses had a higher ratio of sworn officers to students than public campuses.

**Full-time agency employees increased from 2.8 to 3 per 1,000 students between 1994-95 and 2004-05**

Campus law enforcement agencies included in both surveys increased the ratio of full-time employees to students between the 1994-95 and 2004-05 school years. The overall law enforcement staffing ratio increased from 2.8 per 1,000 students to 3 per 1,000 students (figure 3). Among campus agencies using sworn officers, the overall ratio of officers to students increased from 1.7 to 1.8 per 1,000.

In addition to total student enrollment, the number and type of employees in campus law enforcement agencies may be influenced by other factors such as campus land area, number of buildings, type of facilities (e.g., medical centers, stadiums, and arenas), number of full-time students, number of campus residents, number of school employees, characteristics of surrounding city and neighborhoods, and legislative statutes.

**Agencies served on average 11,000 students and campuses of 485 acres and 89 buildings**

On average, campuses included in this survey enrolled about 11,000 students and covered nearly 500 acres in land area (table 3). In terms of both average enrollment and average land area, public campuses were about twice as large as private campuses and included 37 more buildings on average. Private campuses (32%) had a higher percentage of students living on campus than public campuses (21%), a pattern that existed in all campus size categories.

**Table 2. Average full-time employment by campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	All agencies		Agencies employing sworn officers	
	Full-time employees	Per 1,000 students	Full-time	Per 1,000 students
<b>All campuses</b>	34	3.8	23	2.3
<b>Public</b>	35	3.3	23	2.1
15,000 or more	59	2.3	37	1.5
10,000-14,999	31	2.6	21	1.8
5,000-9,999	23	3.4	15	2.2
2,500-4,999	19	5.4	12	3.4
<b>Private</b>	31	4.7	22	3.0
15,000 or more	96	3.9	50	2.3
10,000-14,999	61	5.0	45	3.9
5,000-9,999	33	4.7	18	2.8
2,500-4,999	16	4.7	11	3.0

**Between 1994-95 and 2004-05, the ratio of full-time campus law enforcement employees per student increased slightly**




Figure 3

**Table 3. Selected characteristics of 4-year campuses with 2,500 or more students, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Average number of—			
	Students	Student residents	Acres	Buildings
<b>All campuses</b>	10,874	2,560	485	89
<b>Public</b>	13,413	2,838	614	103
15,000 or more	25,627	4,730	1,104	195
10,000-14,999	12,224	2,508	454	81
5,000-9,999	7,080	1,782	355	49
2,500-4,999	3,676	1,191	316	49
<b>Private</b>	6,730	2,130	272	66
15,000 or more	23,293	5,796	678	223
10,000-14,999	12,368	3,690	609	107
5,000-9,999	6,929	2,174	187	63
2,500-4,999	3,585	1,384	204	40

## Nearly all campuses had 24-hour patrol, a 3-digit emergency number, and emergency blue-light phones

All agencies serving public campuses with 10,000 or more students and those serving private campuses with 5,000 or more students reported having 24-hour patrol services (table 4). Overall 99% of private campus law enforcement agencies and 97% of public agencies provided 24-hour patrol services.

Nearly all campuses had a 3-digit emergency phone number through a 6-1-1 on-campus system or a local 9-1-1 system. Most campuses (91%) also had blue-light emergency campus phones that provided direct access to campus law enforcement.

More than 9 in 10 public and private campuses with 5,000 or more students had blue-light emergency phones compared to about 8 in 10 campuses with less than 5,000 students. Among campuses with a blue-light phone system, the average number of blue-light phones increased from 8 per 2,500 students in 1994-95 to 13 in 2004-05. Private campuses had 17 blue-light phones per 2,500 students compared to 12 for public campuses (not shown in table).

## Campus law enforcement agencies performed a wide range of functions

Overall agencies serving the 100 largest campuses performed more of the functions asked about in the survey than agencies serving the 100 smallest campuses (See appendix table 1 for functions). More than 4 in 5 campus law enforcement agencies performed functions related to special events security (98%), dispatching calls for service (92%), traffic enforcement (89%), property crime investigation (86%), building lockup (85%), parking enforcement (84%), and violent crime investigation (81%) (table 5).

**Table 4. Campuses with 24-hour patrol and emergency telephone access to law enforcement, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	24-hour patrol coverage	3-digit emergency number	Blue-light emergency phones
<b>All campuses</b>	98%	95%	91%
<b>Public</b>	97%	94%	92%
15,000 or more	100	94	97
10,000-14,999	100	94	95
5,000-9,999	96	95	90
2,500-4,999	92	94	80
<b>Private</b>	99%	95%	90%
15,000 or more	100	100	100
10,000-14,999	100	100	92
5,000-9,999	100	95	96
2,500-4,999	97	94	85

Functions performed by a majority of agencies serving the smallest campuses, but not by a majority of agencies serving the largest campuses, included parking administration (87%), vehicle registration (84%), key control (60%), and fire prevention education (52%) (appendix table 1).

## Nearly half of the agencies serving large public campuses used in-field computers

Overall about 1 in 4 (27%) campus law enforcement agencies used in-field computers during the 2004-05 school year (table 6). Nearly half (45%) of agencies serving public campuses with 15,000 or more students reported using in-field computers.

The majority of agencies with in-field computers reported that patrol officers had in-field access to motor vehicle records (61%) and driving records (54%) (not shown in table). Less than half reported that patrol officers used in-field computers to access criminal history information (37%), calls-for-service records (24%), or linked files for crime analysis (13%). A majority of agencies reported that patrol officers had fixed-site computer access to various types of records and other information.

**Table 5. Selected functions performed by campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Selected function	All 4-year campuses	Public	Private
Special event security	98%	99%	98%
Dispatching calls	92	90	95
Traffic enforcement	89	92	79
Property crime investigation	86	94	70
Building lockup/unlock	85	81	93
Parking/vehicle enforcement	84	81	89
Violent crime investigation	81%	92%	62%
Central alarm monitoring	77	78	77
Access control	75	72	83
Surveillance camera monitoring	69	64	77
Parking administration	67	62	78
Vehicle registration	55	47	70

**Table 6. Campus law enforcement agencies using in-field computers, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Percent of agencies using in-field computers
<b>All campuses</b>	27%
<b>Public</b>	31%
15,000 or more	45
10,000-14,999	33
5,000-9,999	24
2,500-4,999	13
<b>Private</b>	21%
15,000 or more	27
10,000-14,999	20
5,000-9,999	26
2,500-4,999	17

## A sixth of sworn campus officers were women

During the 2004-05 school year, 31% of sworn campus officers were a racial or ethnic minority. A sixth (17%) of officers were women.

Characteristic	Percent of full-time sworn personnel
Male	83.3%
Female	16.7
White, non-Hispanic	69.4%
Black, non-Hispanic	21.0
Hispanic	6.5
Other race*	3.1

\*Other race includes American Indians, Asians, Native Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and persons identifying two or more races.

Among agencies included in both the 1994-95 and 2004-05 surveys, women increased from 14% to 17% of officers (figure 4). Minorities—blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities—increased from 27% to 30%; Hispanics increased from 4.4% to 6%.

## Since 1994-95, starting salaries were up 5% for sworn officers but were unchanged for nonsworn officers

Starting salaries for entry-level sworn officers averaged \$30,600 for the 2004-05 school year, 5% more than in 1994-95 after adjusting for inflation (table 7). Average starting salaries (\$22,300) for nonsworn officers were unchanged after adjusting for inflation. During 2004-05, starting salaries in agencies with collective bargaining rights, compared to those without, were 25% higher for sworn officers and 16% higher for nonsworn officers (not shown in table).

## About 1 in 6 agencies required new officers to have a college degree

More than a quarter (28%) of all campus law enforcement agencies had some type of college education requirement for new officers. About 1 in 6 agencies required a 2-year (13%) or 4-year (3%) college degree.

Minimum education requirement for new officers	Percent of agencies
With college requirement	28%
Any degree	16
4-year degree	3
2-year degree	13
Some college	12
Without college requirement	72

## Agencies serving the largest public campuses required about 1,100 hours of training for new officers

Agencies required on average more than 800 hours of training for new officers, including about 500 hours of academy training (table 8). Training requirements ranged from about 1,100 hours at the largest public campuses to about 400 at the smallest private campuses. Some of this variation was attributable to the use of sworn versus nonsworn officers.

## Minority and female full-time sworn personnel in campus law enforcement agencies, 1994-95 and 2004-05




Figure 4

## Table 7. Average base starting salary for selected positions in campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05

Type and size of 4-year campus	Average base starting salary		
	Entry-level nonsworn	Entry-level sworn	Chief or director
<b>All campuses</b>	\$22,300	\$30,600	\$61,700
<b>Public</b>	\$21,500	\$30,700	\$63,300
15,000 or more	21,800	33,500	74,800
10,000-14,999	20,900	30,000	62,900
5,000-9,999	22,100	28,900	55,400
2,500-4,999	20,100	27,300	52,900
<b>Private</b>	\$23,200	\$30,300	\$58,000
15,000 or more	32,700	36,000	79,900
10,000-14,999	23,400	30,200	72,300
5,000-9,999	25,000	30,300	63,600
2,500-4,999	21,500	28,700	49,500

Note: Rounded to nearest hundred.

## Table 8. Average training hours required for new campus law enforcement officers, 2004-05

Type and size of 4-year campus	All agencies		Agencies using sworn officers	
	Academy	Field	Academy	Field
<b>All campuses</b>	509 hrs.	305 hrs.	582 hrs.	357 hrs.
<b>Public</b>	568 hrs.	362 hrs.	584 hrs.	376 hrs.
15,000 or more	624	477	627	487
10,000-14,999	582	357	601	351
5,000-9,999	533	251	547	261
2,500-4,999	497	259	536	296
<b>Private</b>	355 hrs.	183 hrs.	569 hrs.	277 hrs.
15,000 or more	524	303	620	415
10,000-14,999	485	216	576	220
5,000-9,999	381	225	586	296
2,500-4,999	268	129	536	242

Note: Computation of average training requirement excludes agencies that did not require training of that type.

## Training and education requirements were more stringent for sworn officers

On average, agencies required sworn officers to complete more than 900 hours of training compared to about 200 hours for nonsworn officers.

Type of officer	Average number of training hours required for new officers		
	Total	Academy	Field
Sworn police	937	580	357
Nonsworn security	203	93	110

Education requirements were also more stringent for sworn officers, with 30% of agencies requiring newly hired sworn officers to have at least some college compared to 21% for nonsworn officers. About 1 in 6 agencies required sworn officers to have at least a 2-year degree, compared to about 1 in 10 agencies for nonsworn officers (not shown in table).

## Sworn officers were subjected to a wider range of preemployment screening methods

Preemployment screening methods—background screening, personal screening, and physical screening—were used more frequently when hiring sworn officers than nonsworn officers (figures 5, 6, and 7). Most agencies conducted criminal record checks, background investigations, driving record checks, and personal interviews when hiring nonsworn officers while less than half used the other screening methods.

### Percent of campus law enforcement agencies performing selected functions by type of officers employed, 2004-05

	Sworn police	Nonsworn security only
90% or more	Routine patrol Special event security Violent crime investigation Property crime investigation Traffic enforcement Dispatching calls	Routine patrol Building lockup/unlock Special event security Parking enforcement Dispatching calls
80%-89%	Arson investigation Building lockup/unlock Parking enforcement Arena event security	Access control Parking administration Monitor surveillance cameras
70%-79%	Central alarm monitoring Stadium event security Access control	Arena event security Central alarm monitoring Vehicle registration
50%-69%	Drug enforcement Homicide investigation Monitor surveillance cameras Parking administration	Key control Traffic enforcement Fire prevention education Stadium event security Property crime investigation

## Nonsworn agencies were more likely to handle building security and parking-related duties

Nearly all agencies provided routine patrol services, security for special events, and dispatch services. More than 9 in 10 agencies with sworn personnel also had primary

responsibility for crime investigations. Nonsworn agencies were more likely than sworn agencies to handle functions related to building security and parking; a majority of sworn agencies also performed these functions.

## Nonsworn patrol officers were less likely than sworn officers to carry firearms, pepper spray, or batons

Nearly 9 in 10 agencies with sworn officers (87%) used armed patrol officers compared to about 1 in 10 agencies using nonsworn officers only (9%). About 9 in 10 agencies also authorized sworn officers to carry pepper spray (92%) and batons (91%). Among agencies using nonsworn officers, about three-fifths authorized officers to carry pepper spray (61%), and about half, batons (49%). About 1 in 5 agencies authorized sworn officers to carry hand-held conducted energy devices such as Tasers or stun guns (20%). About 1 in 4 agencies authorized such devices for nonsworn officers (24%) (not shown in table).




Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7



### Community policing activities were more prevalent on public campuses than on private campuses

About two-thirds (69%) of campus law enforcement agencies had incorporated community policing into their campus security policy (table 9). Most agencies (59%) assigned patrol officers to specific geographic areas on campus. About half had upgraded technology to support community policing efforts (51%) and collaborated with citizen groups, using their feedback to support community policing strategies (47%).

Public campuses were more likely than private campuses to have implemented most of the community policing activities asked about in the survey. The largest differences were for student ride-a-long programs (49% public versus 22% private) and officer problem-solving projects (39% versus 23%).

### More than 80% of agencies met regularly with faculty, staff, and student groups

Regular meetings with various groups played an important role in campus community policing efforts. During the 2004-05 school year, more than 80% of agencies serving public and private campuses met regularly with other law enforcement agencies (88%) and with on- and off-campus groups and organizations—such as student housing groups (86%), faculty/staff organizations (84%), and student organizations (83%)—to discuss crime and safety-related problems on campus (table 10).

Agencies serving public campuses were more likely than those serving private campuses to meet regularly with fraternity and sorority groups, advocacy groups, and domestic violence groups to discuss crime and safety-related issues. In comparison agencies serving private campuses were more likely to meet regularly with neighborhood associations and religious groups to discuss crime-related issues on campus.

### About two-thirds of agencies had a written terrorism response plan

About 9 in 10 campus law enforcement agencies had a written emergency preparedness plan (94%) and had met with campus administrators regarding emergency preparedness issues (89%) during the 2004-05 school year (table 11). Nearly 7 in 10 agencies had disseminated emergency preparedness information to the campus community (67%) and had a written plan on how to respond in the event of a terrorist attack (66%).

A majority of agencies also conducted emergency preparedness exercises (58%), maintained intelligence sharing agreements with other law enforcement agencies (56%), and held campus meetings on emergency preparedness (55%). Nearly two-thirds of the agencies on public campuses had engaged in these activities compared to less than half of those on private campuses.

Nearly half of all agencies had formed partnerships with culturally diverse organizations on- and off-campus to address emergency preparedness on campus (45%). About a fifth of agencies had conducted a campus anti-fear campaign (21%).

**Table 9. Community policing activities of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type of activity	All 4-year campuses*	Public	Private
Included in campus security policy	69%	73%	63%
Geographic patrol assignments	59	59	61
Upgraded technology	51	53	47
Partnered with citizen groups	47	51	40
Student ride-along program	40	49	22
Written community policing plan	34	38	26
Officer problem-solving projects	33	39	23
Environmental crime analysis	32	36	25
Campus police academy	23	22	25

\*See appendix table 3 for percentages by type and size of 4-year campuses.

**Table 10. Groups that campus law enforcement agencies met with regularly to discuss crime-related problems, 2004-05**

Type of group	All 4-year campuses*	Public	Private
Other law enforcement agencies	88%	89%	86%
Student housing groups	86	86	86
Faculty/staff organizations	84	83	84
Student organizations	83	83	85
Fraternity/sorority groups	57	64	43
Advocacy groups	47	52	36
Domestic violence groups	43	52	28
Local public agencies	40	44	33
Neighborhood associations	39	37	44
Business groups	27	30	21
Religious groups	20	17	25

\*See appendix table 4 for percentages by type and size of 4-year campuses.

**Table 11. Emergency preparedness activities of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type of activity	All 4-year campuses*	Public	Private
Emergency preparedness plan	94%	94%	95%
Met with campus administrators	89	91	86
Disseminated information	67	71	60
Terrorism response plan	66	70	60
Emergency preparedness exercises	58	63	49
Intelligence-sharing agreements	56	65	41
Held campus meetings	55	61	42
Culturally diverse partnerships	45	48	39
Campus anti-fear campaign	21	25	15

\*See appendix table 5 for percentages by type and size of 4-year campuses.

**Agencies serving private campuses were more likely to have written policies related to student judicial officers and residence life officials**

More than 9 in 10 campus law enforcement agencies had written policies and procedures regarding officer code-of-conduct (96%) and use of non-lethal force (91%) (table 12). About 8 in 10 had policies on handling citizen complaints (82%) and working with other law enforcement agencies (79%).

Agencies serving public campuses were more likely to have written policies to address areas such as domestic disputes, off-duty employment, mentally ill persons, and racial profiling. Agencies serving private campuses were more likely to have written policies pertaining to student judicial officers and residence life officials.

**Table 12. Written policies and procedures of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Policy area	All 4-year campuses*	Public	Private
Code of conduct/appearance	96%	97%	94%
Non-lethal force	91	95	85
Citizen complaints	82	87	72
Other law enforcement agencies	79	84	71
Domestic disputes	72	80	57
Juveniles	72	81	52
Employee counseling assistance	70	70	72
Off-duty employment	70	83	48
Mentally ill persons	68	76	55
Victim services	63	63	63
Racial profiling	57	67	39
Student judicial officers	55	51	63
Residence life officials	54	47	66
Homeless persons	27	30	23

\*See appendix table 6 for percentages by type and size of 4-year campuses.

**Table 13. Problems and issues addressed by special programs or designated personnel in campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Problem/issue addressed	All 4-year campuses*	Public	Private
Crime prevention	83%	88%	74%
Rape prevention	78	85	66
Drug education	73	79	60
Self-defense training	69	75	57
Alcohol education	67	75	53
Community policing	63	71	49
Victim assistance	62	67	54
Stalking	60	68	46
Cybercrime	54	62	40
Student security patrol	52	55	46
Bias/hate crimes	51	55	43

\*See appendix table 7 for percentages by type and size of 4-year campuses.

**Agencies serving public campuses were more likely to have designated personnel to address specific campus crime and safety-related issues**

A majority of campus law enforcement agencies had designated personnel to address specific crime-related issues. On some campuses these personnel were assigned full-time to a specialized unit. About 8 in 10 agencies offered general crime prevention (83%) and rape prevention (78%) programs or had designated personnel to address these issues (table 13).

About 7 in 10 agencies had designated personnel for self-defense training programs (69%) while a similar proportion offered drug (73%) and alcohol (67%) education programs. About 6 in 10 agencies had personnel to deal with victim assistance (62%) and stalking (60%). More than half had designated personnel to address cybercrime (54%) and hate crime (51%).

Agencies serving public campuses were more likely than those on private campuses to have programs or designated personnel for each problem or task included in the survey. The largest differences between public and private campuses were in the areas of alcohol education, community policing, stalking, and cybercrime.

**Nearly all students at 4-year schools with 2,500 or more students had access to crime prevention programs**

Nearly 9 in 10 students were enrolled on a campus where campus law enforcement provided general crime prevention and rape prevention programs (figure 8). Forty percent of students were enrolled on a campus with a full-time dedicated crime prevention unit (not shown in figure). For each problem or task identified in the survey, 60% or more of all students were enrolled on a campus where personnel were designated to work at least part-time on that issue.

**Most students were served by campus law enforcement agencies with special programs or designated personnel to address specific problems and issues**




Figure 8

**Campus police were more likely than local police agencies to assess recruits' community-relations skills prior to hiring**

Campus law enforcement agencies with at least 10 but fewer than 100 full-time sworn officers were compared with local police departments in the same size range using data from the 2003 BJS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey. Nearly all (96% or more) campus and local police agencies screened new officers through personal interviews, background investigations, reference checks, criminal record checks, and driving record checks (not shown in figures).

A large majority of both local (86%) and campus (83%) police agencies required psychological evaluations of applicants (figure 9). Nearly two-thirds of local police (64%) required a written aptitude test compared to about half of campus police (52%). Local police were more likely than campus police to conduct physical screening of recruits, including medical exams (97% versus 85%), drug tests (86% versus 76%), and physical agility tests (65% versus 57%) (figure 10).

Campus police were more likely than local police to assess recruits' community-relations skills (figure 11). This included assessments of analytical problem-solving skills (58% versus 37%), understanding of cultural diversity (57% versus 16%), and assessment of skills related to mediation and conflict management (42% versus 11%).

**Campus police were more likely than local police to have a college degree requirement for new officers**

Campus police were more likely to have a college education requirement for new officers. Campus police (91%) were also more likely than local police (57%) to have tuition waivers or reimbursements. While campus police required more education, local police required 11% more training, 1,092 hours versus 981 on average (not shown in table).

Education requirement	Campus police	Local police
With college requirement	30%	20%
Degree, any type	16	11
4-year degree	3	1
2-year degree	13	10
Some college	14	9

**Starting salaries for campus police officers were 6% lower than starting salaries for local police**

Starting salaries for entry-level campus law enforcement officers (\$31,200) were 6% lower on average than for local police (\$32,900) in similar size agencies. Starting salaries for campus police chiefs averaged \$65,800, about 2% higher than for local police chiefs (\$64,700) (not shown in table).

Campus police agencies were more likely than local police agencies to provide shift differential, merit, and hazardous duty pay for sworn personnel. Local police were more than twice as likely as campus police to offer education incentive pay.

Special pay categories	Campus police	Local police
Shift differential	56%	33%
Merit pay	47	29
Education incentive	24	54
Hazardous duty	11	6

**Campus police were more likely to use computers for management functions; local police had more in-field computer capabilities**

Campus police agencies were more likely than local police agencies to use computers for management functions related to investigations, dispatch, interagency information sharing, resource allocation, fleet management, and crime mapping.

Computer functions	Campus police	Local police
Investigations	92%	63%
Dispatch	74	59
Information sharing	64	40
Resource allocation	45	16
Fleet management	36	32
Crime mapping	34	26

Use of in-field computers was more prevalent among local police agencies than campus police agencies. Local police were more than twice as likely to provide officers in-field computer access to information such as motor vehicle records (51% versus 22%), driving records (47% versus 20%), criminal history records (29% versus 12%), and calls-for-service histories (26% versus 9%) (not shown in table).




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11

## The Clery Act and the reporting of campus crime

The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act was signed into law in 1990. It requires institutions of higher education that participate in federal financial aid programs to keep and disclose information about crime on and near campus. The U.S. Department of Education monitors compliance. Violations can result in penalties of up to \$27,500 per infraction and suspension from federal student financial aid programs. The Clery Act's major requirements include:

- An annual campus security report must be published and distributed to current and prospective students and employees by October 1.
- The campus police or security department must maintain a public log of all crimes reported or otherwise known to campus law enforcement officials.
- Institutions must give timely warning of crimes that represent a threat to student or employee safety.
- Institutions must maintain statistics for the most recent three years for crimes committed on campus, in institutional facilities, in non-campus buildings, and on public property.

Campuses must submit an annual report to the U.S. Department of Education. The report should include statistics on criminal homicide, sex offenses, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The Clery Act does not require the reporting of larceny/theft data. The report must identify incidents believed to have been hate crimes. The reports must also include arrests and disciplinary referrals for liquor law violations, drug law violations, and illegal weapons possession. Clery Act statistics are available at <<http://ope.ed.gov/security/index.asp>>.

Violent crimes accounted for 4% of the serious crimes reported to law enforcement agencies serving 4-year campuses with 2,500 or more students during 2004, compared to 12% of all serious crimes reported nationwide (table 14). Murder on campus was rare, with a total of 16 reported, 0.1% of all murders nationwide (not shown in table).

During 2004 campus law enforcement agencies received reports of 62 violent crimes per 100,000 students (figure 12). The violent crime rate was higher among private campuses (100) than public campuses (51), a pattern that existed in all campus size categories. Violent crime rates on campuses were far lower than the U.S. violent crime rate of 466 per 100,000 residents. Between the 1994 and 2004, violent crime rates on campuses decreased by 9%.




Figure 12

Campus law enforcement agencies received reports of 1,625 property crimes per 100,000 students during 2004. Similar to violent crimes, the overall property crime rate per 100,000 students was higher on private campuses (2,212) than public campuses (1,493). This pattern was consistent across all size categories. Nationwide, the rate for reported serious property crimes was 3,517 per 100,000 residents. Compared to 1994, campus property crime rates were 30% lower in 2004.

Table 14. Average number of serious crimes reported to campus law enforcement agencies, 2004

Type and size of campus	Violent crimes					Property crimes				
	Total	Murder	Forcible sex offense	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Total	Burglary	Larceny/theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson
<b>All campuses</b>	7	--	2	2	3	191	24	158	6	1
<b>Public</b>	7	--	2	2	3	208	25	174	7	1
15,000 or more	12	--	3	4	6	393	46	331	16	1
10,000-14,999	5	--	2	1	2	156	19	131	5	1
5,000-9,999	4	0	1	1	2	102	14	84	3	1
2,500-4,999	3	0	1	1	1	71	9	59	2	1
<b>Private</b>	7	--	2	2	2	153	23	122	5	1
15,000 or more	25	--	7	11	7	469	81	378	12	1
10,000-14,999	12	0	4	5	4	309	37	259	9	1
5,000-9,999	7	--	2	2	3	147	20	120	6	1
2,500-4,999	3	--	1	1	1	75	15	54	3	1

Sources: U.S. Department of Education, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  
-- Less than 0.5

## Methodology

This report presents data covering the 2004-05 school year. Agencies serving 4-year U.S. universities and colleges with a fall 2004 enrollment of 2,500 or more, and those serving 2-year public colleges with a fall 2004 enrollment of 10,000 or more were surveyed. U.S. military academies and for-profit institutions were excluded.

Data were collected in conjunction with the 2004 BJS Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. The survey instrument was patterned after the BJS Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. Data were collected describing campus law enforcement agencies, including personnel, expenditures and pay, operations, equipment, computers and information systems, policies, and special programs.

BJS conducted an earlier survey of campus law enforcement agencies, covering the 1994-95 school year. The 1994-95 survey report, *Campus Law Enforcement Agencies, 1995*, is available at <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/clea95.htm>>.

Both the 1994-95 and 2004-05 reports focus primarily on 4-year campuses with some summary data describing 2-year campuses presented in appendix tables.

The 2004-05 survey was initially conducted as a web-only data collection. Follow-up efforts provided agencies with fax and mail-in response options. The final response rate was 82%, with 749 of 913 potential respondents participating in the survey (tables 15 and 16). Nearly two-thirds (65%) of responses were received electronically through the survey website. The remainder were received by mail or fax.

Among 4-year institutions, 606 of 750 agencies responded to the full survey, for a response rate of 81%. Among 2-year institutions, 143 of 163 agencies responded to the full survey, for a response rate of 88%.

For agencies not responding to the full survey, an abbreviated survey instrument was used, giving agencies the opportunity to provide data on type and number of personnel, use of sworn officers, use of armed officers, physical campus characteristics, and number of crimes reported to campus law enforcement authorities. All non-respondents provided at least some of this information.

Campus crime statistics were compiled using data from the BJS survey, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, and the U.S. Department of Education's Campus Security Statistics Website at <<http://ope.ed.gov/security/index.asp>>.

**Table 15. Response rates for agencies serving public and private campuses, by type and size of institution, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Total			Public			Private		
	Surveyed	Responded	Rate	Surveyed	Responded	Rate	Surveyed	Responded	Rate
All campuses	913	749	82 %	628	536	85 %	285	213	75 %
4-year campuses	750	606	81 %	465	393	85 %	285	213	75 %
15,000 or more	172	157	91	152	141	93	20	16	80
10,000 - 14,999	111	93	84	82	67	82	29	26	90
5,000 - 9,999	218	173	79	144	118	82	74	55	74
2,500 - 4,999	249	183	73	87	67	77	162	116	72
2-year campuses	163	143	88 %	163	143	88 %	0	0	~
~ Not applicable.									

**Table 16. Response rates for agencies serving 4-year and 2-year campuses, by region, 2004-05**

Regions	Total			4-year campuses			2-year campuses		
	Surveyed	Responded	Rate	Surveyed	Responded	Rate	Surveyed	Responded	Rate
All campuses	913	749	82 %	750	606	81 %	163	143	88 %
South Atlantic	153	127	81 %	129	106	82 %	24	21	88 %
East North Central	152	128	79	121	100	83	31	28	90
Mid-Atlantic	151	113	91	133	96	72	18	17	94
Pacific	125	106	73	73	62	85	52	44	85
West South Central	105	89	85	86	72	84	19	17	89
West North Central	69	58	84	66	55	83	3	3	100
New England	63	51	91	62	50	81	1	1	100
East South Central	50	39	84	47	38	81	3	1	33
Mountain	45	38	73	33	27	82	12	11	92

Notes: Represents regions of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators. South Atlantic Region includes District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. East North Central Region includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Mid-Atlantic Region includes New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Pacific Region includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington. West South Central Region includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. West North Central Region includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, and South Dakota. New England Region includes Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. East South Region Central includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Mountain Region includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.



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This report in portable document format and in ASCII and its related statistical data and tables are available at the BJS World Wide Web Internet site: <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cle0405.htm>>.

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The Bureau of Justice Statistics is the statistical agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Jeffrey L. Sedgwick is director.

This Special Report was written by Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D. Lynn Langton and Thomas H. Cohen, Ph.D., verified the report. Georgette M. Walsh edited the report, Tina Dorsey produced the report, and Jayne Robinson prepared the report for final printing, under the supervision of Doris J. James.

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**Appendix table 1. Functions performed by campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type of function	All 4-year campuses	By size of enrollment		By type of officers employed	
		100 largest	100 smallest	Sworn police	Nonsworn security only
<b>Building security</b>					
Building lockup/unlock	85%	67%	100%	82%	96%
Access control	75	59	83	72	86
Central alarm monitoring	77	90	72	79	74
Surveillance camera monitoring	69	62	63	65	81
Key control	42	26	60	37	58
<b>Communications</b>					
Dispatching calls for service	92%	93%	91%	91%	93%
Campus switchboard operation	25	10	49	21	38
<b>Crime investigation</b>					
Property crime, any type	86%	98%	74%	97%	50%
Violent crime, any type	81	98	66	95	38
Drug sales	73	93	51	88	26
Arson	69	88	47	82	28
Cybercrime	69	93	45	82	25
Homicide	51	77	27	64	9
<b>Drug/vice enforcement</b>					
Drug law enforcement	55%	76%	34%	69%	13%
Drug task force participation	26	46	10	34	2
Vice enforcement	24	41	10	30	3
<b>Detention (temporary)</b>					
Temporary holding cell	17%	40%	5%	21%	6%
Temporary lockup facility	13	9	17	11	19
<b>Special operations</b>					
Search and rescue	17%	23%	9%	20%	7%
Tactical operations (SWAT)	9	26	0	12	0
Bomb/explosives disposal	3	11	0	4	0
Underwater recovery	1	3	0	2	0
<b>Special public safety</b>					
Fire prevention education	35%	23%	52%	28%	57%
Emergency medical services	31	26	39	27	44
Fire inspection	28	20	41	22	45
Environmental health/safety	24	11	30	20	37
Animal control	20	18	33	21	19
Emergency fire services	15	14	20	13	24
<b>Special security</b>					
Special events	98%	99%	96%	99%	97%
Stadium	68	84	56	74	51
Arena	83	92	72	85	76
Hospital/medical facility	14	30	11	14	11
Nuclear facility	6	19	3	8	1
<b>Traffic-related functions</b>					
Traffic direction/control	89%	91%	79%	92%	76%
Accident investigation	88	94	75	94	67
Traffic law enforcement	84	93	75	91	57
<b>Vehicle-related functions</b>					
Parking administration	67%	30%	87%	63%	83%
Parking enforcement	84	58	95	82	91
Vehicle registration	55	23	84	49	73
Campus transportation system	31	22	30	27	43

**Appendix table 2. Campus law enforcement agencies serving the 100 largest enrollments in the U.S., 2004-05**

4-year campus	Location	Fall 2004, enrollment	Total employees			Sworn personnel		
			Full-time	Part-time	Per 1,000 students	Full-time	Part-time	Per 1,000 students
Ohio State University	Columbus (OH)	50,995	103	0	20	51	0	10
University of Minnesota -Twin Cities	Minneapolis (MN)	50,954	101	80	28	43	20	10
University of Texas at Austin	Austin (TX)	50,377	127	2	25	65	0	13
Arizona State University	Tempe (AZ)	49,171	91	15	20	55	0	11
University of Florida	Gainesville (FL)	47,993	155	30	35	86	5	18
Auraria Higher Education Center*	Denver (CO)	46,645	59	0	13	25	0	5
Michigan State University	East Lansing (MI)	44,836	180	80	49	62	0	14
Texas A & M University	College Station (TX)	44,435	121	1	27	54	0	12
University of Central Florida	Orlando (FL)	42,465	69	12	18	44	0	10
University of South Florida	Tampa (FL)	42,238	57	0	13	40	0	9
Pennsylvania State University	University Park (PA)	41,289	53	127	28	44	0	11
University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign	Champaign (IL)	40,687	70	13	19	55	0	14
University of Wisconsin - Madison	Madison (WI)	40,455	112	5	28	62	0	15
Purdue University	West Lafayette (IN)	40,108	50	0	12	39	0	10
University of Michigan	Ann Arbor (MI)	39,533	96	3	25	54	0	14
New York University	New York (NY)	39,408	345	10	89	0	0	0
University of Washington	Seattle (WA)	39,199	73	0	19	46	0	12
Florida State University	Tallahassee (FL)	38,431	85	5	23	62	1	16
Indiana University-Bloomington	Bloomington (IN)	37,821	57	75	25	45	43	18
University of Arizona	Tucson (AZ)	36,932	66	0	18	52	0	14
University of California - Los Angeles	Los Angeles (CA)	35,966	94	0	26	56	0	16
University of Houston	Houston (TX)	35,180	44	0	13	44	0	13
University of Maryland	College Park (MD)	34,933	115	100	47	76	0	22
Florida International University	Miami (FL)	34,865	64	1	18	45	0	13
Rutgers University	New Brunswick (NJ)	34,696	112	0	32	56	0	16
Brigham Young University	Provo (UT)	34,347	40	125	30	28	12	10
Temple University	Philadelphia (PA)	33,551	202	0	60	119	0	35
California State University	Long Beach (CA)	33,479	35	15	13	27	0	8
University of Georgia	Athens (GA)	33,405	79	11	25	62	0	19
University of California-Berkeley	Berkeley (CA)	32,803	116	65	45	64	0	20
California State University - Fullerton	Fullerton (CA)	32,744	28	32	13	21	0	6
Wayne State University	Detroit (MI)	32,386	54	26	21	39	0	12
University of Colorado at Boulder	Boulder (CO)	32,362	59	0	18	37	0	11
Louisiana State University	Baton Rouge (LA)	32,241	67	1	21	65	0	20
University of Southern California	Los Angeles (CA)	32,160	190	0	59	0	0	0
San Diego State University	San Diego (CA)	32,043	45	37	20	29	0	9
California State University - Northridge	Northridge (CA)	31,341	55	19	21	25	0	8
University of North Texas	Denton (TX)	31,155	58	4	19	46	0	15
North Carolina State University	Raleigh (NC)	29,957	71	0	24	54	0	18
Indiana University - Purdue University	Indianapolis (IN)	29,953	51	10	19	34	7	13
Boston University	Boston (MA)	29,596	57	0	19	50	0	17
University of California - Davis	Davis (CA)	29,210	73	2	25	42	0	14
San Jose State University	San Jose (CA)	29,044	66	6	24	32	1	11
University of Utah	Salt Lake City (UT)	28,933	100	9	36	32	1	11
George Mason University	Fairfax (VA)	28,874	62	12	24	49	0	17
San Francisco State University	San Francisco (CA)	28,804	37	13	15	20	0	7
University of Iowa	Iowa City (IA)	28,442	49	13	20	28	0	10
Texas Tech University	Lubbock (TX)	28,325	79	5	29	49	5	18
Virginia Commonwealth University	Richmond (VA)	28,303	128	37	52	71	0	25
Colorado State University	Fort Collins (CO)	27,973	51	20	22	35	0	13

Note: Per-student ratios were calculated using a weight of 0.5 for part-time employees.

\*Includes University of Colorado at Denver, Metropolitan State College, and the Community College of Denver.



**Appendix table 2 (continued). Campus law enforcement agencies serving the 100 largest enrollments in the U.S., 2004-05**

4-year campus	City	Fall 2004, enrollment	Total employees			Sworn personnel		
			Full-time	Part-time	Per 1,000 students	Full-time	Part-time	Per 1,000 students
California State University - Sacramento	Sacramento (CA)	27,972	46	30	22	16	30	11
Western Michigan University	Kalamazoo (MI)	27,829	61	0	22	29	0	10
University of Tennessee	Knoxville (TN)	27,792	53	20	23	50	0	18
Central Michigan University	Mount Pleasant (MI)	27,683	30	0	11	21	0	8
Virginia Tech University	Blacksburg (VA)	27,619	58	35	27	39	0	14
University of Oklahoma	Norman (OK)	27,483	57	18	24	33	0	12
University of Nevada - Las Vegas	Las Vegas (NV)	27,339	51	52	28	33	22	16
SUNY at Buffalo	Buffalo (NY)	27,276	68	0	25	61	0	22
Georgia State University	Atlanta (GA)	27,261	116	28	48	79	0	29
University of Cincinnati	Cincinnati (OH)	27,178	143	0	53	69	0	25
University of Missouri	Columbia (MO)	27,003	50	32	24	31	0	11
University of Kansas	Lawrence (KS)	26,980	44	0	16	28	0	10
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill	Chapel Hill (NC)	26,878	80	69	43	45	21	21
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee	Milwaukee (WI)	26,832	37	27	19	28	0	10
Texas State University	San Marcos (TX)	26,783	68	0	25	31	0	12
University of Pittsburgh	Pittsburgh (PA)	26,731	130	0	49	74	0	28
Iowa State University	Ames (IA)	26,380	47	116	40	33	0	13
University of New Mexico	Albuquerque (NM)	26,242	59	0	22	34	0	13
University of Texas - San Antonio	San Antonio (TX)	26,175	68	0	26	47	0	18
University of Kentucky	Lexington (KY)	25,686	51	2	20	45	0	18
University of South Carolina	Columbia (SC)	25,596	73	3	29	57	1	22
NOVA Southeastern University	Fort Lauderdale (FL)	25,430	110	0	43	2	0	1
Florida Atlantic University	Boca Raton (FL)	25,319	71	12	30	35	0	14
University of Texas - Arlington	Arlington (TX)	25,297	80	12	34	33	0	13
West Virginia University	Morgantown (WV)	25,255	57	0	23	47	0	19
University of Illinois - Chicago	Chicago (IL)	24,865	113	23	50	68	0	27
Northern Illinois University	Dekalb (IL)	24,820	72	1	29	46	1	19
University of California - San Diego	La Jolla (CA)	24,663	83	56	45	30	0	12
Harvard University	Cambridge (MA)	24,648	91	1	37	71	0	29
University of Massachusetts	Amherst (MA)	24,646	98	0	40	57	0	23
Kent State University	Kent (OH)	24,347	33	6	15	26	0	11
University of California - Irvine	Irvine (CA)	24,344	38	2	16	27	0	11
Utah Valley State College	Orem (UT)	24,149	8	27	9	6	20	7
George Washington University	Washington (DC)	24,092	156	2	65	95	1	40
Eastern Michigan University	Ypsilanti (MI)	23,862	31	0	13	25	0	10
Oklahoma State University	Stillwater (OK)	23,819	39	40	25	32	31	20
DePaul University	Chicago (IL)	23,570	58	10	27	0	0	0
Portland State University	Portland (OR)	23,444	22	8	11	14	0	6
University of Virginia	Charlottesville (VA)	23,341	123	3	53	58	2	25
University of Pennsylvania	Philadelphia (PA)	23,305	100	0	43	100	0	43
Washington State University	Pullman (WA)	23,241	17	92	27	17	2	8
Kansas State University	Manhattan (KS)	23,151	44	20	23	26	0	11
Northeastern University	Boston (MA)	22,932	80	20	39	56	0	24
East Carolina University	Greenville (NC)	22,767	71	12	34	52	12	25
University of Connecticut	Storrs (CT)	22,694	81	3	36	62	0	27
Middle Tennessee State University	Murfreesboro (TN)	22,322	30	18	17	26	0	12
Grand Valley State University	Allendale (MI)	22,063	19	5	10	15	5	8
University of Nebraska	Lincoln (NE)	21,792	50	8	25	29	0	13
Stony Brook University	Stony Brook (NY)	21,685	95	0	44	58	0	27
Columbia University	New York (NY)	21,648	140	0	65	0	0	0

Note: Per-student ratios were calculated using a weight of 0.5 for part-time employees.

**Appendix table 3. Community policing activities of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Type of community policing activity								
	Included in campus security policy	Geographic areas for officers	Upgraded technology	Partnered with citizen groups	Student ride-a-long program	Written community policing plan	Problem-solving projects	Environmental crime analysis	Campus police academy
<b>All campuses</b>	69%	59%	51%	47%	40%	34%	33%	32%	23%
<b>Public</b>	73%	59%	53%	51%	49%	38%	39%	36%	22%
15,000 or more	74	70	59	66	66	44	51	46	28
10,000-14,999	78	63	58	57	49	37	46	40	18
5,000-9,999	71	48	48	42	42	36	26	31	22
2,500-4,999	68	48	41	25	27	30	27	19	11
<b>Private</b>	63%	61%	47%	40%	22%	26%	23%	24%	25%
15,000 or more	87	60	47	53	53	33	47	53	27
10,000-14,999	64	72	52	60	52	28	24	38	36
5,000-9,999	65	70	50	44	17	26	28	28	19
2,500-4,999	58	53	44	30	12	24	16	15	25

**Appendix table 4. Types of groups that campus law enforcement agencies met with regularly to discuss crime and safety-related issues, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Type of group										
	Other law enforcement	Student housing	Faculty/staff	Student	Fraternity/sorority	Advocacy	Domestic violence	Local public agencies	Neighborhood	Business	Religious
<b>All campuses</b>	88%	86%	84%	83%	57%	47%	43%	40%	39%	27%	20%
<b>Public</b>	89%	86%	83%	83%	64%	52%	52%	44%	37%	30%	17%
15,000 or more	90	92	87	91	80	64	55	61	54	41	30
10,000-14,999	90	89	83	83	68	60	54	38	46	27	13
5,000-9,999	88	82	83	80	56	44	51	39	22	24	11
2,500-4,999	84	79	78	70	38	33	44	21	17	19	6
<b>Private</b>	86%	86%	84%	85%	43%	36%	28%	33%	44%	21%	25%
15,000 or more	93	93	87	87	47	53	33	53	67	53	33
10,000-14,999	96	88	96	92	54	62	42	54	69	46	46
5,000-9,999	89	89	85	89	59	43	30	44	46	22	30
2,500-4,999	81	84	80	80	33	25	22	20	34	10	17

**Appendix table 5. Emergency preparedness activities of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Type of emergency preparedness activity								
	Emergency preparedness plan	Met with administrators	Disseminated information	Terrorism response plan	Preparedness exercises	Intelligence-sharing agreements	Held campus meetings	Culturally diverse partnerships	Campus anti-fear campaign
<b>All campuses</b>	94%	89%	67%	66%	58%	56%	55%	45%	21%
<b>Public</b>	94%	91%	71%	70%	63%	65%	61%	48%	25%
15,000 or more	95	95	79	77	81	76	70	64	36
10,000-14,999	92	91	74	63	54	63	58	54	26
5,000-9,999	92	88	64	70	60	60	56	35	17
2,500-4,999	95	87	65	60	40	49	54	27	14
<b>Private</b>	94%	86%	60%	60%	49%	41%	42%	39%	15%
15,000 or more	87	93	80	67	67	73	47	67	0
10,000-14,999	92	92	58	73	65	58	54	54	15
5,000-9,999	96	85	67	70	44	44	54	39	20
2,500-4,999	94	85	54	51	44	31	33	32	14

**Appendix table 6. Written policies and procedures of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Percent of agencies with written policy pertaining to—						Employee counseling assistance
	Code of conduct	Non-lethal force	Citizen complaints	Other law enforcement	Domestic disputes	Juveniles	
<b>All campuses</b>	96%	91%	82%	79%	72%	71%	70%
<b>Public</b>	97%	95%	87%	84%	80%	81%	70%
15,000 or more	99	98	95	90	83	92	79
10,000-14,999	97	98	89	78	78	79	65
5,000-9,999	96	93	84	83	82	79	69
2,500-4,999	97	89	74	79	74	65	63
<b>Private</b>	94%	83%	72%	71%	57%	52%	72%
15,000 or more	87	100	80	87	80	80	73
10,000-14,999	96	92	88	76	68	64	72
5,000-9,999	93	81	80	69	56	48	69
2,500-4,999	95	79	64	69	52	48	73

**Appendix table 6 (continued). Written policies and procedures of campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Percent of agencies with written policy pertaining to—						
	Off-duty employment	Mentally ill persons	Victim services	Racial profiling	Student judicial officers	Residence life officials	Homeless persons
<b>All campuses</b>	70%	68%	63%	57%	55%	54%	27%
<b>Public</b>	83%	76%	63%	67%	51%	47%	30%
15,000 or more	92	87	65	82	51	45	34
10,000-14,999	86	68	60	65	48	49	32
5,000-9,999	75	71	67	62	46	42	28
2,500-4,999	74	66	56	47	61	56	21
<b>Private</b>	48%	55%	63%	39%	63%	66%	23%
15,000 or more	73	53	60	47	67	53	27
10,000-14,999	60	64	72	64	64	64	20
5,000-9,999	46	56	61	31	52	57	15
2,500-4,999	42	53	62	36	68	72	28

**Appendix table 7. Selected crime and safety-related issues addressed by campus law enforcement agencies, 2004-05**

Type and size of 4-year campus	Problems and tasks addressed with a full-time unit or specially designated personnel										
	Crime prevention	Rape prevention	Drug education	Self-defense training	Alcohol education	Community policing	Victim assistance	Stalking	Cybercrime	Student security patrol	Bias/hate crime
<b>All campuses</b>	83%	78%	73%	69%	67%	63%	62%	60%	54%	52%	51%
<b>Public</b>	88%	85%	79%	75%	75%	71%	67%	68%	62%	55%	55%
15,000 or more	96	94	91	88	87	83	73	79	80	67	68
10,000-14,999	89	83	78	75	77	75	72	75	66	64	56
5,000-9,999	85	83	75	66	68	59	62	59	53	50	46
2,500-4,999	71	73	63	63	56	60	55	56	35	32	44
<b>Private</b>	74%	66%	60%	57%	53%	49%	54%	46%	40%	46%	43%
15,000 or more	100	73	67	73	67	87	80	73	73	67	67
10,000-14,999	76	72	68	56	60	56	56	52	56	48	52
5,000-9,999	80	70	56	67	52	50	54	46	44	48	37
2,500-4,999	66	61	59	49	50	42	49	40	28	42	40

**Appendix table 8. Selected characteristics of campus law enforcement agencies serving 2-year and 4-year public campuses with 10,000 or more students, 2004-05**

Characteristic	Type of campus served	
	2-year	4-year
<b>Total number of—</b>		
Agencies	163	234
Full-time employees	3,575	11,567
Full-time sworn personnel	1,516	7,149
<b>Average number of—</b>		
Students enrolled	18,095	20,931
Campus buildings	31	155
Acres on campus	240	878
<b>Percent of agencies using—</b>		
Sworn officers	67%	96%
Armed patrol officers	58	89
<b>Average number of full-time employees</b>		
Total	22	49
Per 1,000 students	1.2	2.4
<b>Average number of full-time sworn personnel</b>		
Total	14	32
Per 1,000 students	0.8	1.6
<b>Percent of agencies with—</b>		
24-hour patrol coverage	79%	100%
3-digit emergency number	88	94
Emergency blue-light phones	72	96
<b>Percent of agencies performing—</b>		
Special event security	98%	100%
Parking enforcement	97	70
Building lockup/unlock	92	75
Dispatching of calls	87	92
Access control	83	66
Traffic enforcement	77	88
Property crime investigation	75	95
Parking administration	72	45
Central alarm monitoring	71	86
Violent crime investigation	69	93
Surveillance camera monitoring	69	67
Vehicle registration	45	31
<b>Percent of sworn personnel who were—</b>		
Female	15%	17%
White, non-Hispanic	59	71
Black, non-Hispanic	17	18
Hispanic, any race	19	8
Other, non-Hispanic	5	3
<b>Percent of agencies with college requirement for new officers</b>		
4-year degree	2%	3%
2-year degree	8	13
Non-degree requirement	10	13
<b>Average number of training hours required for officers</b>		
Academy	528	610
Field	309	441
<b>Average base starting salary</b>		
Chief	\$56,000	\$71,000
Entry-level sworn	33,900	32,400
Entry-level nonsworn	25,700	21,600

**Appendix table 9. Selected activities, policies, and programs of campus law enforcement agencies serving 2-year and 4-year public campuses with 10,000 or more students, 2004-05**

	Type of campus served	
	2-year	4-year
<b>Percent of agencies engaging in community policing activities</b>		
Incorporated into campus security policy	57%	76%
Geographic patrol assignments	55	68
Upgraded technology	40	59
Officer problem-solving projects	29	50
Partnered with citizen groups	24	63
Written community policing plan	24	42
Environmental crime analysis	20	44
Student ride-along programs	20	61
Campus police academy	16	25
<b>Percent of agencies meeting regularly with—</b>		
Faculty/staff organizations	89%	85%
Other law enforcement agencies	79	90
Student organizations	67	88
Advocacy groups	28	63
Local public agencies	25	54
Domestic violence groups	22	55
Neighborhood associations	18	52
Business groups	17	37
Religious groups	8	24
Fraternity/sorority groups	8	76
Student housing groups	8	91
<b>Percent of agencies engaging in emergency preparedness activities</b>		
Emergency preparedness plan	91%	94%
Meetings with campus administrators	89	94
Disseminated information	63	77
Terrorism response plan	62	73
Emergency preparedness exercises	53	73
Campus meetings	53	67
Intelligence-sharing agreements	47	72
Culturally diverse partnerships	28	61
Campus anti-fear campaign	15	33
<b>Percent of agencies with written policies pertaining to—</b>		
Code of conduct and appearance	93%	98%
Non-lethal force	81	98
Citizen complaints	79	93
Other law enforcement agencies	73	86
Juveniles	66	88
Domestic disputes	62	81
Employee counseling assistance	61	75
Victim services	61	64
Mentally ill persons	59	81
Off-duty employment	55	90
Student judicial officers	51	50
Racial profiling	50	77
Homeless persons	35	33
Residence life officials	3	46
<b>Percent of agencies with programs or designated personnel for—</b>		
Crime prevention	62%	94%
Rape prevention	48	92
Self-defense training	48	84
Victim assistance	47	73
Stalking	42	77
Community policing	40	80
Student security patrol	39	66
Drug education	36	87
Cybercrime	35	75
Alcohol education	30	84
Bias/hate crime	28	64

## **FULL SERVICE PUBLIC SAFETY**

### **The path to a safer university community**

#### **A White Paper on Public Safety at OHSU**

By Gary D. Granger

#### **Executive Summary**

OHSU's Department of Public Safety is regularly and increasingly expected to provide services typical of an agency with full law enforcement authority, but is prohibited from doing so by Oregon law. The OHSU Department of Public safety has a status that is neither that of a security force, nor a police department, including areas of authority that are ambiguous and/or contradictory (see Authority Comparison). This situation hampers the department in its efforts to keep the OHSU community safe and in its ability to achieve national leadership and excellence in public safety in a variety of ways, including its ability to respond to critical incidents on campus similar to Virginia Tech, and its ability to cope with escalating extremist threats—a situation that will worsen as OHSU continues to expand.

*Having a nationally accredited campus police department that participates in mutual aid agreements with community emergency responders and joint training with other law enforcement agencies are all cited as a key strengths in Virginia Tech's response to the April 16, 2007, tragedy.\**

*None of these advantages are available to OHSU absent legislative change that clarifies Public Safety's status as a law enforcement agency.*

\*Virginia Tech Security Infrastructure Working Group Report, August 17, 2007

Moreover, OHSU's promotion of its academic and research missions as the foundation of its strategic advantage in the market make escalation of attacks by the ALF and similar groups all but certain. Under current law, the Public Safety department's ability to effectively address this growing threat is not adequate and will diminish over time as extremists learn to exploit our vulnerabilities.

Rapid legislative change is required in order for OHSU to transition its current Public Safety department into one that has the authority, jurisdiction, resources, training, community integration, and professionalism necessary to effectively protect the OHSU community and support OHSU's strategic initiatives.

At a minimum, the following changes are needed to OHSU's enabling statute (ORS 353), and other areas of the law, before this transition can take place:

1. Designate OHSU's Department of Public Safety as a law enforcement agency and permit OHSU to commission officers as "police" officers under applicable laws
2. Remove statutory restrictions regarding the arming of officers
3. Make explicit the requirement that OHSU's officers are eligible for all training provided to police officers state-wide

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### What's Wrong & What's Needed

The path forward for OHSU points toward national leadership, excellence, and innovation and recognizes our research and educational links to clinical care as our top strategic advantage. For OHSU to succeed, every area of the institution must not only embrace these same goals, but have in-hand the means to achieve them. Unfortunately, OHSU's Department of Public Safety is at an unreasonable disadvantage in its ability to keep pace with this journey and protect our strategic advantage. Despite the vast majority of institutions with missions similar to OHSU's operating professional law enforcement agencies (see sidebar), the State of Oregon continues to have laws in place that limit OHSU's ability to adapt, prepare, and respond to its evolution as an institution and the changing threat landscape. Absent rapid legislative action to correct numerous instances of statutory silence, vagueness, and anachronisms that hamper OHSU's first responders, it is unlikely that our Department of Public Safety will be able to keep pace with evolving and escalating threats, sustain its process of improvement, or achieve the level of excellence required to demonstrate true leadership in public safety.

*Sworn or armed officers are used by over 80% of all public institutions of higher education nationally.\**

*Current state law PROHIBITS OHSU's officers from exercising full police authorities (being sworn) or being armed.*

\*Law Enforcement Agencies, 1995, Bureau of Justice Statistics

### Where We Are

The OHSU community of patients, students, employees, and others expects the university's Public Safety officers to provide a full menu of services, from unlocking office doors to investigating items stolen from offices, from jump-starting cars to investigating suspicious people in parking lots, from assisting clinical staff with difficult patients to protecting the entire OHSU community from anyone intent on harming them. Unfortunately, the current laws that govern OHSU's Public Safety Department *prohibit* it from performing some of the most basic functions of a professional public safety agency. Indeed, many services taken for granted by the community as core to what we do are *not* permitted due to prohibitions and/or "silence" in the law. Most unreasonable, however, is the fact that the department's authority to perform a wide range of essential duties is *unclear* in the law. As the attached spreadsheet illustrates, nearly half of the authorities and jurisdictions considered the backbone of security, public safety, and law enforcement in the public sector are literally gray areas in the law for our officers.

### AMBIGUITY:

*While OHSU's officers are granted Probable Cause arrest powers by the state, they are NOT granted Stop & Frisk authority—a key tool in establishing probable cause during many investigations.*

ORS 353.050(16)

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

*On an average day Public Safety officers are called to assist with dangerous or difficult patients over 20 times every day—365 days a year.*

Department of Public Safety Key Indicators, 2007

*A key finding in the government's report on the Virginia Tech Tragedy points to the obstacles in information sharing when someone is likely to be a danger to self or others. A presumed ability for law enforcement is to be able to take such a person into custody before they can act—something OHSU's officers are NOT currently authorized to do under the law.*

Report To The President, On Issues Raised By The Virginia Tech Tragedy, 2007

### Forced to Improvise

The Public Safety Department currently uses a variety of tactics to compensate for these restrictions and lack of clarity, including work-arounds, asking outside agencies for help, not acting on certain issues—and making conscious decisions to act in what we consider the most reasonable manner, despite a lack of clear legal authority to do so. Two such examples are listed below.

### Two Examples

The most relevant and frequent manifestation of this at OHSU involves situations where a mentally ill person behaves in a way that clearly shows that person to be an imminent threat to his/her own safety or the safety of others. Multiple times each year someone in acute distress attempts to take his/her own life on or near our campus. The usual—and expected—response of law enforcement in any community is to intervene in the most humane way possible, take the person into custody, and transport the person to a medical facility for help. Currently, the law governing OHSU's Public Safety Officers does *not* give our officers the authority to take such a person into custody for the purpose of getting that person help. This is unreasonable and places our officers in a "Catch 22": if they fail to act and a person we could have helped is injured or dies while we wait for law enforcement, we may look negligent. On the other hand, acting in a way that takes a person's liberty away without the clear authority to do so presents an array of possible problems. At this point in time our officers have been directed to act *as if* they have this authority and to prevent people from harming themselves or others if the risk is imminent. To fail to act would be unreasonable—and probably less defensible than the chosen alternative.

A second example involves regulatory requirements from the state and federal government for security of irradiator sites maintained by OHSU. The law requires an "armed response" capability for all situations where there is a possible intruder into one of these areas. Because OHSU's officers cannot be armed, our protocol requires requesting that PPB (Portland Police Bureau) respond to these incidents. While this satisfies the letter of the requirement, the intent is to have a rapid armed response capability to prevent unauthorized access to/theft of radioactive materials by determined individuals. However, the response time by PPB will always be at least double the OHSU officer's potential response time.



# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### Obstacles to Information Sharing and Partnership

As noted previously in relation to the Virginia Tech tragedy, in order for a university public safety department to be effective it must be fully integrated with law enforcement and other emergency responders in the surrounding communities via mutual aid agreements, information sharing, and on-going joint training. In every case, when OHSU's department of Public Safety attempts to integrate with local, state, and federal law enforcement, we are faced with the same questions: what is your status? Are you police or not? Can we share this with you or not? Are you allowed to train with us or not?

While we have found creative ways to integrate in some areas, the integration is always slower, more difficult, and incomplete—at best—due to our current status.

### Looking Back

In the past two years the scope and complexity of work required of OHSU's Public Safety Department has leapt forward:

- The BRB houses significant levels of high-risk animal-based research—right along side cutting-edge imagery services for patients
- The KPV combines inpatient, outpatient, and *public* spaces into a single facility
- The Tram presents unprecedented challenges for a university public safety department by inserting a public transportation corridor and tourist attraction directly through a clinical facility
- The CHH has inserted the work of our Public Safety officers directly into the fastest growing section of downtown Portland.

*Total Public Safety service calls increased over 10% in the past year, including a 14% increase in assists with patients.*

*Total calls to Public Safety Dispatch reached nearly 175,000 in 2006.*

Department of Public Safety Key Indicators, 2007

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### Looking Forward

The 20/20 vision for OHSU is nothing less than transformative and intended to position OHSU as a national leader in what we do.

Included in this transformation is a new campus on the Schnitzer donated property, more facilities near the CHH and Tram, additional unique partnership agreements, and an increasing emphasis on our research and academic mission as core to our strategic advantage in the market. The following are *some* of the growing and evolving demands associated with the 20/20 vision that will call upon our Public Safety department for continued innovation, excellence in service, and creativity:

- Between 2 and 3 million new square feet of facilities on the Schnitzer campus that will require patrol, response, security monitoring, etc.
- Mixed use of this new campus space, including classrooms, laboratories, student housing, retail establishments, entertainment venues, and expanded public transportation links
- Thousands of parking spaces inside garages under buildings
- Linking of OHSU property with city greenways and other purely public spaces
- Escalating threats and targeting of OHSU by extremists affiliated with animal rights groups

### Escalating Threats to OHSU's Strategic Advantage

The strategic advantage at the core of OHSU's future is its status as a national leader in research that is ultimately translated to clinical treatments for patients. Unfortunately, this is the single most targeted area of OHSU's work by activists and extremists.

Individuals aligned with terrorist groups, such as the ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and the ELF (Earth Liberation Front), who oppose the use of animals in research and any work related to genetic modifications have targeted OHSU for years. As OHSU's visibility has increased, so has the targeting of the institution and its staff to the point where there is now a credible threat of criminal violence targeting OHSU staff and facilities (see sidebar).

*The Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training (DPSST), the agency responsible for certifying all law enforcement officials in the state, currently PROHIBITS OHSU's officers from attending the DPSST Police academy because of "silence" in the law about our status.*

*In the spring of 2007, supporters of the ALF announced to us that the ALF intended to target OHSU in the summer—and they did. In the summer of 2007 the ALF took credit for vandalizing the home of an OHSU researcher—and threatened to fire bomb his home. In the past 12 months, similar targeting of UCLA led to pipe bombs left at people's homes and the resignation of a prominent researcher.*

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### What We Need

The quote at left makes clear that departments charged with the safety of campuses require several things to be effective. What is assumed in the quote is that there exists an appropriate legal framework of authority and jurisdiction. The OHSU Public Safety Department needs just such a framework in order to be effective.

*“There was a consensus that campus police forces, which are on the front lines in keeping campuses safe, need adequate resources, training, and respect to do their jobs effectively.”*

Report To The President, On Issues Raised By  
The Virginia Tech Tragedy, 2007

*A key assumption in the above statement is that the campus has a “police” force upon which it can rely.*

A draft detailed list the changes needed to create this framework is attached. The list below is offered as a brief summary of what is needed:

- Amend the authorizing statute for OHSU to remove restrictions on authorities and to affirmatively afford commissioned officers the same authorities as “police” officers under Oregon law
- Amend other Oregon law, as necessary, to explicitly include OHSU’s commissioned offers is all other statutes that address the authorities of “police” officers
- Revise OHSU policy to incorporate statutory changes
- Revise OHSU policy to delegate the authority to permit or restrict the implementation or use of all granted authorities to the OHSU Director of Public Safety

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### Armed vs. Unarmed Officers

In the aftermath of the Virginia Tech shootings the OHSU Department of Public Safety undertook a review of how the department would respond to an “active shooter” incident on campus. Because OHSU’s officers are currently prohibited from carrying firearms, the review examined both how our officers would respond, as well as a close look at how our local law enforcement agency, the Portland Police Bureau (PPB), could be expected to respond, and how the two departments would interact.

*The average emergency response time on campus for OHSU officers is 3-4 minutes with multiple officers on scene. Portland Police, EMS, and Fire responses for single units average at least twice that time . . .*

*Active shooter incidents last an average of 8 minutes.*

### Stopping The Killing

*Research into active shooter incidents over the past decade indicates that the moment a suspect is confronted by an armed law enforcement officer, the suspect stops targeting the original victims and focuses on the officer.*

*Our analysis indicates it would be at least 15 minutes before this could happen under the current circumstances.*

### Our review came to several conclusions:

1. OHSU officers would always be the first to arrive on scene
2. A minimum of 3 uniformed OHSU officers could be on scene in well under five minutes 24/7
3. OHSU officers would not be able to approach the actual scene of a shooting any closer than the nearest available hard cover and would have to maintain an escape route at all times
4. PPB officers would begin to arrive on campus in approximately 5 to 8 minutes
5. It would take approximately 15 to 20 minutes from the time of the initial call for assistance for PPB to assemble a five-officer contact team on campus
6. OHSU officers would not be able to lead PPB officers to the shooting scene in most potential scenarios because the OHSU officer would be unarmed and untrained in the team movement tactics used by PPB
7. Due to the dense, complicated, and vertical nature of our campus, the PPB contact team would likely experience significant difficulty in finding and securing the location of any shooting
8. It is likely that an active shooting incident at OHSU would self-terminate (e.g., suicide, hostage situation, suspect fleeing, etc.) before PPB could intervene

The stark conclusions above illustrate one significant liability of maintaining an unarmed department of first responders: *they cannot always respond first.*

Fortunately, active shooter incidents are relatively rare. However, there are many types of incidents where an armed response capability is the most reasonable and provides the greatest margin of safety for all. A few such scenarios are listed here:

1. Armed individuals on or near campus
2. Shots fired on or near campus

## **Department of Public Safety White Paper**

### **Full Service Public Safety**

#### **The Path to a safer university community**

3. Violent individuals armed with knives or other potentially lethal weapons
4. Individuals on campus who are believed to be armed and dangerous due to previous law enforcement contacts and/or a criminal record
5. Individuals on campus in violation of exclusion or protection orders for violent behavior and/or threats of violence

It is worth noting that while actual incidents, such as those listed above, are not frequent, it is not uncommon for reports of such incidents to be received by Public Safety—and for our officers to respond and investigate.

In summary, our current reliance on unarmed officers as de facto first responders places our officers at a clear disadvantage, and limits their ability to protect the OHSU community. Concurrent with the required statutory changes, OHSU should explore options for arming at least a significant portion of its Public Safety officers.

# Department of Public Safety White Paper

## Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

### Transition

The purpose of a transition from the current set of authorities to those necessary to provide a full service level is to *permit OHSU to actively determine what level of service is appropriate as a matter of policy* and to tailor public safety services to match demands *without the need for repeated trips to the legislature.*

OHSU will maintain the ability to regulate the application of all Public Safety authorities by policy and administrative directive at all times.

Such a transition is not uncommon (see sidebar) and there are many industry resources for the development of a detailed transition plan for implementation once the law has been changed.

Some aspects would potentially take years to fully implement (if at all). Other authorities could be put in place almost immediately. Additionally, the Public Safety department could (as is common at university medical centers) develop a two-tiered department where some officers work in a capacity where full authority is not required, while others undergo additional training and exercise all available authorities, including potentially being armed.

### Possible Rapid Implementation Authorities

- Stop & Frisk
- Community caretaking
- Law Enforcement information sharing
- Integrated and joint training

### Authorities Requiring Discussion and/or Longer Implementation Plans

- Issuing citations for crimes, traffic offenses, etc.
- Present warrant applications to courts
- Integration of training programs with DPSST and law enforcement agencies
- Arming officers with firearms

### Costs

A detailed cost analysis will need to be done that accounts for the following:

- Potential salary range adjustments for officers given increased authority and responsibility
- Increased administrative costs related to processing citations, transporting persons taken into custody, retention of evidence,

*Syracuse University transitioned over half of their Public Safety officers to fully sworn officers in 2005 after a decade of limited authorities similar to those currently in place at OHSU.*

<http://Publicsafety.syr.edu>

## Department of Public Safety White Paper

### Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community

changes in record keeping requirements, and increased training requirements\*

- Costs associated with arming some or all officers

\*Under the current laws, OHSU's officers attend an abbreviated training academy conducted by the Oregon DPSST (Department of Public Safety Standards and Training) that is adapted from the standard police academy curriculum. OHSU (and other Oregon universities) are required to pay the full cost of this training. However, DPSST is funded by the state to train "police" officers at no cost to the agency. Statutory change making OHSU's officers "police" would make them eligible for the police academy at no cost to OHSU. OHSU would pay only the officers' salary during training.

#### **Timeline**

A detailed project plan and timeline will need to be developed. However, based on the experience of similar agencies (see sidebar on previous page) and our estimates, a full transition that included implementation of all recommended changes—including arming—would take between 12 and 24 months.

# **Department of Public Safety White Paper**

## **Full Service Public Safety The Path to a safer university community**

### **Additional Details**

#### **Recommended Statutory Changes**

1. Amend the section of the OHSU authorizing statute that defines the university's ability to have "Special Campus Security Officers" (ORS 353.050(16)) to the extent necessary to both remove existing ambiguity in the law, as well as to insure that all of the authorities and jurisdiction needed for the performance of essential public safety duties are available to OHSU's Department of Public Safety. In short, the full authority and jurisdiction of law enforcement officers in the state of Oregon (police powers) should be granted to OHSU's officers, *subject to OHSU's policy*.

#### **Recommended Follow-up OHSU Policy Changes**

1. Amend OHSU policy to permit the Director of Public Safety to implement statutory authorities selectively or comprehensively, as appropriate to the evolving security and safety demands in the OHSU community
2. Amend OHSU policy to change the name of the Public Safety department to the following: Oregon Health & Science University Police & Public Safety
3. Revise the OHSU Position Description for the Director of Public Safety to the following: Chief of Police & Director of Public Safety



OREGON HEALTH & SCIENCE UNIVERSITY  
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
AUTHORITY COMPARISONS\* AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES

July 16, 2007

Authority	OHSU OFFICERS				Implementation Notes
	Police	Private Security	Current	Recommended	
Arrest for observed crime	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Arrest with warrant	Yes	No	Likely	Yes	Immediate: current practice
Arrest for Probable Cause w/o warrant	Yes	No	Yes		
Stop & Frisk	Yes	No	Unlikely	Yes	Immediate: current practice
Issue citations for crimes	Yes	No	Yes		
Issue citations for violations	Yes	No	No	Yes	Rapid: requires minimal training & coordination
Use reasonable force	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Use Tasers	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Use firearms	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Long-term: requires detailed evaluation, training plan, funding
Present warrant applications to court	Yes	No	Unlikely	Yes	Mid-term: requires training & coordination
Community Caretaking	Yes	No	Unlikely	Yes	Immediate: current practice
Investigate crimes	Yes	Limited	Yes	Yes	
Receive law enforcement confidential information	Yes	No	?	Yes	Rapid: requires outreach to law enforcement partners
Traffic law enforcement	Yes	No	No	Yes	Long-term: requires detailed evaluation, training plan, funding
Emergency Response	Yes	No	?	Yes	Mid-term: requires training & coordination
Integrated planning & coordination of safety & response planning	Yes	No	?	Yes	Mid-term: requires training & coordination
Law Enforcement Training	Yes	No	?	Yes	Mid-term: requires training & coordination
Law Enforcement mutual aid with other jurisdictions	Yes	No	?	Yes	Mid-term: requires training & coordination
Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) access	Yes	No	Yes		
Grants for Law Enforcement agencies	Yes	No	?	Yes	Mid-term: requires internal resource development and training

\*This document prepared by OHSU Public Safety in consultation with OHSU Legal and the Multnomah County District Attorney's office



# LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SAFETY

A Strategic Response to the Virginia Tech Tragedy

Presented by: Steve Stadum & Gary Granger

Date: May 14, 2008

# Leadership In Public Safety

## The Virginia Tech Reports

### Four “official” reports were published in the wake of VT

- ❑ **Report to the Governor** of Virginia: Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007
- ❑ **Virginia Tech Internal report:** Virginia Tech Overview of the findings and recommendations of the April 16 Tragedy internal review committees
- ❑ **Report to the President** of the United States: Report To The President On Issues Raised By The Virginia Tech Tragedy
- ❑ **Attorneys General:** National Association of Attorneys General. Task Force On School And Campus Safety

# Leadership In Public Safety

## Virginia Tech Key Findings & Recommendations

### Findings Most Relevant to OHSU

- ❑ Widespread confusion about information sharing led to information silos
- ❑ Lack of a Threat Assessment Team hampered assessment of the threat
- ❑ Campus police could not send emergency messages and needed prior approval
- ❑ Joint training between campus and local police resulted in a coordinated response and saved lives

### Selected Recommendations for OHSU

- ❑ OHSU must have clear, documented information sharing guidelines
- ❑ OHSU must have an interdisciplinary Threat Assessment Team (TAT)
- ❑ OHSU must upgrade its critical incident communications capability
- ❑ OHSU Public Safety officers must be professionalized and able to train with local, state, and federal law enforcement and must train internally for active shooters
  - ❑ *Experience has shown that waiting for a SWAT team often takes too long. The best chance to save lives is often an immediate assault by first responders*

# Leadership In Public Safety

## Responses In Process—NO ELT Action Required

### Key Virginia Tech Findings: OHSU Responses

Responses now in process with existing resources or pending

- ❑ **Information Sharing**
  - ❑ Information sharing matrix & guidelines applicable to threat assessment in final draft
- ❑ **Threat Assessment**
  - ❑ Threat Assessment Team (TAT) formed and in training
- ❑ **Risk Assessment**
  - ❑ Internal assessment in process
- ❑ **Physical Security**
  - ❑ TBD Pending Risk Assessment
- ❑ **Community Training & Awareness**
  - ❑ TBD Pending ELT direction on Public Safety authorities, arming, and WENS project funding

# Leadership In Public Safety

## Responses Requiring ELT Action

### OHSU responses requiring ELT action

#### 1. Campus Law Enforcement Response & Training

- Transition & expand Public Safety authorities in the law and grant full police powers to qualified officers who complete the police academy\*
  - ❖ Requires legislative change

#### 2. Critical Incident Response

- Authorize Public Safety officers trained and certified as police to carry firearms\*
  - ❖ Requires legislative change

#### 3. Emergency Communications Systems

- Fund Workstation Emergency Notification System (WENS)

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

### Why are expanded authorities necessary?

- ❑ **OHSU Officers' current legal authorities are contradictory, unclear, and inadequate for the needs of the OHSU community**
  - ❖ See OHSU Authority Comparison attachment

OREGON HEALTH & SCIENCE UNIVERSITY  
 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
 AUTHORITY COMPARISONS\*

October-07

Authority	Police	Private Security	OHSU OFFICERS	Notes
Arrest for observed crime	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Arrest with warrant	Yes	No	Likely	Current practice is to arrest
Arrest for Probable Cause w/o warrant	Yes	No	Yes	
Stop & Frisk	Yes	No	Unlikely	Current practice is to stop & frisk
Issue citations for crimes	Yes	No	Yes	Not current practice
Issue citations for violations	Yes	No	No	
Use reasonable force	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Use Tasers	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Use firearms	Yes	Yes	No	
Present warrant applications to court	Yes	No	Unlikely	Current practice is assistance from external law enforcement
Community Caretaking	Yes	No	Unlikely	Current practice is to detain & transport
Investigate crimes	Yes	Limited	Yes	
Receive law enforcement confidential information	Yes	No	?	Cooperation varies by jurisdiction
Traffic law enforcement	Yes	No	No	
Emergency Vehicle Response (lights & sirene)	Yes	No	?	Current practice is emergency response in immediate area of Marquam Hill
Integrated planning & coordination of safety & response planning	Yes	No	?	Opportunities vary by jurisdiction
Law Enforcement Training	Yes	No	?	Varies. DPSST will not permit attendance at police academy
Law Enforcement mutual aid with other jurisdictions	Yes	No	?	No current agreements
Law Enforcement Data System (LEDS) access	Yes	No	Yes	
National Accreditation	Yes	No	No	
Grants for Law Enforcement agencies	Yes	No	?	Lack of "police" status often a disqualifier

\*This document prepared by OHSU Public Safety in consultation with OHSU Legal and the Multnomah County District Attorney's office



# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

### Why are expanded authorities necessary?

- OHSU Officers cannot receive law enforcement standard training or attend the police academy
- OHSU Officers are called upon daily to perform duties potentially outside the scope of their authority, including “stop & frisk” and community caretaking (custody of suicidal persons)
- As unarmed officers, OHSU officers cannot train with PPB
- OHSU Officers cannot respond to a VT-type critical incident

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

### Benchmarks

- ❑ **93% of all public universities & colleges employ sworn police/peace officers**
  - ❑ U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Campus Law Enforcement study 1995 and 2004-2005
  
- ❑ **86% of all public universities and colleges employ armed police officers**
  - ❑ U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Campus Law Enforcement study 1995 and 2004-2005

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

### Why not rely on local law enforcement for police services?

- Local law enforcement response times will always be at least 2 to 3 times those of OHSU officers
- Local law enforcement may not be able to respond or remain due to higher priority calls in the community
- 75% of Public Safety service load is related to clinical operations, requiring services not typically performed by police and requiring specialized training

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

### **Financial Impact Peace Officer Status (unarmed): \$zero**

- Authorizing existing and new OHSU officers to be certified as peace officers has no negative fiscal impact**
  
- Existing/new officers would be sent to the DPSST police academy at a rate of 2-3 per 16-week course**
  
- DPSST currently trains all Oregon peace officers at state expense**
  
- Time required to train all staff: approx. 4 years**
  
- Authorizing additional FTEs for 24 months would reduce time required to train at a cost of approx. \$70k / year / FTE**

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #1: Authorities

**Should OHSU seek legislation in 2009 to clarify & expand Public Safety authorities?\***

- ❖ Excluding firearms authority


# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Why should OHSU officers be armed?

- ❑ *“The best chance to save lives is often an immediate assault by first responders”*
  - Report to the Governor of Virginia: Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, pg. 19-20

# ACTIVE SHOOTER TIMELINE ANALYSIS



# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Why NOT rely on local law enforcement for situations involving weapons or critical incidents like VT?

- ❑ Most situations where a weapon is introduced are not identified as such until officers are already on the scene and/or engaged with a subject
  
- ❑ Critical incidents like VT (active shooter) have resulted in an average of four people being shot every minute until the suspect is confronted by an armed officer
  - ❑ OHSU Active Shooter Time Line Analysis



# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Arming Trends

- ❑ **The use of armed officers is increasing:**
  - ❑ From 1995 to 2005 the percentage of public universities and colleges using armed officers increased from 81% to 86%, while the use of sworn officers remained the same at 93%
  
- ❑ **Campuses without police continue to transition to having certified & armed police**
  - ❑ University of Northern Iowa, Iowa State University, and the University of Iowa conversion in 2007
  - ❑ Syracuse University conversion to peace officers in 2004

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Community Input Process on Arming

- Establish a task force to advise the President on whether selected trained & certified OHSU officers should carry firearms**
  - Task force should be broadly representative of all major stakeholders in and around OHSU
  - Representation to include individuals from the Faculty Senate, Unions, Students, Patient/Advocate, AAEO, Risk, Neighborhood, State, and City
  - Facilitated by either a consultant or senior level OHSU staff
  - Complete by September 30, 2008

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Financial Impact of Arming OHSU Officers

#### Year one: \$225,307

- \$138,497: Salary adjustments for armed staff, pro-rated for phased implementation
- \$55,000: Equipment, including weapons, ammunition, storage lockers, etc.
- \$31,710: Training costs, including Overtime, Instructor courses, etc.
- \$7,600\*: Updated psychological evaluations. \*May not be required.
- \$7,500: Savings—DPSST currently charges \$2,500/officer, but “Peace Officers” trained at DPSST expense

#### On-going: \$256,800

- \$209,844: Salary increases for all armed staff
- \$20,000: Equipment, including ammunition, maintenance, etc.
- \$34,456: Training costs, including OT for on-going qualifications
- \$7,500: Savings as noted above

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

### Financial Impact of Arming OHSU Officers (cont.)

#### Arming plan and assumptions

##### Arm total of 3 officers on each of four teams and all command staff

- All staff to be armed must be trained & certified as police by DPSST
- Total of 20 armed staff with minimum of 2 armed staff on duty all hours/all days

##### Costs include increasing salary of armed staff to market rate for similar sized police agencies, equipment, and training

- Pay ranges increased approx. 21% to meet low end of similar departments
- Comparison departments: Tigard, Lake Oswego, Milwaukie, Portland

##### Total training time 24 to 32 months for staff to be armed

- Assumes no new FTEs and training approx. 3 staff per 16-week course
- Authorizing additional FTEs for 18-24 months would reduce time required to train at a cost of approx. \$70k / year / FTE

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #2: Arming

**Should selected OHSU officers be authorized to carry fire arms?\***

- ❖ **Upon completion of DPSST academy and certification**

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #3: Emergency Communications

### Communications Infrastructure Upgrade

- All Virginia Tech reports stressed critical need for multi-modal communications that are rapid and reliable
  
- Current emergency communications tools available to Public Safety leave significant gaps:
  - Many facilities have no overhead paging
  - Many students, faculty, & staff do not carry OHSU pagers
  - Broadcast e-mail, voice mail, & Fax take hours to arrive
  
- Proposed Work Station Emergency Notification System (WENS) will provide significant penetration into all areas, including those with current gaps

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #3: Emergency Communications

**Proposed WENS technology is supported by key stakeholders:**

- Marketing & Communications**
- Risk Management**
- Emergency Management**
- ITG**
- OHSU Safety Officer**
- HCS Emergency Management**
- Public Safety**

# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #3: Emergency Communications

### Financial Impact of WENS Project

#### Year One: \$100,000

- \$78,500: Purchase software with 14,000 licenses, including installation & training support, technical support for first two years
- \$21,500: Server hardware, ITG project support, & contingency
- Additional workstations licenses: \$5.56 each

#### Year Three: \$15,000 to \$20,000

- Estimated cost to upgrade to next version of software, if desired, but not required.

#### Implementation time approximately 90 – 120 days from funding



# Leadership In Public Safety

## ELT Action Item #3: Emergency Communications

**Should OHSU authorize funding for the WENS technology?**

# Leadership In Public Safety

## Responses Requiring ELT Action

### OHSU responses requiring ELT action

#### 1. Campus Law Enforcement Response & Training

- Transition & expand Public Safety authorities in the law and grant full police powers to qualified officers who complete the police academy\*
  - ❖ Requires legislative change

#### 2. Critical Incident Response


- Authorize Public Safety officers trained and certified as police to carry firearms\*
  - ❖ Requires legislative change

#### 3. Emergency Communications Systems


- Fund Workstation Emergency Notification System (WENS)

## ATTACHMENT 6: Critical Incident Readiness Task Force Survey Results (n=202)


**Do you feel OHSU facilities are currently safe?**




**If a decision was made to have an armed presence at OHSU facilities, which of the following groups do you feel could best provide that service?**



**How would your feelings of safety change if there were an armed presence on OHSU facilities?**



**Which category best describes you?**



**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

A	
1	<p><b>generally positive responses: 26%</b>  <b>generally neutral or unclear responses: 29%</b>  <b>generally negative responses: 45%</b></p>
2	<p>If I remember correctly, the security personal who come in to change out the ATM cash machines are allowed to carry firearms, so in my opinion, it is logical that the OHSU security should be armed. In all likelihood, 99.9% of incidents that the public safety officers respond to here will not necessitate use of a firearm. However, all it takes is one such incident like the one at Virginia Tech to show the necessity to have an armed security presence on campus. Hopefully OHSU will never have to deal with a situation like we have seen at various schools and businesses around the nation where a person brings in a gun and uses it on innocent people. In light of such incidents, I would have no problem at all with the presence of armed security on campus.</p>
3	<p>I'm surprised that police response from downtown during a critical incident would not be sufficient for safety, except that knowledge of the campus layout and how to get around would be a very important factor for whomever is responding.</p>
4	<p>I would feel a lot safer if there were not armed officers on campus. The rule of thumb is if you pull a gun be ready to shoot to kill. I would hate to get caught in the crossfire. The past incidents of violence on campuses would not have been prevented by the presence of armed officers.</p>
5	<p>Security makes me feel safe. Armed security makes me feel threatened.</p>
6	<p>1) Consider the number of "suicides by police" versus the number of university shootings. In a population-dense environment such as OHSU, suicide by police would carry a high risk of collateral damage. 2) Consider the potential for injury should a mental patient get hold of an officer's firearm. Also consider the liability and bad publicity resulting from such an event. 3) Have public safety officer's certified to use firearms, but keep the firearms in locked storage. Only access the firearms when there is an incident when the potential for using lethal force would be required. 4) Culturally, we have reached a point where using force, including lethal force, is seen as the first and best response to an incident. I miss the days when police were called "peace officers". 5) Do we want OHSU to feel like an armed camp?</p>
7	<p>If firearms are brought onto the campus then persons possessing a legal state of Oregon Concealed Handgun License should definitely be allowed to carry also.</p>
8	<p>With regard to recent events around the country it is a good idea that OHSU allow its Public Safety/Institutional Police Force to respond to incidents with all available tools, equipment and knowledge needed to protect patients, visitors, staff and students and the physical institution itself. This includes the use of firearms. If OHSU does arm its Public Safety Officers, there needs to be transparency with initial training, yearly benchmarks and qualification/certification live-fire exams, use of force training and education about Oregon State Laws and Statutes and applicable training with local/state law enforcement agencies and the Oregon State Police Academy (DPSST)</p>
9	<p>The presence of armed officers on campus wouldn't have stopped the incidents mentioned in Dr. Robertson's email from happening. Unless you are going to deploy armed officers at every hallway corner if someone is determined they will be able to commit a violent act.</p>
10	<p>I would have more faith in trained Police Officers than the current OHSU Public Safety Officers. Oregon State has State Police on campus.</p>

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
11	I am very much in favor of an armed presence at our facilities. Sure, it would be wonderful to have a world with no guns, but that is not reality and for the safety of everyone I think it best to be prepared.
12	I am quite sure if they decide to go ahead and become armed it would be within reason and would have all safety procedures followed..
13	I am very much opposed to an armed presence on campus. An armed presence creates an atmosphere of mistrust and violence. As health professionals, we aim to create the opposite. I currently feel safe on campus and armed security guards would change that.
14	I think it is time we join the other states and arm our security people.
15	Only on-scene armed officers can respond to today's criminal problems that are increasingly more violent. When I see "security guards" who are unarmed, I know that I am less safe than when trained officers are present and capable of responding.
16	OHSU Public Safety understands the dynamics of OHSU and would provide the best armed security possible. I have always been impressed with their professionalism and willingness to help. Thank you.
17	An armed presence at the facilities is an excellent idea, but we all know that like police, there could only be a few of them in relation to the large area and number of people that need to be protected. The odds of police or security being in the exact spot to prevent several fatalities from an active shooter are astronomically small. The ONLY thing administration can do to SIGNIFICANTLY increase the level of safety on the campus is to allow any citizen that is lawfully allowed to carry a concealed weapon to carry that weapon on campus. Laws or rules that infringe that right guaranteed in the constitution are not only unconstitutional, as shown in legal precedent by the recent Supreme Court decision in the Washington, D.C. area, but are logically flawed. Any disturbed person who chooses to use OHSU to harm people will not obey a rule to leave his gun behind. Such a law or rule only prevents trained, legally allowed bearers of firearms from being able to protect themselves and others. About 6 months before the Virginia Tech, the state passed a law banning legally allowed citizens from carrying on state campuses. The tragic irony is that just one such citizen in the first classroom at Virginia Tech could have reduced the death toll from 30 to one. Any security officer you could employ would readily admit that even a large team would be unable to protect everyone all the time. Honest Oregonian need to be allowed to protect themselves and others on the OHSU campus as they are allowed to do in the rest of the state
18	OHSU Public Safety handled a situation I was involved with very very well. They should be full police so that they can deal with anything
19	Please do not place a permanent armed presence at any of the OHSU campuses.
20	There is a high chance of gang members or domestic violence with a weapon happening at a hospital. It would take only a few minutes for a shoot out to happen. Common sense would dictate arming them. I would highly recommend arming them.
21	I worked as a DPS Officer at OHSU from 1987 until 1994. The main reason I left there was because we were dealing an increasingly violent atmosphere and I felt that the OHSU management did not care about our safety. "If you don't like it, leave" was their attitude. Thank God they're now considering giving them the tools they need.
22	There is no need for being additionally armed. They have tasers now.

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
23	As an ethnic minority working at OHSU, I am particularly concerned about anyone carrying arms at my place of work, I think an on call armed response unit off campus should also be considered.
24	I don't believe that having armed officers on campus is a particularly good idea, or should be made a priority. Instead, more time/money should be spent on properly training the officers that we currently have.
25	Can those who have hand gun permits carry their guns too?
26	I think having local law on campus would help reduce theft also.
27	Having an extensive healthcare security background in both Washington and Oregon I feel that an armed presence is a usefull and needed in a campus setting, however I do not beleive it should be provided by anything less than a police force. Police Officers see a wider variety of incidents and through exposure have better judgement regarding when to draw their weapons. I would prefer to an Oregon State Police officer assigned to OHSU than to arm the current public safety department and would strongly strongly suggest not using a contract security company to provide armed officers.
28	When, at OHSU, has it become necessary to shoot someone?
29	When violence happens it happens fast. While there are no guarantees of safety, the chances for positive intervention increases if our Officers are equiped to respond immediately to protect lives rather than wait on outside LE.
30	Public Safety Officers have been known to exceed their authority in the past and could potentially do more damage then good if they were armed. Additionally, few critical incidents involving a "shooter" or hostage situation are likely to be solved by a public safety officer with a hand gun; the situation would call for tactical deployment of an organized police agency with special weapons and tactics. OHSU is unlikely to have the budget for public safety to have the advanced training, certifications and equipment of a bona fide police agency. A police response would be fast; within a few minutes, typically. Waiting for real police to arrive and initiate a tacial response would be better then having public safety officers opening fire on a college campus with handguns.
31	I am an Oregon police officer, and I feel it's absolutely horrific that university officers are unarmed in this state. I feel it's the same as giving a firefighter all the needed equipment for his or her job, except water. To put it in perspective, think about how many students at educational institutions have been killed or injured by fire in the last 20 years? How many have been killed or injured due to campus violence in that same time period? We don't think anything of equipping a campus with smoke alarms, sprinkler systems, fire resistant building materials, fire extinguishers, etc. At the same time we are not giving uniformed officers the ability to protect themselves and community members when the worst happens. This is absurd! Unarmed, uniformed public safety officers provide only a false sense of security. They are nothing but targets. Please read the research by Lt Col David Grossman on this very subject. He is a nationally recognized expert on school violence. Some of his information can be found at <a href="http://www.killology.com">www.killology.com</a> .
32	The world is complex. More Good guys with guns are necessary. It's amazing the security crew at OHSU isn't armed right now --- they should be.
33	OHSU is such an overwhelmingly large facility that it seems you would need to have an army of officers onsite to cover the entire campus. Our daughter spent 3 weeks in the critical care unit there and as a female parent having to walk alone in the dark many times to the Ronald McDonald house, I have to say it was a bit scary at times. Now a days with so many kooks running amok are you really safe anywhere?

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
34	<p>I am very glad that OHSU has decided to take this matter up and begin making some decisions that affect the long term safety of their patients, employees and service providers. Because if a critical incident happens (like an active shooter), the only people that will be in place to immediately confront the criminal individual who is committing those acts will be the OHSU Security officers, or anyone with a Concealed Handgun Permit who is carrying their pistol with them. Training these officers, maintaining their certification and equipping them properly is a small investment compared to the HUGE investment that OHSU would have to make in the event of a lawsuit filed by patients, employees and service providers or their families who may be injured, killed, or traumatized in just such an incident, knowing that the University had the opportunity to put people and policies in place, yet did not. In addition, having these trained and properly equipped officers on patrol and being highly visible provides a visible and quantifiable deterrent to anyone who may wish to commit an act of madness such as we have seen elsewhere. It has been my experience that criminals do not like to confront armed public safety officers on a frequent basis. These security officers would also provide a “force multiplier” for officers responding to just such an incident. This would coincide with training the Portland Police Bureau could provide to the OHSU Security officers as to what their response would be, along with what their expectations would be of OHSU officers, should they both be involved in something like this. I think it is a great idea and it should be implemented immediately.</p>
35	<p>I think it is important to have the officers that work there armed because they are the ones that will be the primary responders, not the Portland Police. Even if PPB was to respond they would still need to be guided by an OHSU Officer to the incident involving a weapon. Most incidents involving weapons are usually over within a matter of minutes, so PPB would not have enough time to respond to someone who is shooting. I believe in the long run it would be more cost effective to arm the OHSU officers instead of contracting PPB. If the OHSU officers are armed it would help to give them full Police authority to cut out any grey area.</p>
36	<p>I think our safety ultimately comes down to a training issue. If the security staff are intelligent, well-trained and thoughtful, the environment will be more secure. Guns will not accomplish the same level of safety.</p>
37	<p>I just don't feel it necessary to have armed officers on campus.</p>
38	<p>As a trauma intensive care nurse and faculty member at OHSU, I am deeply concerned about dangerous incidents like those at other universities. However, I think the low likelihood of an incident requiring firepower favors not arming our public safety officers. The benefits do not outweigh the costs.</p>
39	<p>Tasers are sufficient. Generally "campus police" exist where there are students living on campus - we do not have that situation.</p>
40	<p>If OHSU Public Safety receives the same training to meet the same standards that the local and state police receive to be armed there is no reason why these folks should not be the armed presence at OHSU. They will no the area and the community better than any local or state police. It is important though that OHSU does not lose the community service that public safety currently provides. Just because an officer is armed does not mean they can't jump start a car or unlock a door. Just because they are armed does not mean that they will have less time to conduct these services, it just means they will be better prepared to deal with an armed subject.</p>
41	<p>OHSU, and all OSU schools NEED campus police</p>
42	<p>while I think it wise to review readiness, clarify authority and expand certain police powers I think it would be a very poor decision to arm our public safety staff. As a health organization we banned smoking on campus because it is not healthy and does not support a healthy environment. Guns are not healthy either and having guns on campus would be in direct opposition to our mission.</p>



**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
43	I work in HRC and was concerned about the reaction " time" i.e. how long would the officers take to respond if I actually had to "Page Dr. Strong". I have been fearing lately for my safety as we've had a person harrassing us in order to volunteer in the department.
44	I've been here for over 25 years and there have been no significant events so far. we are minutes from downtown and a police station and could have a significant presence here in minutes. having guns invites them to be used. other measures are used on psychotic pts now would the next step be to shoot them?
45	Armed personel and pateints don't mix, someone will get killed and OHSU will look like thugs
46	If we can be tobacco free ... We can be gun free
47	the person who carries firearms needs to be well trained
48	I would also support dogs here. They could help protect and be a calming influence on patients and families.
49	Please avoid contract security like Blackwell Forces.
50	The public safety officers that I've had contact with are excellent. A few more of them per shift would be good.
51	I am not sure that armed guards are the answer to security issues... Sometimes this can escalate problems. I feel fairly safe at work, my only concerns are theft from my office (and the suite our department occupies, but I keep mine locked if I'm not there), and I have encountered desperate patients or other visitors who have acted angry and inappropriately, but never directed toward anyone in particular. I think it would be better to have security people trained in mediation and/or psychology (and paid a higher rate) who dress in clothes that are not anything like police uniforms and are hired to decelerate instances like the ones I have mentioned.
52	Improve communications between local police and campus security rather than adding guns to the mix.
53	What about making sure people aren*t carrying objects when they come on board to ohsu through our portals?
54	A number of people I have talked to have indicated their preference to have the public safety officers keep weapons in a locked area, and only access them when necessary. I believe that would help with concerns about the feeling that is created with continuous arming of the public safety group - and the potential that arms may be used when they aren't needed. It appears that weapons are needed infrequently enough that this option might work.
55	I think it is wise to plan ahead for emergencies, however prevention must be addressed as well. My mother-in-law was recently at Kaiser Sunnyside following an operation. In the evening, visitors were required to check in the front desk. This required showing ID (drivers license) and wearing a name badge. Whether or not I was actually safer I felt safer going through the halls. Here at OHSU when I have been on campus after hours, there have been a few times I did not feel safe.
56	I guess my concern is that so often our door shuts and no one knows why...There are times I feel there could be something going on and we wouldn't bother. It is not that I don't feel safe, but this place is so large and there are such unusual characters, I think Safety is quite important in an insitute this large...A lot goes on and I am not sure if I wasn't in my office, where would I go...
57	We do not need armed security officers at OHSU. Having additional weapons on campus will not prevent a tragedy similar to Virginia Tech.



**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
58	This is a huge mistake to 1. compare us to Univ of Iowa and 2. to think about arming our PSOs; the liability and opportunity for tragic outcomes is great.
59	Don't OHSU security officers currently carry tazers ?Is their an example of a security situation on OHSU's campus that has required the use of a tazer. If so would a handgun proved more efficient in that situation?
60	Much of the response to the widely publicized university or school shootings involved "SWAT" teams or the like, which are special units trained in the response to these kinds of incidents. I do not think arming OHSU public safety officers results in the same kind of protection as trained responders who have automatic weapons at their disposal. I adamantly oppose arming any kind of contractual security people; I believe they are not trained nor reliably screened for employment.
61	i think that the CHH building is not really in this. There does not seem to be much of a presence down here.
62	Our public safety works really hard to avoid use of force. They are great at de escalation and dealing with patients and staff as well. Tazers should be the maximum. Despite events at schools, I think the daily risks (accidents, misfires, etc.) outweigh the benefits (being in right place at right time once in a random decade). Does U of O and OSU and Portland state have armed personell? Does St. V's? I think organizing a plan to enlist Portland public police in emergency would be good. I have only had to call PPD once in my over 20 yrs here. Public safety I feel is on the team to support our mission and goals. Having guns I don't think is in the mission or safety goals. If this task force insists on militarizing the campus, I would hope that they would develop a 2 tier system. One that would respond to outside "attack" and one that currently exists to help and respond to staff and patients in need. And who is going to pay for all this extra "safety"? I'm sure it would cost more. I'm more worried about the earthquake that is going flatten the old building I am in than some random act of violence that happened 2 years ago. Please reconsider arming OHSU.
63	While I understand the possible need to arm security officials on campus in case of an incident needing fire arms, guns in general make me uncomfortable and would probably make me feel uncomfortable to an extent on campus.
64	I feel most comfortable with OHSU public safety officers carrying the firearms only provided that they go through at least as much training, psychological testing, and background checks as the Portland Police do.
65	I have been an employee here since 2002 and have not personally experienced or heard about any safety issues that would require OHSU public safety officers to carry firearms. I would expect that the Portland Police to be involved if an armed intervention was needed.

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
66	<p>I have (and our community should too) two major concerns with the carrying of live firearms at OHSU. The first is the obvious concern; guns kill people. In fact, there have been nearly as many bad fatal shootings as good by the PPD in the past three years. Having a gun implies the necessity to use it for many peace officers, and unfortunately that sometimes results in innocent people getting killed. Second, most of the bad (unarmed/misinformed) shooting fatalities in which the PPD have been involved in the past 3 years have been with individuals who are mentally unstable. We are a HOSPITAL... there are literally hundreds of mentally unstable patients on campus EVERY SINGLE DAY. In fact, we may have the largest concentration of mentally unstable people on the hill per square foot than any other spot in PDX. Although I do understand and appreciate the importance of keeping the employees and patients at OHSU safe, you must realize that these particular patients can be irrational, may not listen to instructions given by a peace officer, and may actually be violent but not violent enough to necessitate an act of deadly force. A Taser is easily enough force to bring down most who might meet these criteria; why would a peace officer need a gun? Finally, there have not (to my knowledge) been any incidents in which armed police officers on campus might have been useful. In fact, I would go so far as to say that perhaps some of the incidents in which officers have found it necessary to use force over diplomacy might have ended in a death, instead of an arrest.</p> <p>Thankyou for your time. -Daniel Schwartz</p>
67	<p>I am for it as long as the cost is reasonable. It might be best to delay the implementation until the impact due to the recession/depression is understood.</p>
68	<p>I'm concerned about the principle of escalation. If our officers are armed, then anyone who is going to do harm will then up what they carry, which then leads to officers carrying heavier weaponry, etc. Unless someone is thoroughly trained in usage, both mentally and skillwise of weapons, there will also be the temptation to resort to using the weapons, when negotiation or lesser actions sufficient. The right to write traffic tickets is one thing (I support that) but the carrying of firearms brings both a capability and responsibility that I'm not confident that we are ready to deal with.</p>
69	<p>Question #1: I know there have been break-ins and thefts but I didn't realize there have been the kinds of problems that require OHSU to have an "armed presence". Maybe it's not as safe as I thought!</p>
70	<p>Having contract security or OHSU public safety armed with guns is not a good idea.</p>
71	<p>With our current financial landscape, this idea should be back-burnered if not entirely discarded. In order to do this in a responsible fashion, we would need to spend money on the following 1) send personnel to a series of firearms safety courses - Basic Safety and some of the other courses police officers take 2) we would need to provide them with access to a firing range, and require minimum monthly hours training at it 3) we would need to purchase and insure the weapons, and provide a safe holding place for them We have tightened our belts in every department in the name of healthcare. I cannot get behind doing so in order to provide a means of shooting people. This is not what our workplace is about.</p>
72	<p>I feel having armed public safety officers would increase the risk of injury particularly in the hospital setting where the people coming through can be unpredictable. I feel guns can exacerbate a potentially volatile situation. I can't think of any instance in the ED or TICU where a gun would be necessary. If the situation warranted it I feel the Portland police could respond in a timely manner.</p>
73	<p>I believe that tasers and other less lethal options should be employed by OHSU safety officers. While I do believe everyone has the right to bear arms, I do not think the safety level at OHSU requires the officers to carry guns. I guess it comes down to justification. Sure they can carry the weapons, I don't think it I will feel more safe and I don't think that safety should be the reason for the policy change.</p>

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
74	The Virginia Tech argument is simplistic at best and fear-mongering at worst. OHSU should set a better example for the community. A greater presence of potentially deadly weapons is not the answer. In fact, the day-to-day risk it introduces is greater than the risk it protects against. We can do better than this.
75	I do not feel that weapons are a necessary component of security at OHSU.
76	They once had weapons and due to a incident theywere taken away from them,they would be dangerous if they were armed,due to so many persons on campus,and portland police are very close,and could respond in a very short time,and they are trained in lethal force
77	I believe that choice 3 of question 3 is not a good idea. I have worked at OHSU for many years and will be honest in stating that I have found your work group less than professional on many occasions. The idea of some of your current staff having a live firearm is more alarming. Please allow the professionals to carry the firearms.
78	Armed public safety officers is the only smart, preventive way to ensure that OHSU is prepared in the event of something tragic like Virginia Tech. Without firearms, how will public safety officers respond, by throwing rocks?
79	Leave the guns in the hands of the POLICE only! The fewer guns on the OHSU campus the better.
80	I think guns will not make anyone feel safer. How much will we spend on training, guns, additional pay, additional certifications, additional insurance, etc for what? Why not hire a couple more security officers instead?
81	I would be very nervous about contract or private-paid security being armed because they do not have safeguards like our public servants do. I would rather have local or state police armed b/c they have safety reviews and have better oversight against the corruption of their force.
82	OHSU public safety officers are already law enforcement personnel. This is a total no-brainer. Arming your public safety officers will simply be providing them with the tools necessary to do their job safely and effectively.
83	I don't feel like I have a good enough sense of the depth of risk that exists for not only the staff and patients at the hospital, but also for the security themselves and what advantage would be had by arming the security staff. Is there a possibility that their being armed could actually put others at higher risk than currently?
84	Please make this campus safer.
85	Can't the Portland police be called if there is an incident on campus? The thought of having armed security on campus is really scary. I've never heard of a school doing that. I think it would be more likely that someone would get hurt if security officers had guns than if they didn't. Please don't do this!
86	having public safety officers or contract security would make me feel less safe. I don't think they would be trained enough to provide the illusion of safety.
87	I feel very strongly that our current Public Safety officers should NOT carry firearms. In my experience they have been quick to escalate situations and I believe lack the professional training to be able to make prudent decisions re: the use of firearms. I would feel very nervous knowing they were armed. Please don't arm them, use local or state police if need be.
88	Having watched OHSU public safety officers' handling of events over the years, I would be more fearful if they were armed...they often escalate situations rather than de-escalate them!

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
89	I believe that police would be the best candidates for our overall security as their foundational training includes use of deadly force. My opinion of OHSU security officers hasn't impressed me, most of them don't demonstrate the mental capacity for threat assessment and subsequent actions that may include firearms. Scary thought. It would be great to have real cops with real skills, real training and full range of really big badass guns to deal with every contingency, especially terrorists.
90	Local or state police because they already have the training.OHSU public safety because they know the area better.If public safety were to get firearms they should go through the police academy school for training,also a class on when they should pull there weapon.they should have to meet all requirements of carrying a gun and shooting one.when a gun is discharged there should be an off campus review board of 3 or 5 people to do the investigating to determine if the firing of the gun was justified.the officer or officers should be put on administraction leave until the board reaches a decision.there should be a 6mo or 1yr requirement for every officer including the captains that they meet a firing range test and being questioned by the review board on their performance for the last 6mo or yr.
91	Even in the event it is decided to have armed officers on campus, we would be well served if Public Safety (or a contractor) offered personal safety classes. I am not talking about "self-defense" courses as they are generally understood, but more of a class revolving around personal situational awareness, critical thinking and good judgement in crisis situations.
92	I would not like to see loaded firearms on the OHSU campus.
93	I feel the facilities are "Safe" but they're far from "Secure". People can access just about any area they want - without having ID badges checked. I have been around firearms my whole life. The more accessible they are, the more problems there are with them.
94	Only people who are accustomed with being armed should be armed. Anyone armed at a hospital must be extremely cautious and trained about operating in a hospital setting. The key to safety is not firepower but intelligence and prevention (ie, disasters can be foreseen and prevented).
95	I support am in support of an armed presence at OHSU.
96	I would like to be able to carry my concealed wepon
97	I believe that having armed presence would be a help and could be life saving. The campus is so convoluted and far from the bottom of the hill, if something were to happen, it would be difficult to find the situation taking precious time away from apprehending the perpetrator. I know that I would feel better walking around in the dark if there was someone armed that could come to my rescue if I was threatened or physically assaulted.
98	I do not believe there is a need to have a permanent armed presence at OHSU.
99	Can you imagine what would happen if one of our safety officers shot someone? The incredible fallout for our staff, campus, and reputation? We are a resourceful, intelligent group here with more than enough sharp objects to go around. Don't underestimate the power that is our community. Don't buy into the fear that media reports can incite. I grew up around guns. I am quite comfortable around them when they are at the range, when they are carried by police, and when they are unloaded and locked away at home. However, I would be frightened on a daily basis by seeing members of OHSU staff walking around up here with guns.

**CIRTF Survey Question #4: Do you have any additional comments about the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force you would like to share?**

	A
100	Since events over the past few years have deemed the OHSU Critical Incident Readiness Task Force a necessity, and with the possibility of arming OHSU Public Safety with firearms, OHSU needs to reconsider policy 07-90-030, Section 1, in relation to Law Enforcement and Concealed Handgun License (CHL) holders. I would like to see OHSU policy changed to allow off-duty Law Enforcement Agents the ability and the authority to open and concealed carry on OHSU premises, as well as including State of Oregon Concealed Handgun License holders. The policy should include that permission is granted only as long as applicable local, state and federal laws are followed. So many times OHSU elaborates to the community that seconds matter in a medical emergency. The same is true for an institutional emergency: Like Virginia Tech, OHSU is a large campus. Public Safety can not be everywhere at all times. While you consider arming public safety, I also strongly urge you to consider updating Policy 07-90-030.
101	I would like to see the current public safety officers be trained through the standard Police academy and then be deputized through the 'county or state police. I saw this approach used at the university of Michigan and even though there was some resistance in the end the program has worked extremely well. I am in favor of arming public safety officers.
102	I'm glad we are looking at this carefully. I am unsure if I think an armed presence would be helpful or not.
103	local or state police are best suited to this task
104	This is a waste of money - bureaucrats always create committees for this and that. I would be more afraid of the totally unqualified "Bryman School for Law Enforcement Types" (or similar daytime TV add colleges) graduates carrying guns around - it is bad enough that they armed better than Batman right now. This is a small campus geographically. Foot patrols should be common here - an actual physical presence - not cruising in brand new, unnecessary "cop cruisers" two at time. But common sense to bureaucrats is anathema.
105	I do not feel that arming OHSU security makes us safer - in many instances having an armed presence makes things worse - I would look at the research.
106	It is already pretty apparent that the reality is that the Police can't protect you, me or anyone else. That is why the state of Oregon, is a shall issue concealed handgun license state. Why on earth would OHSU violate state law and ban concealed carry? Then turn around, and seek a right that is already guaranteed through application and training via the state? If OHSU wants this right? It should respect the law as written to preserve this 2nd amendment right just like everyone else, so it doesn't become a mockery of hoops to jump through like you are experiencing now!!
107	If the campus public safety officers are to carry arms they should have to attend the police academy or receive comparable training so that they know what they are doing. Frankly, a two week fire arms course would make me fear for my safety at work.
108	I think officers armed with firearms could potentially do more harm than good. If it is approved, they need much more training and emphasis on how serious and dangerous it is to use a firearm in a hospital setting.
109	The presence of weapons, the sole purpose of which is to inflict harm, seems antithetical to both the Hippocratic oath and to the mission of OHSU. Non-violence preparedness training would be less expensive, less injurious, and more efficacious.
110	Overall, I think adding guns in a place where many children and sick people come for care is a poor idea. In these difficult economic times, I hope the administration will focus resources on the true mission of the university - teaching and healing - and not on arming security officers.
111	I would like to see a campus wide emergency response plan for all employees. Helping to protect one another and ourselves in an emergency is very key also!

## Attachment 7: CIRTF Internal Message Responses

Tone	Question/Concern
neutral	<b>Question/Concern</b>
neutral	OHSU needs more internal support for its mission
neutral	Car stolen. How about installing cameras in parking garages and blue light safety booths?
positive	Appreciate efforts to make campus safer.
positive	Armed officers only with proper training.
negative	Violation of smoking policy, feels public safety can't handle this, then why should they be trusted with guns
neutral	Do we have panic buttons on campus like PSU?
negative	More likely that someone would be shot in error, Portland Police Bureau is enough.
neutral	Can we be part of the OUS cell phone emergency notification system?
positive	Retired military, doesn't like guns, but realizes the necessity of arming hospital security personnel. Works in VA, VA has guns
positive	Public safety should be trained and equipped with guns
neutral	If you've read the Art of War and seen A Few Good Men, then this email might make sense. I think it says public safety should have guns, but we shouldn't tell anyone.
neutral	Would like to join task force
negative	No guns on campus. Too many deaths of mentally ill by law enforcement already.
positive	Public safety should have guns, but shouldn't carry them routinely.
negative	Public safety is already well equipped.
neutral	How would armed public safety officers at VT and NIU have helped?
neutral	Would like to join task force.
negative	No guns please.
neutral	Recent victim of violence at OHSU, who is on task force, where can concerns be addressed?
neutral	How can I be on the task force?
neutral	Been a victim of violence at OHSU. Concerns about public safety's ability to respond to all areas of campus.
neutral	Glad the issue has been raised, surprised the discussion did not arise sooner following VT. The causes of these events need to be studied and preventive action taken. Similar events in Europe rare, possibly because of strict regulations regarding possession of weapons.
positive	Gun-free zones at schools do not work. Strongly believes armed guards should be on Marquam Hill and at waterfront facilities.
negative	Opposed to arming public safety officers. Could increase liability and potential for tragic outcomes.
positive	Would feel safer knowing armed officers on hand. Pleased the issue has been raised.
neutral	Communication process and failures needs to be addressed. Under the impression some public safety officers are already armed.

**Attachment 7: CIRTF Internal Message Responses**

negative	Guns will not have a positive impact of staff, patients or visitors, would rather spend the money on additional public safety officers to increase safety.
negative	Greatly opposed to arming public safety officers. OHSU should focus resources on mental health and well-being of our population. Guns will not improve outcomes of patients or encourage a healthy environment that is needed to succeed as a health care professional.

**positive            7**  
**neutral/other    14**  
**negative            8**

## ATTACHMENT 8: Votes on Recommendations

### *Vote on Recommendation 1*

*Without regard to the question of whether its public safety officers should be armed, should OHSU seek a change to state statute to clarify the roles and authorities of OHSU public safety officers?*

<b>Name</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b><u>Abstain</u></b>
Ginny Burdick	X		
Margie Lowe		X	
Bruce Starr	X		
Timothy Moore	X		
Jane Ames			
Carmen Merlo	X		
Olga Acuna	X		
Susan Egnor	X		
Ken Love			
Mike Reese	X		
Allen Zaugg	X		
Barbara Glidewell	X		
Marcus Mundy	X		
Sandra McDonough	X		
Susan Cox	X		
Carol Howe	X		
Nina Katovic	X		
Mike Bandy	X		
Harold Fleshman	X		
Steven Scott	X		
Nancy Haigwood	X		
Román Hernández	X		
Martha McMurry	X		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>1</b>	



**Vote on Recommendation 2**

*Should a full-time armed law enforcement presence be established at OHSU in order to provide a faster response to an active shooter incident, provided that all the conditions listed below are met?*


- All armed officers have completed the 16-week DPSST academy.
- All armed officers complete supplemental OHSU campus public safety training.
- All armed officers complete 40-hour Critical Incident Training developed and conducted by the Portland Police Bureau.
- All armed officers complete Cultural Awareness Training.
- An official OHSU review process is established to review any use of a firearm by an OHSU officer.
- A commitment to on-going training in firearms proficiency, proper use of force, and joint critical incident training with Portland Police Bureau and other law enforcement agencies.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Abstain</b>
Ginny Burdick	X		
Margie Lowe	X		
Bruce Starr	X		
Timothy Moore	X		
Jane Ames			
Carmen Merlo	X		
Olga Acuna	X		
Susan Egnor		X	
Ken Love			
Mike Reese	X		
Allen Zaugg	X		
Barbara Glidewell	X		
Marcus Mundy	X		
Sandra McDonough	X		
Susan Cox	X		
Carol Howe	X		
Nina Katovic			X
Mike Bandy	X		
Harold Fleshman	X		
Steven Scott	X		
Nancy Haigwood	X		
Román Hernández			X
Martha McMurry			X
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>

# OHSU PEACE OFFICER TRAINING TIMELINE

CURRENT OHSU OFFICERS

TRAINEE OFFICERS



## **ATTACHMENT 10: Mental Health Community Involvement**

When forming the task force, Dr. Robertson wanted to include the viewpoints of as many stakeholders as possible who might be affected by changes to the current armed response at OHSU facilities. Dr. Robertson understands that the OHSU patient population includes many individuals who suffer from a mental illness and specifically wanted to include a representative from the mental health advocacy community on the task force.

David Delvallee, at the time Executive Director of the National Alliance on Mental Illness Oregon (NAMI), accepted an appointment to the task force on August 26, 2008. Mr. Delvallee did not attend the August 26 or September 26 meetings of the task force, and did not reply to e-mails. When task force staff attempted to contact Mr. Delvallee by phone on October 13, they were informed that Mr. Delvallee was no longer with NAMI. At that time a request was made for another person from NAMI to take a seat on the task force and an e-mail request was sent to Acting Executive Director Margaret Brayden asking that a representative from NAMI testify before the task force at the public input meeting to be held on October 23. Ms. Brayden indicated that she would consult with her board and let the task force know who might attend the meeting.

On the afternoon of October 23 staff received a phone from Ms. Brayden indicating that NAMI would not be sending a representative to the public input meeting and suggesting several other groups and individuals who might be better suited to represent the views of the mental health advocacy community. Because of the short notice, no representative from the mental health advocacy community was able to give testimony at the October 23 task force meeting.

Ms. Brayden did send an e-mail to several mental health advocacy groups around the state on October 23. In response to that e-mail, Jason Renaud of the Mental Health Association of Portland wrote an e-mail to Dr. Robertson that expressed in clear terms that his organization was not in favor of firearms being present at OHSU facilities under any circumstances. Staff contacted Mr. Renaud and offered to conduct a briefing for him on the activities of the task force but the offer was declined. Staff attempts to find other advocates who might be interested in providing testimony, or receiving a briefing of the task force's process were unsuccessful.

The *Portland Tribune* published an article on November 6 titled "Safety concerns prompt OHSU to mull gun rules" that quoted both Ms. Brayden and Mr. Renaud. The article summarized the points of view of Ms. Brayden and Mr. Renaud - that members of the mental health advocacy community are opposed to firearms at OHSU facilities. This article, along with a verbal summary from staff of the comments received from the mental health advocacy community and their opposition to firearms at OHSU, was presented to the task force before the work session held on November 6. In her opening remarks to the November 6 work group meeting, Sen. Burdick noted that there were concerns expressed by members of the mental health advocacy community that needed to be weighed against the need for a faster response to an active shooter incident.